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Abstract
How do people make decisions in uncertain environments and what types of knowl-
edge control their choices? Can our decisions be guided by unconscious influences or
intuitive “gut” feelings? According to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, a popular account
of the role of affect in decision-making, emotion-based signals can guide our decisions in
uncertain environments outside awareness. However, evidence for this claim can be ques-
tioned on the grounds of inadequate and insensitive assessments of conscious knowledge.
In this work, variations of a classic experience-based decision-making paradigm, the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), are employed in combination with subjective measures of
awareness in order to investigate the role played by unconscious influences. Specifically,
the validity of post-decision wagering as a sensitive and bias-free measure of conscious
content is examined and contrasted to confidence ratings and quantitative reports. The
results demonstrate the inadequacy of post-decision wagering as a direct measure of
conscious knowledge and also question the claim that implicit processes influence decision-
making.
In order to measure and understand the cognitive and psychological processes un-
derlying performance on the IGT, computational modeling analyses are undertaken to
provide deeper insights into the dynamics of decision-making. Reinforcement-learning
models are evaluated using different model comparison techniques and a computational
model of confidence ratings in decision-making under uncertainty is developed.
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1 Introduction
How do people make decisions and adjust their behaviour in uncertain environments
and what types of knowledge control their choices? The study of human decision-making
has relied on two broad categories of experimental tasks: Description-based tasks in which
information about the possible courses of actions is available (probabilities and monetary
outcomes of an action) and experience-based tasks in which probabilities and outcomes
have to be learned by observing or exploring the different alternatives (e.g., Hertwig,
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Koritzky & Yechiam, 2010).
In description-based tasks, participants make decisions by choosing between two
(or more) verbal descriptions of available options. Each description/option consists of a
monetary outcome (e.g., $5) and a probability (e.g., 𝑝 = 0.4) of this outcome to occur. A
typical instantiation of this paradigm includes two options (Figure 1.1–d): a safe option
which provides a medium magnitude outcome with certainty (𝑝 = 1), and a risky option
which produces a high magnitude outcome with a probability 𝑝 and a low magnitude
outcome with probability 1− 𝑝 (Erev et al., 2010).
In decisions from experience, participants are presented with a number of options
(usually two) and are asked to choose from any option they want in order to maximise
their overall profit. This paradigm has usually been employed in three different variations:
in the partial-information paradigm (Figure 1.1–a) participants only receive feedback on
the selected option (obtained payoff) whereas in the full-information paradigm (Figure
1.1–b) they receive feedback on both the selected and the unselected options (foregone
payoff). In both paradigms only the obtained payoffs contribute to the overall sum of
points/payoffs. A third variation (the sampling paradigm) allows participants to sample
15
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from the available options as long as they wish and then make a single decision between
the options (Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
The repeated nature of the experience-based paradigm allows a number of impor-
tant questions to be examined, relating to how much people explore the environment
before they exploit the most profitable options and what factors affect this trade-off, the
role of cognitive processes such as memory and learning in updating the value of each
option, and economic factors which shape decision strategies (see Rakow & Newell, 2010).
Also, experience-based tasks permit a more insightful examination of individual differ-
ences in cognitive processes and the application of computational models in an attempt
to decompose and explain these underlying cognitive and psychological processes (e.g.,
Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Erev & Barron, 2005; Erev et al., 2010).
time
2 4
2 0
2 4
2 4
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2 0
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2 4
time
4
0
2
4
2
0
2
4
100
100
100 
-1250
50
50
50 
-250
100 
-150
50 
-25
time
A B C DA BA B
a) b) c)
Choose between: 
A: 2! ! with certainty (100%) 
or 
B: 4! ! with probability 60%!
C: 0  with probability 40%  
d)
Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of decisions from experience (a,b, and c) and description
(d). a) Partial-information, b) Full-information, c) The Iowa Gambling Task.
Traditionally, decision research has focused on how people make decisions based
on description and experience and how they process and combine values and their asso-
ciated probabilities. Different formal and descriptive theories of decision-making assume
different integration of values and probabilities. For example, expected value (EV) theory
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dictates a linear combination of values and probabilities for each option whereas expected
utility (EU) theory assumes linear probabilities but non-linear value functions for each
option. Finally, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) assumes non-linear func-
tions and transformations for both values and probabilities associated with each option
(see Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011).
In recent years several theories have emerged which deviate from normative mod-
els and formal theories of decision-making, focusing more on affective and emotional
processes that support decision-making under uncertainty (e.g., Dolan, 2002; Finucane,
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers &
McGraw, 2001; N. Schwarz, 2000). This work has drawn attention to the impact of affect
by pointing out that automatic and rapid emotional reactions may serve as input to the
decision-making process.
1.1 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
In the popular TV series “House of Cards”, the resourceful soon-to-be Vice President
of the USA, Frank Underwood, is taking a walk in the woods near St. Louis, Missouri.
His companion is Raymond Tusk, a friend of the President and a billionaire industrialist
who specialises in nuclear power and owns quite a few nuclear power plants. Given the
President’s hesitation to provide strong support towards a full-scale reliance on nuclear
power, Raymond advocates that nuclear power is “the only option we have right now that
does not completely trash the planet. The argument against nuclear power is an emotional
one”. Frank blandly replies: “And you don’t make decisions based on emotion”. Raymond
takes a deep breath and with a condescending and disdainful tone (as if he was talking
to a little child) says to Frank: “Decisions based on emotion aren’t decisions at all. [They
are] Instincts...Which can be of value. The rational and the irrational complement each
other. Individually, they’re far less powerful.”
Raymond’s reply, that decisions based on emotion are of no practical value, reflects
the tendency which has dominated decision science, that is a focus on mathematical
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functional models, based on principles from economics and statistics (Weber & Johnson,
2009). Decision research neglected the influence of hot, emotional processes and relied
more on cold, reason-based explanations to study and investigate decision-making (Peters,
Va¨stfja¨ll, Ga¨rling, & Slovic, 2006). Emotion and affect were considered as “obstacles”
which bias people’s reasoning and cognitive processes. Despite the fact that affect has
played a major role in shaping a variety of social and behavioural theories, its role has
rarely been recognised as an important component of judgment and decision making
(Finucane et al., 2000). The emotions revolution of the past two decades has tried to
correct the focus on analytic and computational processes by showing the prevalence of
emotional processes as automatic and effort-free inputs that guide and motivate behaviour
(Weber & Johnson, 2009).
One popular account of the role of affect in reasoning and decision-making is the
Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) proposed by Damasio (1994, 1996). Initially, the
SMH was developed to explain deficits in patients with certain kinds of prefrontal brain
damage (ventromedial prefrontal cortex, VMPFC) who exhibit severe decision-making
impairments in social and personal domains while their cognitive and problem solving
abilities remain largely unimpaired (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Saver &
Damasio, 1991). Such patients also have difficulties in expressing emotional and affective
information. The SMH proposes that these deficits are connected and that decision-
making is regulated by neural biasing signals arising from emotion processing (for reviews
see Bechara, 2004; Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). These
signals can be marked as either positive or negative and are linked directly to bodily
states. When a negative somatic marker is associated with a possible response action, it
produces an avoidance reaction; on the other hand, a positive somatic marker indicates
that the response option is beneficial. In situations of uncertainty, these somatic markers
help guide behaviour by marking response alternatives with an emotional signal, thus
providing information useful for guiding the decision process (Damasio, 1994; but see
Davis, Love, & Maddox, 2009). Hence, the inability of VMPFC patients to integrate and
process emotional information leads to disadvantageous decision-making which can be
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described as risky, prone to short-term rewards, and insensitive to loss and long term
consequences (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994).
A major assumption regarding somatic markers is that they operate not only con-
sciously, when someone has accessible knowledge about the possible outcomes of a choice,
but also unconsciously (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel,
& Damasio, 1997). Specifically, in situations of high uncertainty, somatic markers can
guide individuals to make advantageous decisions or avoid disadvantageous ones even
when they are not explicitly aware of the quality or value of those decisions.
The question whether behaviour and decision-making can be influenced by un-
conscious “gut feelings” and “intuitive processes” has attracted considerable attention
within psychological science. The different formulations of this distinction (e.g., System
1 vs. System 2, implicit vs. explicit) have different functional attributes and procedural
features but also share some common characteristics. For example, System 1 is uncon-
scious, associative, effortless, and fast whereas System 2 is conscious, deliberative, and
rule-governed (see Kahneman, 2011). An important feature of System 1 is its reliance
on affective information or signals (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Hence
somatic markers (or emotional/affective biasing signals) can be seen as manifestations
of System 1, guiding people to make advantageous decisions in situations of uncertainty
and outside of awareness. Thus the main assumptions of the SMH fit readily within this
dichotomy of reasoning systems.
1.2 The Iowa Gambling Task
In order to test the SMH empirically, Damasio and colleagues developed a gambling
task (the Iowa Gambling Task, IGT) which attempts to simulate real-life decision-making
in a laboratory setting in the way it employs uncertainty, rewards and punishments
(Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). The IGT is one of the
most popular and frequently used paradigms in decision-making under uncertainty and
has become a standard screening tool for assessing decision-making deficits in a variety of
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clinical populations (Buelow & Suhr, 2009; Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann,
& Wagenmakers, 2013). It is a partial-information experience-based task (see Figure 1.1–
c) where participants receive feedback only from the options they select and this feedback
counts towards the total sum in the game. Participants choose repeatedly from a number
of options without having any prior knowledge about the magnitude and the distribution
of the outcomes. The ultimate goal in the task is to maximise the total winnings.
The original structure of the IGT consists of 4 decks of cards (labelled A-D) from
which 100 cards with different monetary payoffs are chosen without replacement. Par-
ticipants are given $2000 facsimile money as a loan and are instructed to pick one card
at a time from any deck they choose. They must learn that turning each card carries
an immediate reward: Selecting a card from the first two decks (A and B) yields $100
every trial, whereas selecting from the other two decks (C and D) yields $50 (see Table
1.1). Unpredictably, the turning of some cards also carries a penalty which is large in
the high reward decks A and B and small in the low reward decks C and D. Sampling
from decks A and B (bad or disadvantageous decks) leads to an overall loss (a net loss of
−$25 per card), whereas playing from decks C and D (good or advantageous decks) leads
to an overall gain (a net gain of +$25 per card). Another feature of the task is that the
probability of losses varies from deck to deck. In a selection sequence of 10 trials from
deck A, the loss of $1250 is distributed over 5 cards (loss probability 0.5; punishments
from $150 to $350). In deck B the punishment of $1250 occurs once, with the selection
of one card (loss probability 0.1). A similar pattern of losses is reflected in the other two
decks. Specifically, in deck C the $250 loss is divided across 5 cards (punishments from
$25 to $75) whereas in deck D, it occurs only once (Bechara et al., 1994).
Table 1.1: Payoff scheme of the Iowa Gambling Task.
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D
Gain per Card $100 $100 $50 $50
Loss per 10 Cards $1250 $1250 $250 $250
Net per Card −$25 −$25 +$25 +$25
Loss Probability 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1
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The IGT assesses decision making under uncertainty (or ambiguity), in the sense
that at the outset of the task participants are ignorant of the probabilities of gains and
losses (risks) associated with each deck. Experimental and neuroscience studies (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lee, 2013) have yielded considerable insight into the basic
mechanisms of decision making under risk (where the probabilities are known a pri-
ori, as in studies of description-based decision-making). Recently, research on decision-
making under uncertainty has provided insightful evidence about how people behave
when the probabilities and associated payoffs have to be learned by repeated sampling
(i.e., experience-based decision-making) and has identified significant behavioural differ-
ences between decisions based on description and experience (the description-experience
“gap”, see Erev & Barron, 2005; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In fact the
IGT may be best conceptualised as a hybrid of the two, in the sense that repeated choices
permit the payoff probabilities to be learned (Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara,
2007). Recent work has suggested that the brain systems engaged in decision-making
under risk and uncertainty may be largely overlapping (Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini,
& Glimcher, 2010).
In one of the first studies using the IGT, Bechara et al. (1994) showed that VMPFC
patients performed significantly worse than healthy participants. Over time, the healthy
control group learned to consistently select more cards from the good decks, whereas the
patient group continued to select from the disadvantageous decks for the duration of the
task. The behaviour of the patient group was guided by the higher immediate rewards
rather than the delayed punishments available on the disadvantageous decks. Bechara et
al. (1994) proposed the term myopia for the future to describe this behaviour. Their inter-
pretation relied on the somatic marker hypothesis: because of the inability of the VMPFC
patients to activate the somatic marker system, and integrate and process affective sig-
nals and information, their representations of future outcomes could not be marked with
positive or negative emotional value (valence) and thus could not be effectively accepted
or rejected.
Findings supporting the hypothesised role of somatic markers in decision-making
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come from several studies employing the IGT with VMPFC patients and normal controls
whose electrodermal responses were measured via skin conductance responses (SCRs)
as an index of emotional arousal or somatic markers (e.g., Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, &
Bechara, 2003; Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Dama-
sio, 1996). It has been argued that the VMPFC region involved in the processing of
emotion controls the modulation and generation of SCRs (Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, &
Dolan, 2000). SCRs generated during the task were divided into three categories: Reward
SCRs generated after selection of cards which yielded a reward (win), punishment SCRs
after cards which carried a punishment (loss), and anticipatory SCRs (aSCRs) prior to
any deck selection. Both patients and controls showed reward and punishment SCRs.
However, after a number of card selections the control group started to generate aSCRs
which were larger in anticipation of selections from the bad decks, while the lesion group
did not develop these responses. The main conclusion was that failure to activate the
somatic marker system leads to impaired task performance, consistent with the idea that
somatic markers play an important role in guiding decision-making in normal individuals
(see Damasio, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2003). Following this, Carter and Smith Pasqualini
(2004) reported that the stronger the aSCRs prior to disadvantageous choices, the greater
the success of participants in acquiring the advantageous strategy in the IGT (see also
Guillaume et al., 2009; Oya et al., 2005).
1.2.1 Deck selection patterns
Bechara et al. (1994) initially suggested that healthy participants begin to consis-
tently select the good decks after an exploration phase. The driving force for this selection
pattern is the overall expected values associated with each deck. In other words, decks
with a positive total outcome are selected more often compared to the ones with a neg-
ative outcome, regardless of other deck features that may affect decisions such as the
probability and magnitude of losses associated with each deck (see Figure 1.2–A). Re-
garding the latter, it was assumed that choices within good and bad decks were uniform,
suggesting that the frequency of losses is not important. The crucial point of these ob-
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servations is that healthy participants will always learn the advantageous strategy (i.e.,
select decks C and D) in a canonical and predictive manner.
However, it has also been observed that participants select cards from the decks
which produce rare losses. Many studies using the IGT have shown that participants
favoured the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D; 0.1 probability of a loss com-
pared to 0.5 on decks A and C) despite the fact that these losses are of greater magnitude
(see Figure 1.2–B; Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Lin, Chiu, Lee, & Hsieh, 2007; Yechiam
& Busemeyer, 2005). This effect has been observed not only in studies which have em-
ployed the traditional payoff scheme of the IGT but in other experience-based tasks
where participants underweight the occurrence of rare outcomes (e.g., Barron & Erev,
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004). It has also been found that participants select equally often
the good decks C and D and the bad deck B (B, C, and D pattern, Figure 1.2–C; e.g.,
Premkumar et al., 2008; Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, & Davis, 2005). This preference
in deck selections can be seen as a combination of the previous two patterns: participants
select decks on the basis of their overall expected value (good decks) and the rare losses
associated with deck B. Overall, the bad deck A is selected less often as its negative
expected value and the frequent losses it produces make it unattractive to participants.
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, et al. (2013) conducted a literature review on
IGT studies and concluded that the major assumptions relating to decision-making in
healthy participants are essentially invalid. Specifically, there is often no clear preference
for good over bad decks, choice behaviour is not uniform, and the usual exploration-
exploitation trade-off is rarely observed. Instead people seem to prefer the decks with
infrequent losses (decks B and D) with no explicit tendency to exploit the most reward-
ing options (decks C and D). Similarly, Horstmann, Villringer, and Neumann (2012)
concluded that the factors that influence performance on the IGT (in descending order
of importance) are: gain frequency, loss frequency, and overall expected value.
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Figure 1.2: Mean proportion of choices from each deck for different selection patterns.
1.3 IGT and conscious knowledge
1.3.1 Implicit learning and cognition
Implicit learning is a term coined by Reber (1967) to describe a kind of learning
or knowledge that one acquires without being conscious of it. How do we determine that
learning or knowledge is unconscious and what kinds of measures are used to discriminate
between mental states? In general, measures of awareness fall into two broad categories:
objective and subjective measures. Objective measures ask participants to make some
forced-choice discrimination related to the experimental task (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans,
Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008; Shanks, 2005), whereas subjective measures require partic-
ipants to report their internal state of awareness (Tunney & Shanks, 2003). Both tests
assess the degree to which a measure of performance on a task is related to reports of
mental states, meaning that a dissociation between performance and awareness indicates
unconscious learning.
The most common subjective measure is qualitative or descriptive verbal reports.
However, a problem that arises when participants are asked to verbally report their
awareness is that they may withhold information about the knowledge they possess based
on a criterion they have already set. For example, if participants have set a conservative
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criterion, then they would only choose to report knowledge held with high confidence and
therefore knowledge with low confidence may be withheld. Also, participants may report
knowledge unrelated to key features of the experimental task and their performance.
A commonly used alternative to verbal reports is confidence ratings (CR), in which
participants express their awareness in terms of how confident they feel that they have
given a correct answer (e.g., Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Sandberg, Tim-
mermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). Confidence ratings can be used with different
scales including binary, continuous, and percentage scales. In most variations “guess” or
“no confidence” are used to denote the lowest rating. Other subjective measures include
the perceptual awareness scale (PAS; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg et al., 2010),
in which participants respond on a 4-point scale about their subjective experience with
the task, and post-decision wagering (Persaud, Mcleod, & Cowey, 2007), in which par-
ticipants place monetary gambles on the correctness of their decisions.
Dienes et al. (1995) proposed two criteria for the assessment of conscious and un-
conscious processing when using subjective measures of awareness: the guessing criterion
and the zero-correlation criterion. According to the guessing criterion, participants pos-
sess some unconscious knowledge if their performance on a task is above baseline while
they claim to be guessing or having no knowledge (Dienes, 2004). In other words, if par-
ticipants’ performance is random, no kind of knowledge (conscious or unconscious) affects
their performance, but if they perform better than chance when claiming to be guessing,
then they possess some knowledge that they are not aware of (unconscious knowledge).
The zero-correlation criterion looks for correlations between performance and awareness
in a way that if any positive relationship emerges, it means that there is some conscious
knowledge which influences performance. If no relationship exists, knowledge is assumed
to be unconscious.
1.3.2 Measures of conscious knowledge in the IGT
A major issue concerning the IGT is at what stage in the task participants learn the
advantageous strategy and whether this knowledge is assisted by implicit or unconscious
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biasing signals. In a highly influential study, Bechara et al. (1997) proposed that normal
participants decide before knowing the advantageous strategy, meaning that they start to
select cards from the good decks before they have conscious knowledge that those decks
are the best. Tranel, Bechara, and Damasio (1999) suggested that conscious knowledge
alone is insufficient to explain advantageous performance in the IGT. Similarly, Peters
and Slovic (2000) used a variation of the IGT and concluded that affective processes have
an important role in decision-making and can influence choice independently of conscious
knowledge.
To assess participants’ knowledge about the task, Bechara et al. (1997) halted par-
ticipants after 20 trials, and then after every 10 trials and asked them, “Tell me all you
know about what is going on in this game” and “Tell me how you feel about the game”.
Analysis of their responses revealed that participants went through three periods before
they reached the conceptual period where they had a firm and explicit understanding
of the properties of each deck. In the hunch period participants developed a preference
for the good over the bad decks and generated aSCRs prior to selecting from the bad
decks but their verbal responses showed no confidence about this preference. The im-
portance of Bechara et al.’s claim about the existence of unconscious signals comes from
the pre-hunch period in which participants had experienced some losses but without
any conscious insights about what was going on in the task (in the earliest period, pre-
punishment, participants showed a preference for the bad decks before experiencing any
losses from them). The key finding was that aSCRs and card selections from the good
decks began in the pre-hunch period (though in fact this was not statistically significant)
and were sustained throughout the task indicating that implicit learning was taking place
prior to explicit understanding of the reward and punishment schedule for each deck. In
other words, Bechara et al. claimed that participants behave advantageously even when
their knowledge is still at the pre-hunch period, when their explicit conceptualisation of
which were the good and the bad decks had not yet developed.
This proposal about the role of unconscious influences in guiding behaviour in the
IGT has been extensively criticised on the basis of weaknesses in the method that Bechara
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and colleagues used to assess their participants’ knowledge. For example, many studies
in the implicit learning literature have shown that such broad questions as the ones
they employed often fail to identify all of the conscious knowledge that participants
have acquired in performing a task (Shanks, 2005; Shanks & St. John, 1994). Several
criteria that a reliable measure of awareness must satisfy have been elaborated, such as
reliability, relevance, immediacy, and sensitivity (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Newell &
Shanks, 2014). Bechara et al.’s (1997) assessment does not fulfil any of these criteria. For
instance, it is unlikely to be either sensitive (as participants may adopt a very conservative
reporting criterion) or relevant (as participants may concentrate on reporting task features
unrelated to deck value).
For the aforementioned reasons, Maia and McClelland (2004) developed a more
sensitive test of awareness in the form of a structured quantitative questionnaire. After
the first 20 card selections and then after every further 10 card selections, Maia and
McClelland asked their participants a number of questions in which they had to give
ratings on a scale from −10 to +10 concerning how good or bad they thought each deck
was and to provide justifications for their ratings. They also asked participants specific
questions about the expected wins and losses associated with each deck and their level of
confidence that they were aware of the best strategy to win in the game. Also, participants
were asked to report which deck they would choose if they could only select cards from
one of the decks for the rest of the game.
Using this assessment, Maia and McClelland (2004) found that advantageous per-
formance on the task was accompanied by accurate reports about the values of the decks.
They concluded that there is no support for the claims of Bechara et al. (1997) that
unconscious biases guide behaviour before conscious knowledge is acquired or that the
activation of unconscious somatic markers is necessary in order to perform advanta-
geously. Instead, deck selections in the IGT are driven by conscious knowledge about
the decks and by conscious strategies about how to maximise payoffs. Also, the early
awareness of the goodness and badness of each deck that Maia and McClelland observed
(after only 20 trials) means that aSCRs obtained on the IGT could have been generated
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by conscious knowledge of the deck payoffs rather than being causally involved in the
decision-making process (Dunn et al., 2006). Another interpretation of the high aSCRs
before disadvantageous card selections lies in the reward and punishment schedule. Be-
cause the amount of money both gained and lost for each card is on average much greater
for bad than for good decks, participants’ aSCRs would have been higher for bad decks
if they were expecting an immediate higher-magnitude reward (Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, &
Caramazza, 2002). The possibility that unconscious somatic biases are activated during
the task cannot be ruled out, but as Maia and McClelland pointed out, “there is no need
to invoke such biases to explain participants’ behaviour: verbal reports reflect consciously
accessible knowledge of the advantageous strategy more reliably and at least as early as
behaviour itself” (p. 16079).
Another divergence between the two studies concerns the trial at which the onset
of awareness occurred. Bechara et al. (1997) reported that participants started to have
some conscious knowledge on trial 50 on average (range 30-60) and the same finding
was reported by Maia and McClelland (2004) in their replication using Bechara et al.’s
assessment. However, using the more detailed quantitative questions described above,
Maia and McClelland’s participants were classified as aware of the difference between
good and bad decks even after the first 20 trials. This divergence suggests that the
measure employed by Maia and McClelland was considerably more sensitive in revealing
the conscious knowledge that participants acquired.
Similar findings have been reported from other studies which employed quantitative
and focused questions (e.g., Bowman, Evans, & Turnbull, 2005; Cella, Dymond, Cooper,
& Turnbull, 2007; Evans, Bowman, & Turnbull, 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Wagar
& Dixon, 2006). Bowman et al. (2005) assessed participants’ knowledge by asking them
to rate each deck in terms of how good or bad they felt it was. After the first 20 tri-
als, participants showed substantial awareness of which decks were good and bad and
their awareness discriminated the good from the bad decks better than their behavioural
performance did, replicating the results of Maia and McClelland (2004).
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1.3.3 Evidence for conscious processing
Dunn et al. (2006) suggested that there is little evidence to support the view that
deck contingencies are consciously impenetrable and what needs to be tested is whether
participants have an explicit understanding of the reward and punishment schedule or
whether they can merely discriminate the quality of the decks by attributing positive or
negative valances to each one. The important role of conscious knowledge in the IGT
is also supported by a study (Gutbrod et al., 2006) with amnesic patients whose deck
selections were no better than chance indicating that explicit task knowledge is essential
for shaping a behavioural preference towards the advantageous decks. Gutbrod et al. ar-
gued that the causal link between SCRs and behaviour “might not be straightforward
and that a lack of explicit task knowledge may be sufficient to explain why most of our
patients failed to acquire a behavioural preference in the IGT” (p. 1323). Similar find-
ings were also reported by Gupta et al. (2009) who suggested that declarative memory
plays a significant role in forming and updating the representation of rewards and punish-
ments associated with each deck. In addition, Stout, Rodawalt, and Siemers (2001) found
that IGT impairments in Huntington’s disease patients were significantly correlated with
explicit memory deficits.
In a recent study, Fernie and Tunney (2013) presented evidence suggesting that
autonomic activity or somatic markers are not important determinants of successful per-
formance on the IGT. They observed that conscious knowledge developed after approxi-
mately 40 trials and was correlated with advantageous deck selections. Their main results
showed that aSCRs did not discriminate between decks prior to the emergence of explicit
knowledge, while reward SCRs differentiated between good and bad decks only for those
participants who had already acquired some knowledge about the decks’ quality. Another
interesting finding relates to the punishment SCRs; these were found to be of greater
magnitude following larger losses from the bad decks in the initial stages of the task but
not after the emergence of knowledge, indicating that participants became aware that
the bad decks produce big losses.
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The previous findings highlight the importance of cognitive processes underlying
performance on the IGT and offer support for the view that emotional or affective signals
may not be as important as previously believed. Even though the involvement of emotion-
driven learning of the task structure and deck contingencies cannot be entirely ruled out
(see Wagar & Dixon, 2006), many studies have pointed out that the contribution of
emotional information is rather limited. For instance, the decision-making impairments
of VMPFC patients on the IGT can be explained by cognitive deficits (e.g., reversal
learning) rather than by any inability to generate emotional or somatic markers (Maia &
McClelland, 2005). When the reversal learning component is removed, VMPFC patients’
performance on the IGT is comparable to that of normal controls (Fellows & Farah,
2005).
1.3.4 Post-Decision Wagering
In order to avoid some of the complications associated with verbal reports, Persaud
et al. (2007) developed a novel non-verbal method of assessing awareness in the IGT in
which participants are required to place wagers after their card selections. Persaud et
al. characterised post-decision wagering as an objective and direct measure of awareness.
When a participant maximises her earnings through advantageous wagering (that is,
bets high after a correct decision and low after an incorrect one), this is taken to indicate
conscious knowledge about the task.
In Persaud et al.’s (2007) variation of the IGT, participants were asked to make
a wager $10 or $20 after each deck selection. The amount of reward, or of reward and
punishment, was expressed as a multiple of the chosen wager. The reward and punishment
schedule of each deck was modified in order to be dependent on wagering. Selections from
decks A and B (bad decks) yielded a win of 2 times the wager whereas selections from
decks C and D (good decks) returned the amount of the wager. The frequency of losses
was identical to the structure of the original IGT whereas the magnitude was adjusted
to reflect the ratio of losses to wins of the original IGT. The net outcome of choosing
from the bad decks was a loss of 5 times the average wager per 10 cards, and the net
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outcome from the good decks was a gain of 5 times the average wager per 10 cards.
Thus, the net outcome was either a win of $75 (good decks) or a loss of $75 (bad decks)
[((20+10)/2)×5] per 10 cards if participants randomly allocated their wagers (50% high,
50% low).
Persaud et al. (2007) investigated the influence of different modes of questioning in
parallel with deck selections and wagering in three different groups. The first group was
only asked to place a wager, whereas the second and third groups were also given the ver-
bal assessments of Bechara et al. (1997) and Maia and McClelland (2004), respectively.
Persaud et al. measured on which trial good deck selection and advantageous wager-
ing began and conjectured that if a significant difference (lag) between these measures
emerged, with deck selections revealing a preference for good decks before advantageous
wagering emerged, this would indicate an unconscious influence on decision-making. In
the first group (wagering only), good deck selection began on trial 40 and advantageous
wagering on trial 70. The difference between these was statistically significant and indi-
cated that participants showed a preference for the good decks while failing to maximise
their winnings by advantageous wagering. The same pattern was observed in the second
group in which participants were asked the open-ended questions used by Bechara et al.
Good deck selection started on trial 46 and advantageous wagering on trial 76. However,
using the quantitative questions of Maia and McClelland, there was an effect on wagering
even though performance on the task in terms of deck selections was similar to the other
two groups. Specifically, good deck selection began on trial 36 and advantageous wagering
at almost the same time (trial 38).
Persaud et al. (2007) interpreted these findings as demonstrating that the assess-
ment method can affect the knowledge that participants acquire during the IGT. While
performance (selecting the good decks) was unaffected, participants gained earlier insight
(as measured by wagering) about the reward and punishment schedule and the quality of
each deck when they were concurrently asked more specific quantitative questions about
the nature of the game. Indeed the onset of advantageous wagering was brought forward
by over 30 trials in the group that was periodically asked the Maia and McClelland (2004)
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quantitative questions. Persaud et al. proposed that Maia and McClelland’s assessment
method was intrusive and altered participants’ awareness and that performance on the
IGT is primarily affected by unconscious processes which are masked if the measure
of awareness itself makes participants aware of the nature of the task (also see Koch
& Preuschoff, 2007; Reimann & Bechara, 2010; Wang, Krajbich, Adolphs, & Tsuchiya,
2012).
Persaud et al. (2007) noted that “Simply asking people might seem a straightfor-
ward method, but they may deny awareness if the question asked does not relate to the
method they think they used to reach the decision” (p. 257) which is a reasonable cri-
tique of the open-ended questions used by Bechara et al. (1997). However, an intriguing
issue that arises from their own results is to examine the trial on which participants first
demonstrated awareness of the reward and punishment schedule. When no questions were
asked or when participants’ awareness was assessed by open-ended questions, advanta-
geous wagering - putatively a measure of awareness - appeared quite late in the task
(not before trial 70). This pattern, which Persaud et al. did not comment on, is strikingly
inconsistent with the studies described above which showed that higher awareness ratings
were given for the good decks even in the first 20 trials. Although some minor property
of the way they implemented the task or of their participants might have induced this
late sensitivity, it raises the important possibility that post-decision wagering is not as
sensitive and direct as Persaud et al. claimed.
1.3.4.1 Criticisms of post-decision wagering
Although post-decision wagering seems a well-grounded objective method, it has
been the subject of a number of methodological criticisms. First of all, the dichotomous
nature of post-decision wagering seems to presuppose that conscious experience is di-
chotomous as well (see Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006; Sandberg et al.,
2010). If conscious experience does not have this binary character then it is difficult to
ascertain when a participant is aware, as a low wager may not imply absence of awareness
(Wierzchon´, Asanowicz, Paulewicz, & Cleeremans, 2012). Overgaard (2011) noted that
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continuous scales or measures which have multiple response options may be more sensi-
tive than binary selections or ratings (but see Tunney & Shanks, 2003). Also, the type
of analysis that Persaud et al. (2007) used to demonstrate a dissociation between perfor-
mance and awareness has been criticised. Szczepanowski (2010) showed that absence of
advantageous wagering does not constitute absence of conscious awareness.
Another issue is the influence of loss aversion in wagering strategies. According to
prospect theory, humans have an asymmetric utility function; for example, the prospect
of losing $5 has greater subjective magnitude than that of winning the same amount of
money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Schurger & Sher, 2008). Empirical studies have
shown that losses are evaluated roughly twice as much as gains (e.g., De Martino,
Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997; Tom, Fox,
Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). Behavioural measures of awareness, such as post-decision wa-
gering, require participants to place a criterion about whether to wager high or low.
Hence, any response criterion may be modulated or affective by cognitive biases such as
loss aversion (Seth et al., 2008). This consideration is important to allow us to deter-
mine whether or not an individual is consciously aware. Specifically, the individual could
place a low wager in order to minimise loss even though she has some confidence in her
decision. In an artificial grammar study, Dienes and Seth (2010) employed two different
measures of conscious knowledge, confidence ratings and post-decision wagering. They
found that wagering was affected by loss aversion and that confidence ratings comprised
a more sensitive measure of awareness. Dienes and Seth concluded that wagering strate-
gies depend on how loss averse the individual is, meaning that post-decision wagering is
not an unbiased measure of conscious content (for a similar conclusion see Fleming &
Dolan, 2010). Moreover, the type of reinforcer, real or facsimile, may influence wagering
strategies. Persaud et al. (2007) used real money wagers and claimed that real money can
increase motivation but it may also increase the influence of loss aversion on wagering
and as result decrease sensitivity to conscious knowledge (Dienes & Seth, 2010).
A final issue regarding post-decision wagering is that the optimal strategy for wa-
gering in the experiments of Persaud et al. (2007) is, paradoxically, always to wager
1 Introduction 34
high, as this strategy will give the same outcome as wagering low if good vs. bad deck
discrimination is at chance, but will increase winnings if it is greater than chance. In
this sense wagering high can be said to be a weakly dominant strategy with Persaud et
al.’s payoff matrix as it is either no worse than wagering low, or better. A rational par-
ticipant would always wager high regardless of her knowledge about the task (Clifford,
Arabzadeh, & Harris, 2008). This leads to the question: “How can a failure of a subject
to wager optimally be a measure of lack of awareness of the sensory evidence when the
optimal strategy is independent of that evidence?” (Clifford et al., 2008, p. 58). Clifford
et al. (2008) proposed a solution to this issue by modifying the original payoff matrix
used by Persaud et al.
1.4 Cognitive modelling in the IGT
The study of human decision-making has benefited from the application of com-
putational models. The importance of cognitive models lies in the fact that they offer
valuable insights into the cognitive or psychological processes under investigation and
provide a way to identify and quantify underlying processes which guide performance
in cognitive tasks. They also provide formal connections between experimental evidence
and theories, make assumptions about psychological phenomena which can be empirically
examined, and generate quantitative predictions - instead of abstract verbal descriptions
- about how these phenomena would develop in new or different situations (e.g., Ahn,
Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, & Stout, 2008; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Shiffrin, Lee, Kim,
& Wagenmakers, 2008).
In the case of experience-based tasks and in particular the IGT, cognitive modelling
analysis constitutes a way to examine and identify the psychological processes which
contribute to performance on the task (e.g., Steingroever, Wetzels, & Wagenmakers, in
press; Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout, & Bechara, 2005). The IGT is a complex task in which
the interplay between cognitive, motivational, and response processes gives rise to deck
selection on each trial (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). Thus, a formal-quantitative assessment
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is needed in order to measure and understand the interactions between the psychological
processes underlying decision-making in the IGT.
Importantly, the IGT has become a standard screening tool for decision-making
deficits in clinical populations. Hence, it is very important to provide a formal modelling
framework which could accommodate the behavioural results and make psychologically
interesting observations regarding the underlying decision processes. This will lead re-
searchers to identify key differences between clinical groups and healthy controls and
make strong connections between neurophysiology and behaviour, leading to a better
characterisation of the psychological symptoms of the disorder under investigation (Stout,
Busemeyer, Lin, Grant, & Bonson, 2004). A main goal of clinical research is to establish
an explanatory framework for particular clinical groups and hence connect pathological
behaviour to patterns of behaviour on clinical and cognitive experimental tasks, and to
map these deficits to neurophysiological mechanisms. Computational cognitive models
serve as the intermediate step between the brain and observed behaviour where perfor-
mance on a task can be decomposed into its constituent cognitive processes and mapped
to neural mechanisms (Busemeyer, Stout, & Finn, 2003).
To this end, several studies have used cognitive modelling analysis to measure and
characterise differences in behaviour found between clinical populations and healthy con-
trols (e.g., Busemeyer et al., 2003; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2012; Fridberg et
al., 2010; Kjome et al., 2010; Lane, Yechiam, & Busemeyer, 2006; Yechiam et al., 2005).
For example, Yechiam et al. (2005) applied a reinforcement-learning (RL) model to dis-
criminate and find key differences among 10 groups of people with neuropsychological
disorders and addictions (e.g., VMPFC patients, Parkinson’s, Asperger’s, cocaine addicts
etc.). Although these groups perform very poorly on the IGT, their decision-making
deficits could be attributed to different psychological impairments. Using this analysis,
the different impairments and psychological processes were quantified (using the param-
eters of the RL model) and compared to those of healthy controls. Similarly, Fridberg et
al. (2010) employed a cognitive modelling analysis to identify differences between healthy
controls and chronic cannabis users and Premkumar et al. (2008) used the same analysis
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to characterise decision-making deficits in schizophrenia.
1.4.1 Modelling approaches to the IGT
1.4.1.1 Reinforcement Learning
A very successful computational approach to decomposing and explaining decision-
making processes in the IGT comes from the reinforcement-learning (RL) framework
(see Sutton & Barto, 1998). The core idea of the RL framework is that agents interact
with the environment and make decisions between possible courses of actions/alternatives
based on the learned experience they have had with each alternative up to the point of
the decision. Thus, RL is an ideal framework to study decision-making and learning
processes in dynamic experience-based tasks (Gureckis & Love, 2009). Optimal decision-
making is defined as a process of maximising rewards and minimising punishments (Niv,
2009). Following this definition, the alternative with the highest learned experience will be
chosen with a certain probability on the next decision time-point (i.e., trial). These ideas
have been formulated into computational algorithms which describe how agents learn and
update the expected value of each alternative (in the RL terminology, the alternatives
are called bandits) and how they choose an alternative based on these learned values.
The choice between bandits is not only governed by the learned experience of each option
(that is, the bandit with the highest value will always be selected) but also by a trade-
off between exploration and exploitation. In other words, agents have to first explore
the environment and the available bandits and then exploit the most profitable of them.
Importantly, in dynamically changing environments (i.e., the value of each bandit changes
over time) agents do not perform a one-off switch from exploration to exploitation but are
instead engaged in constant switching between these two response states in an attempt
to maximise the overall rewards (see Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007).
Computational modelling of choice behaviour in the IGT using the RL framework
has relied on three assumptions about the underlying psychological processes that drive
performance on the task. These assumptions are thought to be directly mapped onto dis-
tinct motivational, cognitive, and response processes and translated into computational
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algorithms (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002, see Chapter 5 for details about the mathemati-
cal form of these algorithms). The first assumption relates to the formation of a utility
or valence for the wins and losses experienced after selecting a deck. Because the IGT
involves both positive and negative payoffs, agents may give more weight to losses com-
pared to wins (motivational processes). These utilities are used to form expectancies for
each deck which are learned or updated by an adaptive learning mechanism (cognitive
processes). Finally, a choice is made which is a probabilistic function of the formed ex-
pectancies associated with each deck (response processes). Integrating these assumptions
into computational algorithms allows the decomposition of the processes involved in com-
plex decision-making and the examination of individual differences in choice strategies.
1.4.1.2 Heuristic, Rule-Based and Instance-Based Learning Models
Alternative modelling approaches for the IGT assume heuristic strategies or sim-
ple rules in which the level of computations or cognitive demands is minimal. According
to these approaches, agents employ heuristics and simple strategies based on the envi-
ronment and task demands (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). One of these approaches is the
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy which is commonly employed in experience-based
tasks (see Steyvers, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2009; Worthy & Maddox, 2014). In its simplest
form this heuristic dictates that participants “stay” with the same option/deck on the
next trial if they receive a reward but “switch” randomly to another deck if they do
not receive a reward. In the context of the IGT, participants stay with the same deck if
the net outcome (wins − losses) on each trial is equal to or greater than zero and shift
randomly to one of the three remaining decks if the net outcome is negative (Worthy,
Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013). This model does not pose any cognitive demands as partici-
pants do not have to learn or keep in memory expected values associated with each deck.
A more sophisticated version of the WSLS model requires participants to remember the
payoff received on the previous trial (or the average payoff of n previous trials) and stay
with the same option on the next trial if the received payoff is equal or greater than the
payoff of the previous trial, or switch to other options otherwise (Worthy & Maddox,
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2014).
Another model which falls into the same category is the Strategy-Switching Heuristic
Choice Model proposed by Busemeyer and Stout (2002). This model attempts to capture
the reversal learning component observed in IGT choice behaviour. At the beginning of
the task, participants assume that the best strategy is to select cards from the bad decks
because they return high rewards. However, after experiencing large losses from the bad
decks, participants switch strategies and select more cards from the good decks. The
choice mechanism of this model is a simple decision tree: the first stage represents the
choice of a strategy (good or bad decks), and in the second stage a single deck is selected
on the basis of the selected strategy.
The list of models that can be applied to the IGT and other experience-based
tasks is very large. As Lejarraga, Dutt, and Gonzalez (2010) pointed out “a common ap-
proach in the study of decision making involves observing human performance in a choice
task followed by the development of a cognitive model that reproduces that behaviour
and predicts new unobserved behaviour within the same task” (p. 143). This has led
to the development of many computational models which differ slightly in the way they
integrate and test assumptions about behaviour in decision-making under uncertainty.
Gonzalez, Lerch, and Lebiere (2003) developed a general theory of dynamic decision-
making, Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT), that can accommodate and explain
behaviour in a range of choice tasks. A computational model based on the principles
of IBLT, the IBL model, assumes that people choose between options by learning and
recalling instances from memory produced by experienced outcomes from each option
(see Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012a). These instances are activated depending on the frequency
and recency of experienced outcomes, i.e., more recent and frequent outcomes are more
likely to be activated than distant and infrequent outcomes. Finally, a choice is made by
selecting the option which has the highest blended value. The blended value of an option
is defined as the sum of all experienced outcomes from this option multiplied by their
probability of recalling each outcome from memory (also see Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011).
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1.5 Overview of thesis
The main theme of the present thesis is to examine the role played by unconscious or
implicit influences on experience-based decision-making. Our approach involves the inves-
tigation of choice behaviour in variations of a classic experience-based paradigm, the IGT,
in combination with subjective measures of awareness such as post-decision wagering and
confidence ratings (Chapters 2-4). In addition, in order to measure and understand the
cognitive and psychological processes underlying performance on the IGT, computational
modelling analysis is employed to provide deeper insights into the dynamics of decision-
making. Reinforcement-learning models are evaluated using different model comparison
techniques and a computational model of confidence ratings in decision-making under
uncertainty is developed (Chapters 5-6).
Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 2 were designed as direct replications of Persaud et
al.’s (2007) IGT study with post-decision wagering. Both experiments demonstrate that
learning to make advantageous decisions in the IGT is not dissociable from awareness,
which is at odds with the main claims of Persaud et al. Comparison of participants’
advantageous wagering performance against their numerical reports in the quantitative
questions of Maia and McClelland (2004) suggested that wagering is not a sensitive
measure of conscious content.
Chapter 3 (Experiments 3-5) addresses two main response biases of post-decision
wagering which depend on the design of the pay-off matrix: the definition of the optimal
strategy and loss aversion. Chapter 4 (Experiments 6-7) compares binary and 4-point
post-decision wagering against confidence ratings, showing that confidence ratings are
indeed more sensitive and exhaustive compared to wagering. Experiment 8 uses confidence
ratings to evaluate participants awareness in two experimental conditions: a standard
200-trial version of the IGT and a dynamic alternative, in which decks’ payoffs and
quality (good or bad) change periodically (every 50 trials). In both groups, participants’
metacognitive judgments closely track advantageous deck selections, providing further
evidence of the direct and close relationship between learning and awareness.
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The final chapters of this thesis are devoted to computational cognitive modelling
analyses. Chapter 5 provides a thorough examination and comparison of the proposed
choice RL models for the IGT by employing comparison methods in addition to traditional
model fitting such as simulation and recovery (model and parameter) methods. In Chapter
6, we develop a novel computational model as an extension to the RL models in order
to account for participants’ confidence ratings. The main results suggest that the same
mechanism which is responsible for choice behaviour can give rise to confidence judgments.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings and provides suggestions for future
research.
2 Replication of Persaud et al. (2007)
Our first experiments take a closer look at the study of Persaud et al. (2007) and
their claims regarding the influence of implicit or unconscious processes on decision-
making under uncertainty. This is an important starting point to gain better insights
into post-decision wagering. It is also important to check whether the results in Persaud
et al. are reproducible. To anticipate the results of our replication study, we only par-
tially replicated the findings of Persaud et al. in Experiment 1. Thus, Experiment 2 was
designed to provide further evidence of whether the difference in the pattern of results
between Experiment 1 and that of Persaud et al. (2007) persists with a different group
of participants.
2.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 included two groups in an attempt to reproduce the key findings
reported by Persaud et al. (2007). Both groups performed the IGT and made post-
decision wagers. In the questionnaire group participants were also regularly asked a subset
of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) quantitative questions, while those in the control group
were not. Comparisons between these groups allow a number of issues to be addressed:
First, in the control group, is there evidence that deck selections begin to discriminate
good from bad decks before the trial at which advantageous wagering first occurs? This
is the key piece of evidence for an unconscious influence on decision-making. Secondly,
does quantitative questioning bring forward the point at which advantageous wagering
occurs, as Persaud et al. suggested? Thirdly, what is the comparison between wagering
and quantitative judgments in the questionnaire group? Although they included such a
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group, Persaud et al. did not report the quantitative judgments their participants made.
Even if making these judgments has the effect of focusing participants’ attention on the
task and rendering them more rapidly aware of the task structure (and hence improving
wagering), it is still of considerable interest to examine such data. Importantly, we can
ask whether the quantitative assessments participants make at their first assessment (trial
20) - when questioning cannot have had any effect on task awareness - reveals awareness
which is undetected by the wagering measure.
Experiment 1 thus aimed to replicate the design and methodology employed by
Persaud et al. (2007). One difference between our experiment and Persaud et al.’s lies
in the format of the IGT. We used a computerised version of the IGT whereas Persaud
et al. used a classic manual format (see Bechara et al., 1994). Previous studies observed
no differences in the pattern of deck selections between format types, however (Bechara,
Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Bowman et al., 2005).
2.1.1 Method
Participants
Thirty volunteers (20 females) between the ages of 19 and 30 years (𝑀 = 22.66, 𝑆𝐷 =
2.96) were recruited from the University College London subject pool. All participants
received $3 for their participation.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups (no questioning [control],
quantitative questioning [questionnaire]). The control group made a high or a low wager
following each deck choice whereas the questionnaire group, in addition to wagering,
were asked a subset of the Maia and McClelland (2004) questions every 20 trials. In the
original study, the questionnaire was given to participants every 10 trials after the first
administration on trial 20. We reduced the frequency of administering the questionnaire
to limit fatigue.
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Task
A computerised variant of the IGT was employed. There were four decks of cards
with labels A, B, C, and D. The rewards and punishments were the same as in Persaud
et al. (2007) and these were dependent on the quality of the deck (Good or Bad) and
the wager (High: $20 or Low: $10). Specifically, selecting a card from the bad decks
(A and B) yielded a win of two times (2 ×) the wager (High: $40, Low: $20) whereas
selecting a card from the good decks (C and D) returned the wagered amount (1×; High:
$20, Low: $10). Also, some trials carried a punishment: the distribution and frequency
of the punishments were as for the original IGT whereas the magnitude was adjusted to
reflect the ratio of losses to wins of the original IGT (see Appendix A for the reward and
punishment schedule).
Participants in both groups were given an initial endowment of $400 of play money
and were asked to maximise their earnings. The task comprised 100 card selections. After
each card selection, a frame appeared on the screen with two alternative choices, “High
($20)” and “Low ($10)”, allowing participants to place a wager on their card selection.
Along with wagering the questionnaire group was administered a modified version of
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) questionnaire (see Appendix B). The qualitative parts of
the questionnaire were omitted and it was administered every 20 trials. Participants were
asked to provide ratings of the “goodness” of each deck, to report or calculate amounts of
money related to the decks’ payoffs, and to indicate which deck they would select cards
from for the rest of the task if they could only choose from one deck.
Instructions were presented on the screen before the experiment started. At the top
of the display was a green bar that expanded or contracted according to the amount of
money won or lost after each deck selection and wager. Every time a participant clicked
on a deck to pick a card, the deck was highlighted and the wagering frame appeared on
the screen. After the wagering selection, the face of that card appeared on the top of
the deck showing the amount of money behind the card and a message was displayed on
the screen indicating the amount of money won or lost. Once the money had been added
or subtracted, the face of the card disappeared and the participant could select another
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card.
Procedure
Participants sat in front of a PC display. They were then asked to read the on-screen
instructions about the task. In brief, participants were told that the game was about
learning to gamble on card selections, that all of the cards would yield some money but
some would lose money, that their objective was to win as much as money as possible,
and that they were free to switch from one deck to another at any time. Additionally,
participants were presented with instructions about wagering. Specifically, they were told
that if they were confident that their choice would give them some net winnings, then
they should wager high, otherwise, they should make a low wager. The questionnaire
group was presented with instructions about the quantitative questions. Each session
ended after 100 trials.
2.1.2 Results
Choice and Wagering
Advantageous wagering was defined as either a high wager after choosing a good
deck or a low wager after choosing a bad deck. Our analyses employed the average propor-
tion of good deck selections (choice) and advantageous wagers (wagering) across subjects
over successive blocks of 10 trials to investigate any differences between the two groups
(control, questionnaire) and to locate the onset of learning and awareness (see Figure
2.1).
The onset of deck discrimination, as revealed by the first block in which choice of
the good decks was significantly above chance (0.50), was at block 4 for both conditions
(Control: 𝑀 = 0.63, 𝑡(14) = 3.25, 𝑝 = .006, 𝑑 = 0.84, Questionnaire: 𝑀 = 0.70, 𝑡(14) =
5.29, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.37). Advantageous wagering exceeded chance level (0.50) at the
same time as choice, also in block 4 (Control: 𝑀 = 0.63, 𝑡(14) = 3.08, 𝑝 = .008, 𝑑 = 0.80,
Questionnaire: 𝑀 = 0.66, 𝑡(14) = 3.43, 𝑝 = .004, 𝑑 = 0.89). These results indicate that
there was no advancement in the onset of advantageous wagering in the quantitative
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Figure 2.1: Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials for the control and questionnaire groups in Experiment 1 (lines). The grey diamond and
the triangle markers represent the proportion of participants who gave higher ratings to one
of the two best decks and the proportion of participants who selected one of the two best
decks as their choice if they were allowed to select only one deck. The star and the square
markers represent the proportions of participants who gave the highest reported expected net
and calculated net to one of the two best decks. Points are offset horizontally so that error bars
(± 1 SEM) are visible.
questioning group who made explicit judgments about the deck payoffs.
Two separate mixed ANOVAs were performed on the proportion of good deck selec-
tions and advantageous wagers across blocks of 10 trials. It is important to note that even
though they use the same scale, the two measures cannot be compared directly because
advantageous wagering is dependent on the first-order decision (e.g., deck selection) and
this creates the possibility of functional differences between the measurement scales. For
example, if a participant always chooses a good deck (with the proportion of good deck
selections therefore being 1.0), but decides to make both high and low wagers because she
is more confident on some trials than others, then advantageous wagering cannot attain a
value of 1.0. Its maximum value under such circumstances would be equal to the propor-
tion of high wagers. Like Persaud et al. (2007), our contrast between deck selection and
wagering is therefore an indirect one, based on estimating the trial block at which each
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reaches a level significantly above chance. This contrast is likely, if anything, to be biased
in favour of obtaining evidence of learning without awareness. Both measures could be
numerically above chance, but deck selection might be significantly so and wagering not
(it might be a noisier measure, for instance).
A 2 (group [control, questionnaire]; between) × 10 (block: 10 trials each; within)
mixed ANOVA was performed to assess group differences on good deck selections. For
the main effect of block, polynomial contrasts were also applied. The analysis revealed
a significant main effect of block, 𝐹 (9, 252) = 26.80,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.00, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.39
(for generalised eta squared, 𝜂2𝑔 , see Bakeman, 2005), indicating that participants learned
about the quality of each deck as there was a tendency for choice to increase across time
(significant linear and quadratic effects, 𝑝 < .001). The main effect of group did not
reach significance, 𝐹 (1, 28) = 0.92,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 10.94, 𝑝 = .35, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.01, and the interaction
between group and block was not significant, 𝐹 (9, 252) = 0.39,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.00, 𝑝 = .94, 𝜂2𝑔 =
0.01, suggesting that the mean proportion of good deck selections across blocks was
similar in the two conditions. This finding is in accordance with Persaud et al.’s (2007)
results: in their study more detailed questioning did not affect participants’ deck-selection
strategies. In other words, when awareness is probed by more “invasive” methods, no effect
is observed in the application of this knowledge to decision-making behaviour.
Analysis of the proportion of advantageous wagers revealed a similar pattern of re-
sults. Again, the main effect of group was not significant, 𝐹 (1, 28) < 1,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 13.12, 𝑝 =
.86. Participants were able to maximise their winnings as the proportion of advantageous
wagers increased across blocks, 𝐹 (9, 252) = 19.35,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.44, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.32.
The interaction between group and block was not significant, 𝐹 (9, 252) = 0.46,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
3.44, 𝑝 = .90, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.01.
These results indicate that participants favoured the good decks and became grad-
ually capable of maximising their winnings by placing appropriate wagers. The estimated
onsets of good deck selections are consistent with those reported by Persaud et al. (2007;
also see Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio, & O’Connor, 2005; Wagar & Dixon, 2006),
namely on trials 40 and 36 (block 4) for their control and questionnaire groups, re-
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spectively. The key result though is that advantageous wagering developed according
to approximately the same time-course as choice behaviour. The extra requirement to
rate the quality of the decks and answer questions about the payoffs did not affect par-
ticipants’ decision-making or wagering strategies. Since choice and wagering displayed
similar patterns in both groups there is no evidence of a dissociation between learning
and awareness of the optimal strategy, assuming that wagering is indeed a valid index of
awareness. The simultaneous onset of awareness in the two groups also contradicts the
main claim of Persaud et al. about learning without awareness in the IGT. Specifically,
Persaud et al. reported that in their control group, where no quantitative questions were
asked, advantageous wagering lagged behind deck selections whereas this was not the
case in their quantitative questioning group. This pattern was not observed here.
Signal Detection Theory Analysis
Another approach to investigate participants’ awareness is to use the well-established
framework of signal detection theory (SDT). Type 2 SDT provides valuable insights into
participants’ metacognitive sensitivity and wagering strategies by measuring sensitivity
and bias independently (Clifford et al., 2008; Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Higham, 2007;
Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001). In applying SDT to the IGT and post-decision wa-
gering, a hit is a high wager after a good deck selection and a false alarm a high wager
after a bad deck selection. A constant of 0.5 was added to the counts of hits, false alarms,
misses and correct rejections in order to prevent infinite values for the calculation of 𝑑′
(metacognitive sensitivity) and ln β (metacognitive bias; Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013;
Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).
A 2 (group [control, questionnaire]; between) × 10 (block: 10 trials each; within)
mixed ANOVA was performed to investigate whether there were any differences in 𝑑′ be-
tween the two conditions (see Figure 2.2). The analysis revealed no main effect of condi-
tion, 𝐹 (1, 28) = 0.02,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 1.73, 𝑝 = .90. Figure 2.2 shows a tendency for 𝑑′ to increase
across blocks, resulting in a significant main effect of block, 𝐹 (9, 252) = 14.26,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
0.60, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.28. As expected, the group × block interaction was not significant
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indicating that the questionnaire did not increase participants’ metacognitive sensitivity,
𝐹 (9, 252) = 0.39,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.60, 𝑝 = .94. Moreover, the analysis is consistent with the pre-
vious analyses as the first point at which 𝑑′ significantly exceeds chance (𝑑′ = 0) is block 4
in both conditions (Control: 𝑡(14) = 2.17, 𝑝 = .04, Questionnaire: 𝑡(14) = 2.24, 𝑝 = .04).
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Figure 2.2: Participants’ metacognitive sensitivity (𝑑′) as a function of questioning group and
block of trials in Experiment 1. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
Moreover, we can obtain useful insights into participants’ wagering strategies by
examining the bias measure ln β (ln β = 1 if no bias; ln β > 1 if conservative; ln β <
1 if liberal; Higham, 2007; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Analysis of variance revealed
that neither the main effect of condition, 𝐹 (1, 28) < 1,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 1.00, 𝑝 = .84, nor the
interaction (group × block), 𝐹 (9, 252) < 1,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.29, 𝑝 = .94, were significant. There
was a significant main effect of block, 𝐹 (9, 252) = 7.63,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.29, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.17,
as participants became more liberal across blocks (mean ln β ranged from 0.04 (block 1)
to -0.58 (block 10) in the control group and from 0.26 (block 1) to -0.54 (block 10) in the
questionnaire group).
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Questionnaire
Participants’ knowledge regarding the advantageous strategy in the questionnaire
group was explored. Two of the measures reflect knowledge about the general quality of
each deck and the remaining two about the actual payoffs. For questions 1 and 3 (see
Appendix B) if a participant gives the highest rating to one of the two best decks and
selects one of the two best decks to pick cards until the end of the experiment, that means
the participant possesses accurate knowledge about the task. In the same manner, when
the highest reported (Question 2.a) and calculated net (Questions 2.b, 2.c and 2.d) is
attributed to one of the best decks, this indicates high levels of awareness. The calculated
net (CN) for each participant, deck, and question period is obtained using the following
equation: CN = Q2.b + (Q2.c/10)×Q2.d.
Figure 2.1 (Questionnaire group) shows the proportion of participants whose an-
swers favoured the good decks on each of the questionnaire measures. Participants whose
verbal responses did not discriminate between good and bad decks (i.e., they give the
same ratings or the same reported net for all decks) do not count towards this propor-
tion. Inspection of the figure shows that participants exhibited substantial knowledge
about the quality of each deck even in the first assessment period (trial 20). Not only did
they rate the good decks higher than the bad decks, but also they had a firm basis for
such an attribution as revealed by their reported and calculated net payoffs. Table 2.1
also shows the mean deck ratings (-10 very bad, +10 very good) for each deck and the
proportion of selections throughout the task for both groups. The results show a clear
trend, that is the more positive the rating for a deck, the more likely the deck was to
be selected. This correlation between ratings and selections adds further support to the
view that decision strategies in the IGT develop in parallel with explicit knowledge.
The use of the questionnaire allowed us to explore differences between the two
measures (i.e., post-decision wagering and questionnaire) in terms of how sensitive each
is in assessing participants’ awareness. It is important to check whether the quantitative
questions reveal more knowledge about the task than wagering in the first assessment
(trial 20). However, the two measures are not directly comparable due to the fact that
2 Replication of Persaud et al. (2007) 50
Table 2.1: Mean ratings and proportion of selections for each deck in Experiment 1.
Proportion of Selections
Deck Mean Ratings (SD) Questionnaire Control
A -3.01 (3.69) 0.12 0.12
B -2.71 (4.86) 0.20 0.24
C 0.67 (3.37) 0.33 0.30
D 2.17 (3.33) 0.34 0.34
the questionnaire was administered once at trial 20 whereas participants placed wagers
after each deck selection. To overcome this problem, we classified each participant as
aware or unaware based on the average proportion of advantageous wagers placed across
trials 16-25. If the average was equal to or greater than .5, then participants were identified
as aware of the advantageous strategy. The proportion of participants classified as aware
by the wagering measure was then compared against the proportion of participants who
favoured one of the two good decks in Question 3 (i.e., deck-selected measure). We used
the deck-selected measure because it requires only one response and is therefore similar to
wagering. To see whether the two proportions were significantly different (deck-selected:
0.67, wagering: 0.33) we used the McNemar test for dependent proportions (see Agresti,
2002; Wild & Seber, 1993) which was found to be non-significant, 𝜒2(1) = 2.78, 𝑝 = .096,
possibly due to the small sample size (N = 15). Nevertheless, the numerical difference
suggests that wagering underestimates participants’ acquired knowledge possibly due to
the effects of biases in participants’ wagering strategies.
2.1.3 Discussion
We draw three principal conclusions from Experiment 1. First, under the conditions
tested here awareness as measured by wagering tracked deck selections quite closely. We
found no indication that wagering lagged behind the selection of good decks, with both
measures becoming reliably better than chance fairly early in the task, between trials 30
and 40. Secondly, the results of the explicit questions revealed that wagering, if anything,
underestimates task insight. As early as trial 20, the majority of participants were able
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to give accurate reports about the quality of the different decks. Thirdly, there was no
evidence that eliciting explicit reports in the questionnaire group altered participants’
wagering strategy. Persaud et al. (2007) did report such a bias, but it was not observed
here. Regardless of whether they explicitly reported their task knowledge, participants
began to wager advantageously in block 4 (and this is about the same point at which
they began to reliably select the better decks).
2.2 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 revealed no evidence of a dissociation between learning and awareness.
In both experimental groups, awareness of the advantageous strategy emerged early in
the task as shown by advantageous wagering and participants’ responses following the
administration of the quantitative questions every 20 trials. This pattern of results is at
odds with the claims of Persaud et al. (2007) about learning without conscious knowledge
in the IGT and the intrusive nature of the questionnaire of Maia and McClelland (2004),
which (they argued) alters participants’ awareness and makes them more aware of the
task structure. Experiment 2 was designed as an exact replication of the control group of
Experiment 1. Since the pattern of results deviated from what was observed in the no-
questioning group of Persaud et al., the purpose of Experiment 2 was to ascertain whether
the effect we obtained in Experiment 1 was reliable and consistent. In other words, the
question is whether advantageous wagering will closely track good deck selections and
thus provide additional evidence regarding the close connection between learning and
awareness in the IGT.
2.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduate psychology students participated (10 females, age 𝑀 =
20.25, 𝑆𝐷 = 0.97) and they received $2 for their participation.
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Task/Procedure
The task and procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to the control group of
Experiment 1.
2.2.2 Results
Choice and Wagering
The method for identifying the onset of good deck selections and advantageous
wagering was the same as in Experiment 1. Performance exceeded the chance level at
block 6 for both measures (Choice: 𝑀 = 0.67, 𝑡(19) = 2.93, 𝑝 = .009, 𝑑 = 0.66, Wagering:
𝑀 = 0.63, 𝑡(19) = 2.05, 𝑝 = .05, 𝑑 = 0.46) (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in Experiment 2. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of block on good deck
selections, 𝐹 (9, 171) = 4.70,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 4.87, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.13. Wagering performance
closely followed the optimal decision-making strategy as demonstrated by a main effect
of block, 𝐹 (9, 171) = 4.62,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 5.11, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.14. These findings provide
another piece of evidence that when participants start to consistently select cards from
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the good decks, they also possess conscious knowledge of their decisions (in this case, as
indexed by wagering). In other words, the results from this experiment indicate once again
that there is no dissociation between learning and awareness of the optimal strategy, as
claimed by Persaud et al. (2007). In addition, the pattern of this experiment resembles
the one observed in Experiment 1; that is, advantageous wagering did not lag behind
good deck selections.
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Figure 2.4: Mean proportion of choices from bad decks (A and B) and good decks (C and D)
in Experiment 2.
However, there is a difference of about 2 blocks of trials in the onset of both mea-
sures (i.e., good deck selections and advantageous wagering) compared with the control
group of Experiment 1. One possible explanation for this difference lies in the nature
of the IGT as a probe of decision-making. In their literature review on IGT studies,
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, et al. (2013) observed high variability in performance
between studies but also within participants in the same study. Specifically, performance
on the IGT ranged between .43 and .70 (proportion of selections from the good decks)
with most studies reporting only a weak preference for the good decks, between .50 and
.60. Similarly, Fernie and Tunney (2008) associated difficulties with manipulations of the
reward and punishment schedule of the IGT; because wins, loss probability and mag-
nitude, and overall expected values are all confounded with each other it is difficult to
ascertain which aspect of the schedule has a bigger effect on choice behaviour. Thus,
it is not surprising that participants differ in the way they perform on the IGT across
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studies and that individual differences exist in a complicated task which depends on each
individual-difference variables such as risk propensity, general motivation, and working
memory capacity. For example, some participants never learn to select the good decks
whereas for others a few trials suffice in order to start behaving advantageously. In the
present experiment, the percentage of good deck selections (C and D) across blocks was
.593, indicating a weaker learning effect compared to the control group of Experiment 1
(.638; see Figure 2.4). The pattern of individual deck choices resembles the “B,C, and D”
pattern described in the Introduction (see Figure 1.2). Participants’ choices are driven by
the expected values (or overall goodness) of each deck but also by a loss-frequency effect;
that is, even though deck B is a disadvantageous deck it is selected as often as the good
decks C and D because it produces rare losses (0.1 probability of loss, 1 per 10 trials)
2.3 Discussion
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 do not offer any support for the claims of Persaud
et al. (2007) that learning to make advantageous decisions can occur in the absence of
awareness. We only replicated the results relating to the quantitative questioning group
where deck selection and advantageous wagering exceeded chance at the same time. In
contrast to Persaud et al.’s results, the same pattern was observed in the group that was
asked only to make a wager after their deck selections, suggesting no dissociation between
choice and wagering.
Even though the pattern of results between the two experiments is qualitatively the
same (i.e., advantageous wagering did not lag behind good deck selections), a difference
was observed in the time that both measures exceeded chance, which could be due to the
high variability observed in performance on the IGT.
3 Optimal Strategy, Loss Aversion, and
Pay-off Matrices
In the present chapter, we will focus on two problematic and rather contradictory
aspects of post-decision wagering: the definition of the optimal strategy and loss aversion.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the optimal wagering strategy under the pay-off matrix
of Persaud et al. (2007; Table 3.1) is always to wager high, irrespective of the acquired task
knowledge. This is because the same amount of money can be won or lost on any given
wager (Clifford et al., 2008). If participants perform randomly (i.e., have no knowledge
about the quality of each deck) then their expected gain from betting either high or
low is zero. However, when they start to realise which are the good decks, betting high
will increase their winnings. Following this, wagering high constitutes a weakly dominant
strategy as it is never worse than wagering low. Consequently, this optimal strategy offers
no insight about the knowledge participants have acquired during the task.
Table 3.1: Payoff matrices for the different combinations of deck selection and wager.
Persaud et al. Clifford et al. Schurger & Sher
Deck Selection
Wager Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Low +1 -1 +2 -1 +1 -2
High +2 -2 +5 -5 +10 -10
A second important issue is the influence of loss aversion on wagering strategies.
The placement of a high or low wager can be strategy dependent, reflecting people’s
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greater sensitivity to losses than equivalent wins. In other words, people may wager con-
servatively (i.e., low wagers) in order to minimise losses even if they have some confidence
in their decisions. Many studies have shown that post-decision wagering is susceptible to
loss aversion biases which makes it less sensitive and exhaustive than other measures of
awareness (e.g., Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchon´, & Cleere-
mans, 2013; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012). To overcome issues associated with loss aversion,
Schurger and Sher (2008) proposed a different pay-off matrix which encourages partici-
pants to wager high (Table 3.1). Under this matrix low wagers are meant to avoid large
losses so that participants would bet high even in situations when their task knowledge
is not fully developed.
3.1 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 further examines the utility of wagering as a valid alternative to verbal
reports for assessing awareness by applying two modifications to Persaud et al.’s (2007)
procedure. First, the original reward and punishment schedule of the IGT was used, and
secondly we tested the modified pay-off matrix proposed by Clifford et al. (2008). As
noted earlier, the pay-off matrix used by Persaud et al. encourages rational participants
to employ the weakly-dominant strategy of making high wagers all the time, irrespective
of the knowledge they possess about the decks (see Table 3.1). The modified version of
the pay-off matrix, in contrast, encourages participants to wager low under uncertainty
and to wager high when they have acquired some knowledge about the decks.
Specifically, in the modified matrix participants are discouraged from wagering high
until they feel confident that their decision is a good one. When discriminative knowledge
about the decks is absent or low, it is advantageous to wager low. This can be shown
by the expected payoff from wagering low which is +1/2[= (+2 − 1)/2] compared to
0[= (+5 − 5)/2] from wagering high. However, when deck discrimination is better than
chance, it is more rewarding to wager high due to a larger payoff with a good/high
combination (+5) than a good/low one (+2). Based on this matrix a rational participant
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(i.e., a participant who seeks to maximise gains) would start to wager high only when her
deck discrimination (i.e., probability of selecting a good deck is) 4/7 or .57. The latter
can be computed from the differential loss of wagering on a bad decision (5 − 1 = 4)
divided by the sum of the differential loss and the differential gain of wagering on a good
decision (5− 2 = 3; Clifford et al., 2008).
Experiment 3 therefore asks two main questions. First, we have another opportunity
to examine whether awareness as measured by wagering lags behind deck selection. Sec-
ondly, we can ask whether the modified payoff matrix locates the onset of awareness at an
earlier point than the original matrix. Given that Experiment 1 suggested that wagering
(under the original matrix) locates the onset of awareness far too late (in comparison to
numerical reports on the values of the decks), it is possible that the modified matrix will
yield a more appropriate, earlier, estimate.
3.1.1 Method
Participants
Sixty healthy volunteers participated (28 females, age 𝑀 = 22.32, 𝑆𝐷 = 3.02).
Thirty-five participants were recruited via the subject pool and the rest were undergrad-
uate students who received course credit for participating. Participants were randomly
assigned to the two conditions.
Design
The simple-wagering group participated in a replication of Persaud et al.’s (2007)
IGT task with wagering. The differences between Persaud et al.’s study and this experi-
ment are that we employed the original reward and punishment schedule of the IGT, and
the wagers were divided by a factor of 10. The modified-wagering group was administered
the IGT with wagering but using the pay-off matrix proposed by Clifford et al. (2008;
see Table 3.1).
3 Optimal Strategy, Loss Aversion, and Pay-off Matrices 58
Task
The reward and punishment schedule used in this study was the same as in the
original IGT. After selecting a card from decks A and B participants won $100 whereas
on decks C and D they won $50. However, on some trials, there was a punishment which
was larger on decks A and B compared to decks C and D. On deck A, 50% of the trials
carried a punishment (varying from $150 to $350) leading to an overall loss of $250
every 10 trials. On deck B, the net outcome was the same as in deck A (−$25 per card)
but there was one large loss ($1250) every 10 trials. The same pattern was present on
decks C and D; on deck C, 5 out of 10 trials had a punishment (from $25 to $75) leading
to an overall gain of $250 (+$25 per card) whereas on deck D, there was one loss ($250)
every 10 trials.
After each card selection in the simple wagering group, a new frame appeared on the
screen with two alternative choices, “High ($2)” and “Low ($1)”, allowing participants to
place a wager on their card selection. The amount behind the card was multiplied either
by 2 or 1 according to wager selection. In the modified wagering group, the procedure was
the same, except that the wagers were not expressed as amounts of money but simply
as “High” and “Low”. This is because the final amount of money won or lost after each
card selection was multiplied by the appropriate weights in the modified pay-off matrix.
The task comprised 100 card selections. Because there were only 40 cards in each
deck, it was possible to run out of cards from a given deck (as in the original IGT).
When this happened, a message appeared on the screen instructing participants to stop
choosing from that deck and to continue selecting from the remaining decks.
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 3 was identical to that of previous experiments.
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3.1.2 Results
Choice and Wagering
The method for identifying the onset of good deck selections and advantageous
wagering was the same as in previous experiments (see Figure 3.1). Good deck selection
commenced on block 5 for the simple wagering group, 𝑀 = 0.63, 𝑡(29) = 3.20, 𝑝 =
.003, 𝑑 = 0.58, but on block 4 for the modified wagering group, 𝑀 = 0.68, 𝑡(29) =
4.81, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.88. There hence seems to be a small difference in the onset of
learning between the two groups. Additionally, a difference was observed regarding the
onset of advantageous wagering. Specifically, in the simple wagering group awareness arose
relatively late in the task, on block 7, 𝑀 = 0.61, 𝑡(29) = 2.82, 𝑝 = .008, 𝑑 = 0.51, whereas
participants started to place appropriate wagers on block 4 in the modified wagering
group, 𝑀 = 0.69, 𝑡(29) = 5.48, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 1.00.
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in the simple wagering and modified wagering groups in Experiment 3. Points are offset
horizontally so that error bars (± 1 SEM) are visible.
A 2 (group [simple wagering, modified wagering]; between) × 10 (block: 10 trials
each; within) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of good deck selections revealed a non-
significant main effect of group, 𝐹 (1, 58) = 0.22,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 5.24, 𝑝 = .65. There was a
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significant main effect of block, 𝐹 (7.19, 416.22) = 32.59,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 4.22, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.33
(significant linear and quadratic trends). The analysis also revealed a significant group ×
block interaction, 𝐹 (7.19, 416.22) = 2.18,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 4.22, 𝑝 = .022, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.03 (Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). Simple effects analyses showed a significant difference on block 4
(𝐹 (1, 58) = 14.86,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.77, 𝑝 < .001) which is consistent with the difference reported
above in the onset of good deck selections between the two groups.
A similar analysis was performed on the proportion of advantageous wagers. The
main effect of group was significant, 𝐹 (1, 58) = 4.15,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 12.02, 𝑝 = .046, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.02,
as participants in the modified wagering group demonstrated higher proportions of ad-
vantageous wagers across blocks. The main effect of block was significant, 𝐹 (9, 522) =
16.88,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.65, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.18. The difference between the two groups in
awareness was further supported by a significant group × block interaction, 𝐹 (9, 522) =
3.36,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.65, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.04, with reliable differences in blocks 4, 5, 6, and 7
(simple effects comparisons, 𝑝 < .05), reflecting the later onset of awareness in the simple
wagering group. These results demonstrate that awareness lagged behind deck selections
in the simple wagering group which is in accordance with the dissociation between the
two measures observed by Persaud et al. (2007). In addition it appears that asymmet-
ric weights in the pay-off matrix of the modified wagering group helped participants to
perform advantageously earlier in the task.
Signal Detection Theory Analysis
We also investigated the confidence-accuracy relationship using Type 2 SDT (Fig-
ure 3.2). A 2 (group [simple wagering, modified wagering]; between) × 10 (block: 10
trials each; within) mixed ANOVA was computed. The analysis revealed a significant
main effect of group, 𝐹 (1, 58) = 4.69,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 2.43, 𝑝 = .034, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.02, indicating that
the modified pay-off matrix was more sensitive in assessing participants’ task knowl-
edge (simple wagering: 𝑀 = 0.20, 𝑆𝐸𝑀 = 0.06; modified wagering: 𝑀 = 0.47, 𝑆𝐸𝑀 =
0.06). Also, there was a significant effect of block, 𝐹 (6.81, 394.91) = 12.52,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
0.79, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.14. The interaction between block and group was significant,
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𝐹 (6.81, 394.91) = 2.77,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.79, 𝑝 = .009, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.03. Simple effects analysis revealed
significant differences between the two groups in blocks 4 and 5 (block 4: 𝐹 (1, 58) =
10.51,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.74, 𝑝 = .002; block 5:𝐹 (1, 58) = 9.13,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 1.33, 𝑝 = .004), a pattern
of results which resembles the differences found in advantageous wagering between the
two groups.
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Figure 3.2: Participants’ metacognitive sensitivity (𝑑′) as a function of wagering type and
block of trials in Experiment 3. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
We also investigated the mean bias (ln β) in the two groups; in terms of loss aver-
sion, we can ask whether the type of wagering matrix caused participants to develop a
liberal or a conservative strategy about the wagers they placed. A 2 × 10 (group [simple
wagering, modified wagering] × block) mixed ANOVA revealed that neither the group ×
block interaction, 𝐹 (9, 522) = 1.05,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.22, 𝑝 = .39, nor the main effect of group,
𝐹 (1, 58) = 1.89,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.39, 𝑝 = .17, reached significance indicating that, in general,
the different pay-off matrices did not affect participants’ wagering strategy. However,
there was a significant effect of block, 𝐹 (9, 522) = 2.53,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.22, 𝑝 = .008, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.04.
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3.1.3 Discussion
Whereas Experiments 1 and 2 revealed no lag between deck selection and awareness
- the latter measured by wagering - the present experiment did reveal such a lag in the
simple wagering group, of approximately 2 blocks of trials. In this group, advantageous
deck selections became reliable at block 5 whereas wagering only became significantly
better than chance in block 7. Presumably one of the minor procedural changes between
Experiments 1 and 2 on the one hand and Experiment 3 on the other led to the difference
in findings.
The reward and punishment schedule used in Experiment 3 was the same as in
the original IGT. In fact, the pattern of deck selections was slightly different compared
to Experiment 1 (compare Table 2.1 and Figure 3.3). Deck B was selected more often
which is in accordance with previous studies that used the original IGT and evaluated
the perceived “badness” of deck B (Lin et al., 2007). Examination of choice behaviour in
Experiment 1 (Table 2.1) and Persaud et al.’s (2007) study reveals a different pattern,
which is not present in studies with the original IGT payoff schedule.
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Figure 3.3: Mean proportion of choices from bad decks (A and B) and good decks (C and D)
in Experiment 3.
Although the lag observed in the simple wagering group (which replicates what
Persaud et al., 2007, found) might be taken as evidence that advantageous deck selection
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is driven initially by unconscious influences, the results from the modified wagering group
suggest caution in drawing such a conclusion, because a relatively small change in the
payoff matrix brought wagering back into line with deck selections (and led participants
to select from the good decks slightly earlier than those exposed to the original matrix).
Why might this have happened? One hypothesis is that it arises because the original
payoff matrix discourages participants from thinking carefully about the wagers they
place, especially before they have learned which are the best decks. There is a possibility
that Persaud et al.’s matrix led participants to believe that, prior to learning, wagering
had no overall effect on their winnings. As noted previously, it is indeed the case that with
a symmetric matrix and random deck selection, it makes no difference how the participant
wagers. Participants may therefore have stopped thinking carefully about their wagers.
As the optimal weakly dominant strategy using the original matrix is always to wager
high (Clifford et al., 2008), this means that the payoffs are independent of the wagers, and
thus participants may have believed that their wagers were irrelevant. When they started
to learn about the quality of each deck and discovered that their wagers might be relevant
to the encountered payoffs, it may then have taken them longer to implement this new
knowledge into their wagering strategy, leading to an apparent late onset of awareness. In
contrast, the asymmetric payoffs of the modified matrix encourage participants to believe
that it matters whether they wager high or low, even before they start to choose the good
decks. In other words, the original pay-off matrix did not guide participants to express
their knowledge as their wagering choices were random and not consistent with their deck
selections.
3.2 Experiments 4A and 4B
Experiment 3 showed that the exact form of the pay-off matrix can affect partici-
pants’ wagering strategy, with the Clifford et al. (2008) payoff matrix bringing forward
by several blocks the point at which above-chance awareness was located. The sensitiv-
ity of wagering to small procedural changes undermines its reliability as a measure of
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awareness. Yet the results of Experiment 3 might nevertheless encourage the view that
wagering under the modified matrix is an accurate measure (and the results of Experi-
ment 1, in which wagering again developed early, might be interpreted in the same way).
Even though wagering tracks choice under the modified matrix, does this mean that it is
a reliable and sensitive measure of awareness? In Experiment 4A we address this ques-
tion by measuring awareness both with Clifford et al.’s payoff matrix and simultaneously
with Maia and McClelland’s (2004) quantitative questions in a probabilistic alternative
version of the IGT. Experiment 4B is a replication of Experiment 3’s modified wagering
condition with the inclusion of Maia and McClelland’s questionnaire.
3.2.1 Experiment 4A
3.2.1.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-one volunteers participated (13 females, age 𝑀 = 23.45, 𝑆𝐷 = 3.56), all of
whom were recruited via the departmental subject pool. They were paid $2 for their par-
ticipation and an additional amount between $0 and $3, depending on their performance
in the task.
Task
A variation of the original IGT was employed in which the allocation of wins and
losses on each trial was sampled at random from the overall distribution (for a similar task
see Scho¨nberg, Daw, Joel, & O’Doherty, 2007). This modification removes many of the
complications that arise from using the typical IGT structure in which the disadvanta-
geous decks are initially good (because losses do not occur early in the task), eliminating
the predominant preference for the bad decks (see Fellows & Farah, 2005). The payoff
structure of each deck was different from the original IGT; the pay-off matrix of Clifford
et al. (2008) was used to determine the payoffs received by participants on each trial, in
such a way that the amount won or lost was dependent on card selection and wagering.
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For example, based on the contingencies of Table 3.1, a payoff of 2 is always associated
with a good deck selection and a low wager. Whether this amount was a win or loss was
defined by the distribution of outcomes associated with each deck. Specifically, for decks
A and B, the probability of a loss was .75 and .60 respectively, whereas for decks C and
D, the probability of a win was .75 and .60, respectively, resulting in different overall
expected payoffs for each deck. In contrast to the original IGT (where the win on each
trial could be coupled with a loss), the outcome on each trial was either a net win or a
loss and participants could win or lose points, not real or facsimile money.
The task comprised 100 card selections. Each deck had 60 randomly predefined wins
and losses based on the probabilities programmed for that deck. After each card selection,
participants could place a wager, either High or Low, on their card selection. Based on
the combination of deck selection and wagering, participants were presented with a single
amount, either a win or a loss. Along with wagering, participants’ conscious knowledge
was assessed using a modified version of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) questionnaire.
The qualitative parts of the questionnaire were omitted and it was administered every 20
trials.
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 4A was identical to that of previous experiments.
3.2.1.2 Results
Choice and Wagering
Performance exceeded the chance level on block 1 for both measures (Choice: 𝑀 =
0.59, 𝑡(20) = 2.83, 𝑝 = .01, 𝑑 = 0.62, Wagering: 𝑀 = 0.65, 𝑡(20) = 3.80, 𝑝 = .001, 𝑑 =
0.83) (see Figure 3.4).
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of block on good deck
selections, 𝐹 (9, 180) = 12.40,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 2.32, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.28. Wagering performance
closely followed the optimal decision-making strategy as demonstrated by a main effect
of block, 𝐹 (4.92, 98.46) = 4.92,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 2.23, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.13. These findings are
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Figure 3.4: Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in Experiment 4A (lines). The grey diamond and the triangle markers represent the pro-
portion of participants who gave higher ratings to one of the two best decks and the proportion
of participants who selected one of the two best decks as their choice if they were allowed to
select only one deck. The star and the square markers represent the reported expected net and
the calculated net, respectively.
consistent with the previous results relating to the modified payoff matrix, indicating no
dissociation between performance and awareness. In fact, the pattern of both good deck
selections and advantageous wagering is similar to the modified wagering condition in
Experiment 2, albeit with accelerated learning.
Rapid learning can be explained by the probabilistic allocation of wins and losses on
each trial. Fellows and Farah (2005) found that in their shuffled IGT version (the order of
the decks was changed so that losses from the bad decks occurred at the start of the task)
normal control participants selected more cards from the good decks even in the first 20
trials and they kept on choosing the good decks throughout the task. Our probabilistic
version of the payoff schedule removes the reversal learning component (that is, to learn
that the decks which yield higher rewards are disadvantageous in the long run) of the
IGT which can be slow and delay learning of the optimal decisions.
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Since each deck had different overall expected payoffs we investigated whether
participants could discriminate not only between good and bad decks but also within
each pair of decks (A vs B and C vs D). Participants selected more cards from the
good decks in all blocks, 𝑡(20) = 12.02, 𝑝 < .001, and this tendency increased from
block 1 to block 5. Also, they selected more cards from deck C compared to deck D,
𝑡(20) = 3.97, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.87. No significant difference was observed between selections
from decks A and B across blocks, although participants tended to select more cards from
deck B.
Signal Detection Theory Analysis
Participants’ confidence-accuracy levels were examined using Type 2 SDT. As shown
in Figure 3.5 (circle markers), meta-cognitive sensitivity as measured by 𝑑′ was signifi-
cantly above chance (𝑑′ = 0) even in the first 10 trials indicating that even a few deck
selections sufficed to acquire awareness of the advantageous strategy. In other words, par-
ticipants were able to discriminate between good and bad decks and make an appropriate
wager. Figure 3.5 shows a tendency for 𝑑′ to increase across blocks, although the main
effect was not significant, 𝐹 (9, 180) = 1.57,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.43, 𝑝 = .13.
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Figure 3.5: Participants’ metacognitive sensitivity (𝑑′) in Experiment 4.
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Questionnaire
Participants’ knowledge regarding the advantageous strategy was further supported
by the various measures included in the questionnaire. Figure 3.4 shows that they exhib-
ited substantial knowledge about the quality of each deck, even in the first assessment
of awareness (trial 20). In fact, the pattern is similar to that observed in Experiment 1.
Importantly, the mean ratings for each deck give further support to the pattern of deck
selections. Not only are the good decks selected more often than the bad decks, but also
participants’ ratings align with the expected value of each deck. Table 3.2 shows that deck
C is evaluated more positively than deck D even though both decks are advantageous.
In other words, knowledge about the quality of each deck led participants to select more
cards from deck C. Similarly, deck A (which has a higher probability of loss compared to
deck B) has the lowest mean rating.
However, the two measures of awareness are not directly comparable based on the
information shown in Figure 3.4. We applied the same procedure as in Experiment 1
to test whether the proportion of participants who preferred a good deck in the deck-
selected measure (.81) is significantly different from the proportion classified as aware
of the optimal strategy based on wagering (.76) on trials 16-25. The McNemar test for
dependent proportions was not significant, 𝜒2(1) = 0.2, 𝑝 = .65.
Table 3.2: Mean ratings and proportion of selections for each deck in Experiments 4A and 4B
Experiment 4A Experiment 4B
Deck Mean Rating (SD) Choice Mean Rating (SD) Choice
A -5.32 (3.61) 0.09 -2.46 (4.39) 0.15
B -2.94 (4.40) 0.11 -1.47 (5.51) 0.25
C 5.60 (2.98) 0.42 1.58 (3.39) 0.25
D 4.31 (3.29) 0.38 3.52 (4.06) 0.35
Another way of examining the two measures is to look at participants’ deck selection
and wagering in the trials following the administration of the questionnaire (trials 21, 41,
61, 81; we also include trial 100 immediately prior to the final administration of the
questionnaire). Specifically, we are interested in the verbal reports and wagers of those
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participants who behave advantageously (i.e., select good decks) in these trials. Figure
3.6 shows that the majority of participants demonstrate knowledge of the advantageous
strategy in all the questionnaire items. However, wagering underestimates the acquired
knowledge in all trials following the questionnaire compared to the verbal reports. Thus,
it is evident that the detailed and structured questions reflected high levels of awareness
compared to wagering.
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of participants who showed knowledge of the advantageous strategy
in the questionnaire items versus in their wagers in Experiment 4A. Wagering indicates the
percentage of participants who made an advantageous wager (high on a good deck choice) on
the trial immediately following the administration of the questionnaire.
3.2.2 Experiment 4B
3.2.2.1 Method
Partcipants
Nineteen volunteers participated (10 females, age 𝑀 = 24.95, 𝑆𝐷 = 3.15) from
UCL’s subject pool. As in Experiment 4A, they received $2 for participation and an
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additional fee up to $3 dependent on their performance in the task.
Task
The decision-making paradigm was identical to the modified wagering condition
of Experiment 3, that is, the payoff schedule was the same as in the original IGT and
wagering was expressed as a binary choice (“High” and “Low”). The extra component
of this experiment was the questionnaire of Maia and McClelland (2004) which was
administered every 20 trials.
3.2.2.2 Results
Choice and Wagering
The mean probability of selecting a good deck and making an advantageous wager
exceeded chance on block 5 for both measures (Choice: 𝑀 = 0.67, 𝑡(18) = 3.21, 𝑝 =
.005, 𝑑 = 0.70, Wagering: 𝑀 = 0.65, 𝑡(18) = 3.51, 𝑝 = .003, 𝑑 = 0.77) (see Figure 3.7).
Compared to the onset of learning and awareness in Experiment 2, there seems to be a
lag of one block. Despite the fact that both measures are numerically above chance on
block 4 (𝑀 Choice = 0.57, 𝑀 Wagering = 0.53), neither is significant.
A repeated-measures ANOVA showed significant main effects of block on choice,
𝐹 (9, 162) = 12.72, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.32, and wagering, 𝐹 (9, 162) = 8.81, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂
2
𝑔 =
0.28. These results agree with our previous experiments where we used the Clifford et
al. (2008) matrix (Experiment 3, modified wagering group; Experiment 4A). Learning of
the good decks and awareness progressed in the same manner and no dissociation was
observed.
Signal Detection Theory Analysis
Figure 3.5 (square markers) shows that mean 𝑑′ exceeded chance on block 5, 𝑀 =
0.78, 𝑡(18) = 3.97, 𝑝 < .001, in line with the advantageous wagering performance. There
was a significant effect of block, 𝐹 (9, 162) = 8.47,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.57, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.28,
as metacognitive discrimination gradually increased over time. On the other hand, par-
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in Experiment 4B (lines). The grey diamond and the triangle markers represent the
proportion of participants who gave higher rating to one of the two best decks and the proportion
of participants who selected one of the two best decks as their choice if they were allowed to select
only one deck, respectively. The star and the square markers represent the reported expected
net and the calculated net, respectively.
ticipants seemed not to change their wagering strategy across blocks as indicated by a
non-significant effect of block on mean ln β, 𝐹 (9, 162) = 0.88,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.25, 𝑝 = .54.
Questionnaire
The proportion of participants whose responses favoured the good decks is illus-
trated in Figure 3.7. The majority of participants showed a preference for the good decks
in the verbal questions except at the first question period where the proportion was lower
but still above chance.
The mean ratings for each deck (see Table 3.2) converge with the profile of deck
selections. Deck D has the highest mean rating which explains why this deck is selected
more often than the other decks. Even though decks C and D share the same overall
expected values, the small probability of loss on deck D affects the perceived goodness of
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this deck. The same principle applies to deck B too; despite its overall negative appraisal,
it is selected as often as deck C. Also, the high probability of loss on deck A in conjunction
with its negative expected value led participants to negatively evaluate and to avoid
selecting cards from this deck.
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of participants who showed knowledge of the advantageous strategy
in the questionnaire items versus in their wagers in Experiment 4B. Wagering indicates the
percentage of participants who made an advantageous wager (high on a good deck choice) on
the trial immediately following the administration of the questionnaire.
In order to compare how sensitive the two methods are in assessing conscious knowl-
edge we again examined the proportion of participants who behaved advantageously in
the trials following the administration of the questionnaire (we again include trial 100
which immediately preceded the final set of questions). Figure 3.8 demonstrates that in all
question periods the proportion of participants who translated their knowledge into a high
wager is less than the proportion who favoured the good decks in their verbal reports.
This pattern suggests that wagering underestimated participants’ acquired knowledge
and that the more elaborated questions detected higher levels of awareness. Despite the
fact that wagering closely tracks deck selections, it is not therefore an exhaustive and
3 Optimal Strategy, Loss Aversion, and Pay-off Matrices 73
sensitive method to measure awareness. This conclusion is supported by a significant dif-
ference between the proportion of participants who opted for one of the good decks in
the deck-selected measure (.63) and the proportion classified as aware based on wagering
(.32) in the first administration of the questionnaire, 𝜒2(1) = 6, 𝑝 = .014.
3.2.3 Discussion
The key point of Experiments 4A and 4B is that even though wagering closely tracks
deck selection and learning, it underestimates what participants have learned about the
task and deck contingencies. This also applies to the results of Experiment 3 where we
found that small procedural changes can affect the extent to which wagering tracks deck
selection.
Finally, the analysis based on the trials following the administration of the question-
naire suggests that acquired knowledge is not automatically translated into an appropriate
wager after a deck selection (Figures 3.6 and 3.8). Why is this? A possible reason is loss
aversion. The prospect of losing more money/points even if knowledge is above guessing
levels can be aversive.
3.3 Experiment 5
Depending on the setup of the pay-off matrix participants may employ different
response criteria to place high or low wagers which makes the detection of the acquired
knowledge very difficult. This leads to the possibility that the expression of awareness via
wagering may be constrained by factors other than knowledge itself. For instance, many
studies have shown that loss aversion affects awareness assessment as indexed by wagering
(e.g., Dienes & Seth, 2010; Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Wang et al., 2012; Wierzchon´ et al.,
2012).
Schurger and Sher (2008) proposed that the design of a pay-off matrix should take
into account the tendency of participants to evaluate losses worse than equivalent wins.
Unlike Clifford et al.’s (2008) matrix which encourages low wagers when certainty is low,
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“subjects seem to need precisely the opposite sort of encouragement” (Schurger & Sher,
2008, p. 209). Table 3.1 shows the matrix devised by Schurger and Sher as a means
to counter loss aversion. Specifically, looking at Table 3.1, when discrimination between
good and bad decks is at chance it is more advantageous to wager high due to a negative
expected payoff from wagering low [(+1 − 2)/2 = −1/2] compared to a neutral payoff
from wagering high [(+10 − 10)/2 = 0]. Following this, it can be shown that a rational
participant would switch to high wagers even when her discrimination is below chance
(50%), at 8/17 or 47%. Specifically, the differential loss of wagering on a bad decision is 8
(= 10−2) divided by the sum of the differential loss and the differential gain of wagering
on a good decision (10− 1 = 9).
Despite the fact that this matrix discourages participants from wagering low, its
weights regarding high wagers are two times bigger compared to the matrix of Clifford
et al. (2008). On the one hand, the larger loss following a low wager after an incorrect
decision discourages participants from wagering low, thus overcoming the problem of
loss aversion. On the other hand, the bigger weights for high wagers could discourage
participants from wagering high, even when knowledge about the quality of the decks
exists. Thus, the utilisation of this matrix might reveal that the remedy proposed to
counter loss aversion cannot be achieved due to the increased weights associated with
high wagering.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
We tested a total of 30 participants (24 females, age 𝑀 = 25.08, 𝑆𝐷 = 4.02),
recruited from UCL’s psychology subject pool. Participants were rewarded between $1
and $5, proportional to their performance on the task.
Task
The payoffs of each deck were different to the original IGT, but their overall expected
payoffs reflected the ratio of losses to wins of the original task (Table 3.3). There were four
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decks of cards each having 100 associated wins and losses, one for each trial. A randomly
drawn value (win − loss) was then computed for each trial, which constituted the payoff
on that deck for that trial. Decks A and B were bad decks, with an overall net outcome
of −500 points (a net loss of −5 per card). These decks had high rewards (from 15− 25
points), but large losses (from 25− 75). Decks C and D were good decks, with an overall
net outcome of +500 points (a net win of +5 per card). They had lower rewards (from
5− 15), but their losses were smaller too. Decks A, B, and C had a loss on 50% of trials,
whereas Deck D had a loss on 10% of trials. The characteristics of each deck matched
the original IGT, including the probabilities and relative magnitudes of losses, except for
deck B. The losses on deck B were distributed over 50 trials (as against originally 10 trials
only). We did this to avoid a major loss if participants were unlucky enough to encounter
the deck B loss with a high wager. The post-decision wagers comprised multipliers, with
the payoff schedule as proposed by Schurger and Sher (2008). Accordingly, a given IGT
trial payoff was multiplied by a factor of 2 when wagering low on decks A and B, and
by 1 when wagering low on decks C and D. When wagering high, all deck payoffs were
multiplied by a factor of 10.
Table 3.3: Payoff schedule in Experiment 5. The numbers in parentheses show the probability
of the outcome.
Deck A+ A− B+ B− C+ C− D+ D−
+15 (.33) -25 (.17) +15 (.33) -50 (.50) +5 (.33) -5 (.17) +5 (.33) -50 (.10)
+20 (.34) -50 (.16) +20 (.34) 0 (.50) +10 (.34) -10 (.16) +10 (.34) 0 (.90)
+25 (.33) -75 (.17) +25 (.33) +15 (.33) -15 (.17) +15 (.33)
0 (.50) 0 (.50)
Net -5 -5 5 5
3.3.2 Results
Choice and Wagering
Performance exceeded chance on block 1 for both measures (Choice: 𝑡(29) = 2.39, 𝑝 =
.023, Wagering: 𝑡(29) = 2.52, 𝑝 = .018) (Figure 3.9). This result indicates that partici-
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pants’ optimal decision-making and learning about their selections occurred very early in
the task, a pattern that is not observed in previous studies which have utilised a payoff
schedule similar or identical to the original IGT.
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Figure 3.9: Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in Experiment 5. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
Two separate within-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to investigate the progres-
sion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks. There was a sig-
nificant main effect of block on the proportion of good deck selections, 𝐹 (5.54, 160.72) =
16.27,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 2.41, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.24 (Figure 3.9). However, the same trend was not
observed on the proportion of advantageous wagers as the main effect of block was not
significant, 𝐹 (5.14, 149.04) = 2.06,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.33, 𝑝 = .10. Even though wagering was
above chance from block 1, it never exceeded 0.7. In a situation where high wagers have
much greater stakes than low wagers, participants may wager conservatively through-
out the task, independent of learning and awareness, due to an aversion to big losses.
Additionally, advantageous wagering was above chance in all blocks of trials.
Figure 3.10 shows the proportion of deck selections throughout the task. Deck B was
not selected as often as in previous studies using the IGT, a fact which reflects the change
of the loss probability. When the occurrence of losses is more frequent (.5), the prominent
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deck B phenomenon is not observed. On the other hand, deck D (loss probability .1) was
selected more often than deck C (loss probability .5) even though both decks have the
same expected value.
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Figure 3.10: Mean proportion of choices from bad decks (A and B) and good decks (C and
D) in Experiment 5.
3.3.3 Discussion
This experiment confirms the hypothesis that loss aversion modulates wagering
strategies by making participants more sensitive to losses. While the payoff matrix we
used encourages high wagering under uncertainty, the probabilistic IGT variant we em-
ployed was found to be easier to learn than the classic IGT and thus participants were
able to grasp the payoff schedule in the first 10 trials, indicating that they did not go
through a phase of exploration or uncertainty. Having learned the probabilistic structure
of wins and losses early in the task, it might be expected that wagering would simultane-
ously follow the optimal choices. This was the case in the first 2 blocks where participants
had learned about the good strategy and made high wagers. Yet a random loss which
may occur from the selection of a good deck with a high wager (×10) would result in a
large amount of points being deducted from the total sum. Hence, a “lose-less” strategy
seems to overtake the tendency to maximise winnings, and in this particular case leads
to suboptimal wagering. In other words, loss aversion constrains participants from wa-
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gering high on their good deck selections. This is indicative of a bias regulating wagering
strategies and not lack of awareness. While good deck selections gradually increased to
reach a maximum by the end of the task, it would be unreasonable to argue that this
was the effect of an unconscious mechanism.
The present experiment also highlights the inadequacy of post-decision wagering
to measure awareness objectively and directly. Small changes in the payoff matrix can
dramatically change the expression of awareness as cognitive or response biases overtly
influence participants’ wagering strategies.
3.4 General Discussion
The experiments described in the current chapter examined two main response
biases, dominance and loss aversion, which arise from the design of the pay-off matrix. In
both cases, there was a direct effect of the design of the pay-off matrix on the wagering
strategies that participants employed. In Experiment 3, despite the fact that there was a
difference in the onset of learning and awareness in the simple wagering condition, no such
difference was observed in the modified wagering group. Thus we were able conceptually
to replicate Persaud et al.’s (2007) finding of a lag between choice and wagering, but a
simple change in the weights of the pay-off matrix was sufficient to make wagering a more
sensitive method.
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to measure wagering concurrently with explicit
questioning. Experiments 1 and 3 (modified wagering condition) showed that wagering
can closely track learning, but is that alone an adequate indicator of a robust method
for measuring awareness? We employed the questionnaire of Maia and McClelland (2004)
in order to examine how well wagering performs in comparison to another method of
awareness. The results showed that even though wagering followed deck selections, it is
not a sensitive index of awareness as it underestimates the knowledge that participants
possess. We compared the proportions of participants classified as consciously aware by
the two measures. No significant differences were observed in two of the experiments
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because of the small sample sizes, although more participants were identified as aware
according to the questionnaire.
One possible criticism of the quantitative questions employed here is that they might
have a reflexive effect on the very property they are attempting to measure, namely
awareness. However, in Experiment 4A participants’ wagering performance was better
than chance even before the first administration of the questionnaire, indicating that
the explicit nature of the questions did not make participants more aware of the decks’
payoffs.
In Experiment 5, we tried to control for the effects of loss aversion on wagering
strategies, mindful of the possibility that the high values in the wagering matrix could
make participants reluctant to place high wagers. The matrix proposed by Schurger and
Sher (2008) attempts to eliminate loss aversion in situations of uncertainty, that is when
knowledge about a response option is weak. Participants were able to discriminate be-
tween the decks after a few trials. Although wagering performance was better than chance
from the beginning of the task, it did not lead participants to maximise their earnings.
One explanation lies in the design of the task: with random losses occurring even on
selections from the good decks and wagers treated as multipliers of the actual payoffs,
the prospect of losing a significant amount could inhibit the placement of high wagers.

4 Confidence Ratings and Wagering
In the previous experiments we examined two problematic aspects of the use of
post-decision wagering as a measure of awareness and compared it with the quantitative
questions of Maia and McClelland (2004). One possible problem with this comparison is
that it is not a direct one as the questionnaire was administered every 20 trials whereas
wagers had to be placed on every trial. In addition, wagering was used in a binary manner
as participants could place either a high or a low wager on every trial. The first aim
of this chapter was to compare wagering with confidence ratings, a common subjective
measure of awareness which can be used on a trial-by-trial basis. The comparison between
confidence ratings and wagering is a natural one as both measures assess the degree of
certainty about one’s judgments as opposed to other subjective measures such as the
perceptual awareness scale (PAS; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) and the continuous scale
(CS; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004) which are direct and introspective measures of “pure”
awareness (Wierzchon´, Paulewicz, Asanowicz, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2014). Also,
wagering and confidence ratings were used in a gradual manner in the experiments of
this chapter as including more categories could potentially allow for a finer investigation
of awareness and acquired knowledge in the task.
The second aim of the present chapter was to examine the development of learning
and awareness of the advantageous strategy in a dynamic deck-shifting version of the IGT
(Experiment 8). Previous research on deck-shifting variants suggested that participants
were able to adapt to the new environment and select advantageously after an exploration
phase (see Dymond, Cella, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2010; Turnbull, Evans, Kemish, Park, &
Bowman, 2006). While these studies indicated that people are good at detecting change
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and adapt their behaviour accordingly, it is not clear whether participants had conscious
knowledge to support their decisions. It could be that people employ simple strategies
or intuitive heuristics instead of having explicit knowledge of the decks’ contingencies in
order to deal with the increased uncertainty of the environment. In this experiment, con-
scious content was assessed using confidence ratings and two of the quantitative questions
of Maia and McClelland (2004).
4.1 Experiment 6
The purpose of this experiment was to compare post-decision wagering with con-
fidence ratings, the simplest and most commonly used subjective measure of awareness
(for some examples see Dienes et al., 1995; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010;
Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Tunney & Shanks, 2003). Confidence ratings are metacognitive
reports about having performed a judgment or discrimination accurately (e.g., perception
of a subliminal visual stimulus) or having selected the best from a set of alternatives (e.g.,
selection of a good deck in the IGT). Confidence ratings can be expressed in a binary
way such as “not confident” and “very confident” (different labels have been employed
such as “guessing” and “knowing”) or on a continuous Likert-like scale.
In this experiment we used a 2-point confidence scale in order to make a direct
comparison with binary wagering, and also a 4-point scale to gain deeper insights into
the confidence-performance relationship.
4.1.1 Method
Participants
There were 118 participants in the experiment (97 females, age 𝑀 = 18.73, 𝑆𝐷 =
0.90), all of whom were psychology undergraduate students at University College London
and took part in fulfilment of a course requirement. The 6 best performers on the task
were awarded $15 each.
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Design
The experiment consisted of three different conditions: binary wagering (𝑁 = 40),
binary confidence ratings (𝑁 = 40) and 4-point confidence ratings (𝑁 = 38). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions.
Task
The original IGT payoff schedule was used across conditions. After each card selec-
tion, participants were asked to indicate their awareness of the deck payoffs using wagering
or confidence ratings. In the binary wagering condition, participants had to place a wager,
High ($2) or Low ($1), which multiplied the payoffs associated with each deck and trial
(this condition was identical to the simple wagering condition of Experiment 3). In the
binary confidence condition, participants were asked to express their confidence in having
selected a good deck using the descriptions 1 = “I am not confident” and 2 = “I am very
confident”. The descriptions for the 4-point confidence scale were 1 = “I am guessing”, 2
= “I am not confident”, 3 = “I am quite confident”, and 4 = “I am very confident”.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of previous experiments, with the exception
that a different set of instructions was presented for the confidence ratings measure.
4.1.2 Results
Choice and awareness
Evidence of conscious knowledge regarding the optimal strategy in the binary wa-
gering condition was obtained using advantageous wagering (a high wager after a good
deck and a low wager after a bad deck). The same principle was applied to the confi-
dence ratings conditions so that the combinations good deck/high confidence and bad
deck/low confidence were taken to indicate conscious knowledge. In this stage of the
analysis the 4-point scale was dichotomised with confidence levels 1 and 2 collapsed
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to signify low confidence and 3 and 4 collapsed to give high confidence. We then iden-
tified the onset of choice and awareness as the first block at which performance was
significantly above chance (0.5) for each of the three conditions (see Figure 4.1). With
this method, good deck selections exceeded the chance level on block 5 for the binary
confidence ratings, 𝑀 = 0.60; 𝑡(39) = 3.00, 𝑝 = .004, 𝑑 = 0.48, and wagering groups,
𝑀 = 0.60; 𝑡(39) = 2.82, 𝑝 = .007, 𝑑 = 0.45, and block 6 for the 4-point confidence group,
𝑀 = 0.62; 𝑡(37) = 3.73, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.61. These results indicate slightly later (about 1
block) deck discrimination than in previous experiments.
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of good deck selections and awareness across blocks of trials for each
group in Experiment 6.
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Regarding conscious knowledge of the deck values, confidence ratings significantly
exceeded chance at the same time as or earlier than choice in the confidence rating groups,
namely at block 5 in both cases (2pts scale: 𝑀 = 0.62; 𝑡(39) = 3.89, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑑 = 0.62,
4pts scale: 𝑀 = 0.58; 𝑡(37) = 2.28, 𝑝 = .029, 𝑑 = 0.37), whereas there was a delay of (at
least) one block in the onset of conscious knowledge as indexed by wagering (block 6),
𝑀 = 0.59; 𝑡(39) = 2.23, 𝑝 = .031, 𝑑 = 0.35. This last result replicates what was observed
in the simple wagering group of Experiment 3, namely a delay in the onset of awareness.
In both groups, deck discrimination became significant at block 5, while advantageous
wagering did not become significant until block 6 (Experiment 6, wagering) or block 7
(Experiment 3, simple wagering). In fact the data from the two groups are more similar
still, as in the present wagering group advantageous wagering was not significantly greater
than chance in blocks 7, 8, and 9.
A 3 (group) × 10 (block) mixed ANOVA on the mean proportion of good deck
selections showed no main effect of group, 𝐹 (2, 115) = 0.88,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 15.05, 𝑝 = .42, 𝜂2𝑔 =
0.004, but there was a significant effect of block 𝐹 (7.38, 848.97) = 47.86,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.65, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.22. Also, no significant interaction between group and block (main effect) was
observed, 𝐹 (14.76, 848.97) = 0.73,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.65, 𝑝 = .75, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.008 (Greenhouse-Geisser
correction). In general, these results suggest that the acquisition of the advantageous
strategy was not substantially affected by the different subjective measures of awareness
and participants were able to learn to discriminate between the decks based on their
overall expected values.
The second important conclusion from this analysis refers to the pattern of overall
deck selections; despite the fact that participants learned to discriminate between the
decks, this learning effect was rather weak. Figure 4.2 illustrates that participants did
not take into account the infrequent but rather large losses in deck B as this deck was
selected as often as deck D, showing a strong loss-frequency effect. Interestingly, deck B
was the overall deck of choice in the 4-points confidence group.
The same type of analysis was applied to mean performance on the awareness mea-
sures. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of condition, 𝐹 (2, 115) = 3.96,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
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Figure 4.2: Mean proportion of choices from each deck in the three groups in Experiment 6.
11.68, 𝑝 = .022, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.02, which was mainly driven by a significant difference between
the overall means of binary confidence ratings (𝑀 = 0.59) and wagering (𝑀 = 0.52)
(Tukey’s HSD, 𝑝 = .016). No other significant differences between the three measures
were observed. The main effect of block was significant, 𝐹 (7.63, 877.57) = 21.41,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
3.70, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.12, indicating that participants’ responses in the confidence and
wagering measures were consistent with learning of the advantageous strategy. Partici-
pants were able to demonstrate conscious knowledge which closely tracked their decisions.
Also, the interaction between group and the block main effect did not reach significance,
𝐹 (15.26, 877.57) = 1.04,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.70, 𝑝 = .41.
Signal Detection Theory Analysis
The confidence-accuracy relationship was examined using Type 2 SDT. Figure 4.3
confirms the pattern described above, namely that wagering underestimates awareness
compared to confidence ratings. The mean 𝑑′ exceeded chance in block 5 for both the
confidence ratings scales (2pts: 𝑀 = 0.45, 𝑡(39) = 2.80, 𝑝 = .007, 4pts: 𝑀 = 0.57, 𝑡(37) =
4.17, 𝑝 < .001) although it was not significantly above chance for the 2-point scale in
block 6 (see Figure 4.3). In contrast, the mean 𝑑′ for wagering was only marginally above
chance in block 6 (𝑀 = 0.34, 𝑡(39) = 1.99, 𝑝 = .05), and never reliably exceeded chance
for the rest of the task. A 3 (group) × 10 (block) mixed ANOVA on the mean 𝑑′ confirmed
a significant main effect of group, 𝐹 (2, 115) = 7.08,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 1.83, 𝑝 = .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.03,
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due to significant differences between wagering and the confidence scales (Wagering 𝑀 =
0.02, 2pts 𝑀 = 0.31, 4pts 𝑀 = 0.34) based on pairwise comparisons between wagering
and confidence ratings using Tukey’s HSD, 𝑝 = .005 (2pts) and 𝑝 = .002 (4pts). There
was also a significant effect of block, 𝐹 (18, 1035) = 18.89,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.78, 𝑝 < .001. The
interaction between group and the block main effect, however, did not reach significance,
𝐹 (18, 1035) = 1.11,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.78, 𝑝 = .34.
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Figure 4.3: Participants’ metacognitive sensitivity (𝑑′) in Experiment 6.
Analysis of the 4-point confidence ratings
We examined the 4-point confidence ratings in order to provide a more detailed
assessment of conscious knowledge in the IGT by employing a nonparametric receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. Two separate ROC curves were constructed,
one before the onset of good deck selections (blocks 1-5) and one after (blocks 6-10).
Deck selection performance did not significantly change across blocks 6-10, 𝐹 (4, 148) =
0.97, 𝑝 = .43, allowing for a finer examination of the respective ROC curve. Figure 4.4
shows that the probability of selecting a good deck gradually increases with confidence in
blocks 6-10 whereas the straight ROC line for blocks 1-5 is indicative of a poor relationship
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between accuracy and confidence. The Type 2 sensitivity derived from these curves (A, the
area under the ROC curve) indicated above-chance (.50) metacognitive discriminability
for blocks 6-10, 𝐴 = .65, 95% CI [.63, .68], but not for blocks 1-5, 𝐴 = .48, 95% CI [.46,
.51] (for the calculation of confidence intervals see DeLong, DeLong, & Clarke-Pearson,
1988). In addition, fitting the ROC model to each individual participant for blocks 6-10
revealed substantial variability across participants (see Figure 4.4-B).
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Figure 4.4: (A) Type 2 ROC curves for the blocks before (1-5) and after (6-10) the onset of
good deck selection in Experiment 6. (B) Distribution of the area under the curve (A) when
fitting the ROC model to each participant (blocks 6-10).
This fine-grained assessment of the confidence-accuracy relationship suggests that
participants’ decisions were accompanied by fairly accurate confidence reports. It is also
important to investigate how participants utilised the confidence rating scale and whether
there was any involvement of unconscious or implicit knowledge after the onset of good
deck selection (blocks 6-10). The latter was assessed by using the guessing criterion
(Dienes et al., 1995) according to which unconscious knowledge is present when partici-
pants can discriminate between good and bad decks at above chance levels when they are
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guessing or their confidence is low. We calculated the mean proportion of good deck se-
lections for each confidence level. Importantly, at neither of the two low-confidence levels
(i.e., 1 = “I am guessing” and 2 = “I am not confident”) did deck selection significantly
exceed chance (0.50) (Means for each level: 1 = 0.47, 2 = 0.49, 3 = 0.72, 4 = 0.78),
indicating that good deck selections were not made under conditions of low confidence
and that conscious knowledge strongly associated with above-chance performance on the
IGT. Also, the mean confidence following good deck selections was 2.66 (SEM = 0.10)
and for bad deck selections was 2.08 (SEM = 0.09). The difference between these values
was significant, 𝑡(37) = 8.50, 𝑝 < .001, suggesting the same conclusion as the guessing
criterion. Participants were more confident when they made a good rather than a bad
deck choice.
4.1.3 Discussion
The present experiment provides another demonstration of the involvement of con-
scious knowledge in the IGT. When participants started to consistently sample from the
good decks, they were able to report their acquired knowledge through their confidence
ratings. However, post-decision wagering showed a similar pattern as in the simple wa-
gering condition of Experiment 3, namely a lag in the onset of wagering compared to
deck selection. While this latter pattern might be indicative of unconscious processes in
choice behaviour, the results from the confidence groups suggest a simpler explanation,
namely that wagering is an insensitive measure of awareness.
The confidence rating scales produced similar results when the 4-point scale was
collapsed into two categories. A more detailed examination of the continuous scale re-
vealed that participants’ deck selections were accompanied by accurate confidence ratings.
Specifically, the ROC analysis showed increased metacognitive monitoring after the point
at which performance on the IGT began to exceed chance. While the presence of conscious
knowledge does not necessarily mean that unconscious or implicit processing is absent,
data from the guessing criterion analysis suggest that deck selections and confidence
ratings are highly related to one another.
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4.2 Experiment 7
In all the experiments described so far, post-decision wagering was employed in a
binary manner: participants could place a wager expressed as “Low” or “High”. How-
ever, wagering can be used as a gradual scale, with discrete monetary wagers. According
to Dienes (2008) a gradual scale with more than two categories is likely to be more
sensitive than a binary scale as it allows finer discriminations of the acquired knowl-
edge. In contrast, Tunney and Shanks (2003) showed that binary confidence scales were
more sensitive in artificial grammar learning (AGL) tasks. Dienes (2008) used 6 differ-
ent confidence scales in an AGL task: binary (high, low), binary (guess, sure), numerical
(50%-100%) with and without detailed information about what the numbers should in-
dicate, numerical categories in bins of 10 (e.g., 51-59, 60-69 etc.), and verbal categories
(“complete guess”, “more or less guessing”, “somewhat sure”, “fairly sure”, “quite sure”,
“almost certain”, “certain”). He surprisingly found no significant differences in terms of
sensitivity as all of the scales demonstrated a similar measure of the confidence-accuracy
relationship.
In this experiment, we employed two versions of post-decision wagering (binary and
gradual with four monetary categories) and confidence ratings with four categories as in
Experiment 6. Although many studies have shown that wagering (even with a gradual
implementation) is no more sensitive and exhaustive than confidence ratings, it is possible
that gradual wagering may be more appropriate than binary wagering.
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Fifty-three individuals (recruited from the UCL subject pool) participated in the
study (33 females, age 𝑀 = 22.15, 𝑆𝐷 = 6.56). They received $2 for their participation.
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Design
There were three different conditions: binary wagering (𝑁 = 18), 4-point wagering
(𝑁 = 17) and 4-point confidence ratings (𝑁 = 18). Participants were randomly allocated
to one of three groups.
Task
The payoff schedule of Experiment 1 was used in this experiment (see Appendix A).
The reason was to examine gradual wagering under the payoff schedule used by Persaud et
al. (2007) and compare it against binary wagering. After their deck selection participants
were asked to report their awareness in one of the three measures. In the binary wagering
condition, participants chose between $10 (Low) and $20 (High) whereas in the 4-point
wagering participants had 4 available wagers: $5, $10, $15, and $20. The selected wager
multiplied the payoffs of each deck and trial. The descriptions for the 4-point confidence
scale were as in Experiment 6: 1 = “I am guessing”, 2 = “I am not confident”, 3 = “I
am quite confident”, and 4 = “I am very confident”. Since there was no change in the
payoffs in the confidence ratings group, they were scaled up by a factor of 10 in order to
maintain a similar level of payoffs across conditions.
4.2.2 Results
Choice and Awareness
In this stage, the 4-point scales (wagering and confidence ratings) were dichotomised
with wagers $5 and $10 indicating low wagering and wagers $15 and $20 high wagering.
Similarly, confidence levels 1 and 2 were collapsed to signify low confidence and levels
3 and 4 to give high confidence. Following the procedure of the previous experiments,
neither of the measures (choice and awareness) was significantly above chance throughout
the task (all one-sample t-tests, 𝑝 > .05; Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Proportion of good deck selections and awareness across blocks of trials for each
group in Experiment 7.
Participants consistently selected more cards from the disadvantageous deck B,
showing a strong loss-frequency effect and attention to immediate higher rewards (Figure
4.6). Deck B is the overall deck of choice across conditions followed by deck D. Participants
never started to reliably choose from the good decks which is evident in the progression of
the good deck selections measure in Figure 4.5. Selections from the good decks show an in-
creasing trend across blocks of trials, 𝐹 (6.79, 339.64) = 7.63,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 4.87, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 =
0.09, but this trend is rather weak as it never reached above chance performance. Neither
the main effect of condition, 𝐹 (2, 50) = 0.24,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 23.08, 𝑝 = .79, nor the interaction
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(condition× block), 𝐹 (13.59, 339.64) = 1.01,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 4.87, 𝑝 = 0.45, reached significance.
These results suggest that participants behaved similarly across conditions, favouring the
decks with infrequent losses.
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Figure 4.6: Mean proportion of choices from each deck and group in Experiment 7.
Mean awareness ratings across blocks revealed a similar picture: the main effect
of block was significant, 𝐹 (6.82, 341.37) = 8.00,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 4.81, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.09, but
awareness was constrained due to the overall low performance in the task. The progres-
sion of awareness was similar across conditions as the main effect of condition, 𝐹 (2, 50) =
2.30,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 17.67, 𝑝 = .11, and the interaction, 𝐹 (13.65, 341.37) = 0.46,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
4.81, 𝑝 = 0.97, were not significant. At a first glance, Figure 4.5 suggests that aware-
ness did not lag behind performance on the task, indicating no dissociation between the
two measures. In fact, in the 4-point wagering group, awareness is higher than good deck
selections throughout the task which suggests that participants wagered advantageously
by placing low wagers ($5, $10) on bad deck selections. However, the observed pattern
of the two measures is not overly suggestive that learning and awareness developed in
parallel. It is possible that if participants had learned the advantageous strategy and
selected more cards from the good decks, a dissociation could have emerged.
Although many IGT studies have found a clear preference for deck B (see Stein-
groever, Wetzels, Horstmann, et al., 2013), this preference is taken as evidence of poor
performance on the task. To rule out the possibility that learning and awareness are not
dissociable in the context of the IGT, we applied a median split on the overall proportion
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of selections from the good decks (C and D), in order to examine how awareness pro-
gressed in the group of participants who performed advantageously on the task (Figure
4.7).
Low Performers High Performers
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
C
onfidence R
atings (4pts)
W
agering (2pts)
W
agering (4pts)
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Block
M
ea
n 
P
ro
po
rti
on
Good Deck Selection Awareness
Figure 4.7: Proportion of good deck selections and awareness for low and high performers
across blocks of trials and groups in Experiment 7.
Focusing on the high performing group, we identified the onset of choice and aware-
ness for each of the three conditions. Good deck selection exceeded chance on block 3
(trials 41-60) for the 4-point confidence group, 𝑀 = 0.63, 𝑡(9) = 2.35, 𝑝 = .043, and
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the 4-point wagering, 𝑀 = 0.67, 𝑡(8) = 4.59, 𝑝 = .002, and block 4 (trials 61-80) for
the binary wagering group, 𝑀 = 0.68, 𝑡(8) = 2.60, 𝑝 = .031. These results indicate that
the onset of good deck selection for the high performers is similar to that of previous
experiments. Regarding conscious knowledge of the advantageous strategy, the 4-point
confidence and wagering scales significantly exceeded chance on block 3 (4-point CR:
𝑀 = 0.66, 𝑡(9) = 2.67, 𝑝 = .025, 4-point wagering: 𝑀 = 0.61, 𝑡(8) = 2.46, 𝑝 = .039),
whereas the binary wagering never crossed the chance level (all blocks, 𝑝 > .05), indicat-
ing a possible failure to detect acquired knowledge. The latter might be taken as evidence
that the binary wagering employed in previous experiments and by Persaud et al. (2007)
is an insensitive method. On the other hand, gradual wagering tracked closely good deck
selection, suggesting that the use of more than two categories could potentially allow par-
ticipants to use wagering adaptively and in accordance with their knowledge. However
these are weak conclusions as the patterns in the two wagering groups are numerically
very similar, as shown in Figure 4.7.
ROC Analysis
As in Experiment 6, we employed a nonparametric ROC analysis for a more detailed
assessment of conscious knowledge and how participants utilised each awareness scale.
We only applied the analysis on the high performing group of each condition and we
constructed two ROC curves, one before the onset of good deck selections (blocks 1-2)
and one after (blocks 3-5). Figure 4.8 shows good discriminability between good and bad
decks after the onset of good deck selection (block 3) which increase with higher confidence
or higher wagering amounts. All three scales demonstrated above chance metacognitive
sensitivity (A, the area under the curve - AUC), 2-point wagering: 𝐴 = .55, 95% CI
[.52, .60], 4-point wagering: 𝐴 = .64, 95% CI [.59, .68], 4-point confidence ratings: 𝐴 =
.59, 95% CI [.54, .63]. The analysis showed that the AUC for the 4-point wagering was
numerically above .50 in blocks 1-2 but not significantly different from chance (𝐴 =
.53, 95% CI [.47, .59]). A comparison of the AUCs showed that there was a significant
difference between the 4-point wagering and the binary wagering scales, 𝑧 = 2.38, 𝑝 =
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.017, but no other significant differences were observed.
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Figure 4.8: Type 2 ROC curves for the blocks before (1-2) and after (3-5) the onset of good
deck selections for each group in Experiment 7.
We also examined how participants used the scales and the proportion of low ratings
after selecting a good deck. According to the guessing criterion, if participants use the
lowest ratings of a scale while their performance is above chance then this is an indicator
of unconscious learning. The proportion of good deck selections for each confidence rating
indicated that more good deck selections made under high confidence (Means for each
level: 1 = 0.44, 2 = 0.49, 3 = 0.72, 4 = 0.67), and a similar pattern was observed for the
4-point wagering scale (Means for each level: $5 = 0.58, $10 = 0.59, $15 = 0.67, $20
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= 0.81). However, while there is a gradual increase from the lowest to the highest wager
amount, the proportion of good deck selections at the lowest rating ($5) was above 0.50
which would indicate that above-chance performance is guided by implicit influences.
However, this pattern can be explained by loss aversion: even when participants have
acquired some conscious knowledge about their decisions and can discriminate between
good and bad decks, the prospect of losing money/points may lead them to place low
wagers.
4.2.3 Discussion
In this experiment we compared three different measures of awareness in the con-
text of the IGT, binary wagering, 4-point wagering, and 4-point confidence ratings. The
main results indicated that participants did not learn to significantly discriminate be-
tween good and bad decks and awareness was constrained due to this pattern. In order
to examine whether learning dissociates from awareness, we performed a median split on
the proportion of good deck selections and focused on those participants who performed
advantageously. The results showed no dissociation between learning and awareness when
participants started to select more cards from the good decks in the 4-point scales (wa-
gering and confidence ratings). However, awareness as indexed by the binary wagering
measure never reliably exceeded chance indicating a possible failure to detect conscious
knowledge. In addition, the ROC analysis showed that there was a significant difference
between binary and 4-point wagering in assessing the level of metacognitive monitoring
suggesting that wagering can possibly be more sensitive if it is used with more categories.
The analysis based on the guessing criterion revealed a difference between 4-point
wagering and confidence ratings in the way participants used the two scales. While confi-
dence ratings showed no involvement of unconscious learning after the onset of good deck
selections (i.e., the proportion of good deck selections at the lowest rating was below 0.50),
inspection of the 4-point wagering measure revealed some influence of implicit knowledge
(the proportion of good decks selected at the lowest rating was 0.58). As it seems rather
unlikely that in the same version of the IGT the involvement of implicit learning is present
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or absent depending on the scale used, we conclude that confidence ratings and wagering
differ in their sensitivity to low levels of consciousness (Wierzchon´ et al., 2012). The most
plausible explanation is that wagering is affected by loss aversion, leading participants to
place low wagers even if they are consciously aware of the task structure. The effect of loss
aversion on wagering strategies which forces participants to select more often the lowest
rating has been observed in many studies which compared different subjective measures
of awareness (see Sandberg, Bibby, & Overgaard, 2013; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Wierz-
chon´ et al., 2012). In a recent re-analysis of Szczepanowski et al.’s (2013) study which
compared three subjective measures of awareness (post-decision wagering, confidence rat-
ings, and perceptual awareness scale [PAS] ratings), Sandberg et al. (2013) found that
confidence and PAS ratings were significantly more sensitive than post-decision wager-
ing. Sandberg et al. suggested that “there in now convincing evidence that post-decision
wagering should only be used when participants are unable to use other, more direct
measures such as confidence ratings and PAS, and when doing this, analyses should take
loss aversion into account” (p. 809).
4.3 Experiment 8
The payoffs that participants receive in experience-based tasks can depend on a
series of dimensions: probability, magnitude, domain (wins, losses, or mixed), and rela-
tionship or association with the feedback from other alternatives. Another distinction
refers to the overall nature of the task, ranging from complete stationary environments
(i.e., actions are sequential and the environment does not change over time) to com-
plete dynamic environments where the environment changes over time based on some
inherent properties of the system but also as a function of the agent’s previous decisions
(Brehmer, 1992; Busemeyer, 2002; Edwards, 1962). The original IGT can be seen as a
semi-stationary (or semi-dynamic) task because the payoff schedule for each deck is pre-
programmed (i.e., the outcomes are not sampled from a probability distribution) but the
payoffs that each deck returns are not identical on every trial. In addition, participants’
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selections have no effect on future outcomes.
The purpose of this experiment was to examine how learning and awareness develop
in a dynamic variant of the IGT. Specifically, the decks swap their payoffs every 50 trials
in such a way that the good decks become bad and vice-versa. It is of particular interest
to investigate participants’ choice behaviour and whether it adjusts to the environment of
each deck-shift period. Importantly, if participants exhibit adaptive behaviour and select
advantageously, then the question is whether this is accompanied by conscious knowledge
of the decks’ quality.
4.3.1 Method
Participants
Forty participants (21 females, age 𝑀 = 26.28, 𝑆𝐷 = 8.47) were recruited from the
UCL subject pool. All participants received a turn-up payment of $1 and an additional
amount up to $2, depending on their performance in the task.
Task and Design
The experiment consisted of two conditions: the control (𝑁 = 20) and the switch
groups (𝑁 = 20). The original IGT payoff schedule was used and participants had to
select a card from any deck they chose for 200 trials. After their card selection and before
receiving the outcome of their choice, participants indicated their confidence in having
selected a good deck using a 4-point confidence scale. The descriptions of the scale were
the same as in previous experiments (see Experiments 6 and 7). In addition, every 50
trials participants were asked to provide ratings about the perceived goodness of each
deck (Ratings - Question 1 in Appendix B) and which of the four decks they would
choose if they could only select cards from one deck for the remainder of the task (Deck
Selected - Question 3 in Appendix B).
In the switch group, a new deck contingency period was introduced every 50 trials,
immediately after the administration of the two questions. The deck positions remained
the same on the screen but the payoffs of each deck changed. During these shift periods,
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the initially good decks C and D (Period 1: Trials 1-50) were replaced by decks A and
B (Period 2: Trials 51-100). In shift Period 3 (trials 101-150) each deck had the same
payoffs as in Period 1 whereas in Period 4 (Trials 151-200) each deck changed quality
(good or bad) and the probability of the losses it produced (frequent or infrequent) (see
Figure 4.9).
Deck Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
A
B
C
D
Good - Frequent Good - Infrequent
Bad - Frequent Bad - Infrequent
Figure 4.9: Schematic representation of the quality (good-bad) and frequency of losses
(frequent-infrequent) of each deck for the four shift periods in the switch group of Experiment
8.
4.3.2 Results
Control Group
As in previous experiments, the 4-point confidence scale was dichotomised so that
the lowest ratings (1 and 2) indicated low confidence whereas the highest ratings (3 and
4) indicated high confidence. We then identified the point at which both measures became
significantly better than chance. Good deck selection exceeded chance on block 4 (trials
61-80),𝑀 = 0.64, 𝑡(19) = 2.83, 𝑝 = .01, at the same point as awareness𝑀 = 0.65, 𝑡(19) =
2.81, 𝑝 = .011 (Figure 4.10). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed significant main effects
of block on good deck selection, 𝐹 (4.61, 87.64) = 10.26,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 13.15, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 =
0.21, and awareness, 𝐹 (3.78, 71.84) = 2.73,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 20.65, 𝑝 = .03, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.08. These
results suggest a similar interpretation as in previous experiments: when participants
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started to consistently select more cards from the good decks, conscious knowledge about
their choices closely followed. The slightly later onset of good deck selections compared
to previous experiments can be attributed to the longer duration of the present task. It
is possible that participants spent more time exploring the task before they switched to
the decks which give better outcomes since they knew that the task comprised 200 trials.
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Figure 4.10: Proportion of good deck selections and awareness across blocks of trials in the
control group of Experiment 8.
The next step in the analysis was to examine the proportion of choices from in-
dividual decks across blocks of trials in parallel with the confidence ratings and ques-
tionnaire responses. Figure 4.11-A shows the mean proportion of choices from each deck
across blocks of 50 trials which is in accordance with the mean confidence ratings after
each deck selection (Figure 4.11-B). During the first block, participants selected more
cards from decks B and D and this is reflected in the confidence ratings. Both decks
receive a higher rating compared to the decks with infrequent losses, A and C. However,
the questionnaire responses revealed a different picture: even in the first administra-
tion of the questionnaire participants rated the good decks C and D higher than the
bad decks A and B (Figure 4.11-C). Decks C and D receive positive ratings through-
out the task whereas decks B and D are consistently on the negative side of the scale.
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A 2 (deck [good, bad]) × 4 (block) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant
main effect of deck, 𝐹 (1, 19) = 29.28,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 41.3, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.40, with good
decks receiving higher ratings than bad decks, and a significant deck × block interaction,
𝐹 (3, 57) = 5.97,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 7.55, 𝑝 = .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.07, indicating that the difference between
good and bad decks increased across blocks. The main effect of block was not signifi-
cant, 𝐹 (3, 57) = 1.04, 𝑝 = .38. A similar picture emerges in the “deck selected” question
(Figure 4.11-D): the majority (70%) of participants would select one of the good decks
for the remainder of the task even when they were asked on trial 50 and this percentage
increases in the remaining blocks (75%, 85%, 90%, respectively).
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Figure 4.11: Deck selections and awareness measures across blocks of 50 trials in the control
group of Experiment 8. A) Mean proportion of choices from each deck. B) Mean confidence
ratings for each deck. C) Mean questionnaire ratings. D) Proportion of participants who would
select each deck for the remainder of the task.
These results demonstrate that conscious knowledge of the deck contingencies is
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the driving force for participants to behave advantageously. Although knowledge of the
advantageous strategy is present even before the first administration of the questionnaire,
participants did not exclusively select cards from the good decks. In fact, our results are
consistent with those of Maia and McClelland (2004) who noted that “the tendency is
for knowledge of the advantageous strategy to be more evident in all of the verbal report
measures than in behaviour (which may be due to exploration of the different decks or
risk-taking by some participants)” (p. 16077).
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Figure 4.12: Type 2 ROC curves for the blocks before (1-3) and after (4-10) the onset of good
deck selections in the control group of Experiment 8.
The confidence-accuracy relationship was examined using an ROC analysis. Two
curves were constructed, one before (blocks 1-3) and one after the onset of good deck
selections (blocks 4-10). Deck selection performance did not significantly change across
blocks 4-10, 𝐹 (6, 114) = 1.25,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 11.31, 𝑝 = .28. Figure 4.12 shows that there
is above-chance metacognitive discriminability after the onset of choice (blocks 4-10),
𝐴 = 0.66, 95% CI [0.64, 0.68] but not before (blocks 1-3), 𝐴 = 0.48, 95% CI [0.45, 0.52].
The proportion of good deck selections for each confidence level showed that higher ratings
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were given to the good decks (levels: 1 = 0.48, 2 = 0.58, 3 = 0.76, 4 = 0.82). According to
the guessing criterion, the lowest confidence rating did not reveal above chance accuracy
indicating no involvement of unconscious knowledge in advantageous selections (Dienes et
al., 1995; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012) which is consistent with the guessing criterion analysis
in Experiments 6 and 7.
Switch Group
Figure 4.13 shows good deck selection and awareness in the switch group. As in
the control group, the awareness measure is calculated after dichotomising the 4-point
confidence scale. The good deck selection measure represents the proportion of selections
from the advantageous decks across shift periods (dotted vertical lines). For example, in
shift period 2 (blocks 6-10) the red line indicates the proportion of selections from decks
A and B which are advantageous in this period. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed a
significant main effect of shift period, 𝐹 (3, 57) = 4.26,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 48.67, 𝑝 = .008, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.09,
as participants progressively selected more cards from the advantageous decks. Individual
repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed within each shift period. The main effect of
block was significant only in period 3, 𝐹 (4, 76) = 3.16,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 5.67, 𝑝 = 0.02, in which
participants selected more cards from the good decks. Examination of the awareness
measure revealed a similar picture. There was a significant main effect of shift period,
𝐹 (3, 57) = 4.75,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 42.82, 𝑝 = .005, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.10, and significant effects of block in
period 3, 𝐹 (4, 76) = 5.56,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 3.22, 𝑝 < .001, and period 4, 𝐹 (4, 76) = 3.99,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
4.91, 𝑝 = .005.
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Figure 4.13: Proportion of good deck selections and awareness across blocks of trials and shift
periods (vertical dotted lines) in the switch group of Experiment 8.
To further investigate participants’ choice behaviour and the knowledge they ac-
quired during the task, we analysed their responses in the questionnaire reports. The
decks were categorised based on whether they were good (green colour) or bad (red
colour) and whether they produced infrequent (solid colour) or frequent losses (transpar-
ent colour) in each shift period (Figure 4.14). Choice behaviour was similar to that in
the control group in period 1 as participants selected more cards from the bad deck with
infrequent losses (i.e., deck B) and their mean confidence ratings followed this tendency
(Figure 4.14-B). When looking at the questionnaire responses on trial 50 (end of shift
period 1) a slightly different pattern emerges: participants seem to be aware of the task
structure as they gave higher ratings for the good decks (Figure 4.14-C) and opted for
one of the good decks in the deck selected measure (Figure 4.14-D). A 2 (deck [good,
bad]) × 4 (block) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of deck,
𝐹 (1, 19) = 21.97,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 12.96, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.16, with good decks receiving higher
ratings than bad decks, but the interaction between deck and block was not significant,
𝐹 (3, 57) = 0.59,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 6.58, 𝑝 = .62, suggesting that the difference between good and
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bad decks remained constant across blocks of trials. Interestingly, the good deck with
frequent losses received a marginally higher rating and more participants would select it
compared to the good deck with infrequent losses. In the following shift periods (2, 3,
and 4) the pattern of questionnaire responses is similar: good decks attain higher ratings
and participants would prefer these decks to select cards from for the remainder of the
task. In other words, participants were able to discover which were the good decks by
the end of each period and indicated their preference and knowledge in the quantitative
questions.
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Figure 4.14: Deck selections and awareness measures across blocks of 50 trials in the switch
group of Experiment 8. The green and red colours indicate good and back decks, respectively.
Transparent and solid colours indicate decks with frequent and infrequent losses, respectively.
A) Mean proportion of choices from each deck. B) Mean confidence ratings for each deck. C)
Mean questionnaire ratings. D) Proportion of participants who would select each deck for the
remainder of the task.
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The mean proportion of good deck selections and confidence ratings in period 2
showed that participants did not translate their acquired knowledge into making more
advantageous choices. Even though confidence ratings discriminate between good and
bad decks by period 3, the effect of this knowledge on choice behaviour is rather weak
as the difference between good and bad decks is small (Figure 4.14-A) even in the last 5
blocks of the task (period 4). However, this approach takes into account all the choices
within one period and thus participants’ choices within the first blocks of each period
may reflect what they have learned about the task and the decks from the immediately
preceding period. Thus, we looked at the choice behaviour and confidence ratings at the
last block of each period. Figure 4.15 shows a pattern which is in accordance with the
questionnaire responses. Apart from block 5 in which participants thought that deck
B (bad deck-infrequent losses) was a good deck and gave higher confidence ratings after
selections from this deck, the remaining blocks showed a consistent pattern: advantageous
decks with high expected values are selected more often and their ratings suggested a
strong relationship between selections and awareness. Importantly, participants seemed
to effectively adapt to the shifts in contingencies and learned the advantageous strategy
by the end of each shift period.
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Figure 4.15: Mean proportion of choices from each deck (A) and mean confidence ratings (B)
for the last block of each shift period in the switch group of Experiment 8.
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Another way to examine whether participants learned the advantageous strategy in
each period is to look at the number of switches between decks as a rough measure of
exploration. It was hypothesised that participants would explore more in the first trials of
each period but when they discovered which were the good decks they would start to ex-
ploit and select more cards from these decks. As expected, Figure 4.16 shows this pattern:
participants switched between cards more often during the first blocks than later blocks
of each period and this tendency was more pronounced in the last 2 shift periods of the
task. The main effect of block was significant only in periods 3, 𝐹 (4, 76) = 3.94,𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
0.04, 𝑝 = .006, 𝜂2𝑔 = 0.05, and 4, 𝐹 (4, 76) = 2.52,𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 0.04, 𝑝 = .048, 𝜂
2
𝑔 = 0.03,
indicating that participants progressively decreased the number of switches and focused
more on a single deck to choose cards from.
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Figure 4.16: Mean proportion of switches across blocks of trials for each shift period in the
switch group of Experiment 8.
The next step was to examine choice behaviour in the “exploration” trials and
whether there was systematic switch behaviour. For example, it could be the case that
participants switch from a good deck to the other good deck or to a bad deck and vice-
versa, and from a bad deck to a bad deck or a good deck. We found no systematicity
in exploration behaviour as shown in Figure 4.17. When participants switched decks,
they did it in an exploratory manner and no apparent trend was observed. Individual
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chi-squared analyses for each shift period showed no significant effects apart from shift
period 1, 𝜒2(1) = 8.29, 𝑝 = .004. The probability of switching to a good deck after a
good deck selection is significantly smaller than the other switches. Participants prefer
the decks with higher positive rewards hence are more likely to switch to a bad deck after
a good deck selection.
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Figure 4.17: Mean proportion of switches for each category across shift periods in the switch
group of Experiment 8. B: Bad deck, G: Good deck
An interesting finding of the present experiment relates to the choices from each
deck separately. While most IGT studies have found a strong loss-frequency effect with
participants preferring the decks which produce rare losses (decks B and D - solid coloured
decks in Figures 4.14 and 4.15), the choice behaviour observed in this experiment suggests
that participants had a slight preference for the good decks with frequent losses. This is
evident not only in the proportion of choices from each deck but also in the confidence
ratings and the questionnaire measures.
The confidence-accuracy relationship was further examined using an ROC analysis.
Four curves were fitted to the data for each shift period. As shown in Figure 4.18-A
participants exhibited good metacognitive monitoring in the last two periods of the task.
The AUC was numerically above chance in period 2 but this was not significant, 𝐴 = .53,
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95% CI [.49, .57]. As in previous analyses, the problem is that each period also contains
“transfer” trials. When the ROC analysis is performed only on the last block of each
period, there is a stronger relationship between discrimination of good and bad decks
and confidence. The AUC is significantly above chance even in the last block of period 2
𝐴 = .67, 95% CI [.60, .74], indicating the close link between learning of the advantageous
strategy and awareness.
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Figure 4.18: Type 2 ROC curves for each shift period (A) and the last block in each period
(B) in the switch group of Experiment 8.
4.3.3 Discussion
The purpose of the present experiment was to examine learning and awareness in
a controlled dynamic environment. In the control group, where there were no shifts in
the decks’ quality and payoffs, participants’ choice behaviour and conscious knowledge
developed in parallel, with no evidence of unconscious influences. Their questionnaire
verbal reports showed that they acquired significant insights about the deck properties
which drove their advantageous selections. Even in the first 50 trials in which they select
more cards from the disadvantageous decks, their questionnaire responses showed that
they possessed discriminative knowledge about the decks but they did not apply it to make
more selections from the good decks. If anything, this suggests that decision-making in
experience-based tasks is not only governed by explicit knowledge of the decks’ values
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(which is substantial) but in addition involves a combination of exploration and risk taking
behaviours. Also, participants’ use of the confidence ratings scale was in alignment with
their choices and never lagged behind advantageous selections. These findings support the
view that decision-making is not dissociable from awareness and that conscious knowledge
about the decks is sufficient to guide choice.
A similar interpretation applies to the findings from the switch group. Previous re-
search has found that people are good at detecting change in the environment and adapt
their choices based on new information (e.g., Dymond, Cella, et al., 2010; Turnbull et
al., 2006). We extended these findings by investigating the level of conscious knowledge
that people possess when they make decisions in dynamic environments. It can be argued
that in such volatile environments in which uncertainty looms higher than in the origi-
nal IGT, participants do not acquire conscious knowledge of their decisions but come to
rely instead on their intuition and on simple strategies to cope with the uncertainty and
make advantageous decisions. However, our results suggest the opposite interpretation:
conscious knowledge of the task structure was present as shown in the trial-by-trial con-
fidence ratings and the questionnaire responses at the end of each shift period. A clear
preference for the good decks was more profound in the last blocks of each period after
an initial stage of exploration which decreased across blocks of trials. As in the control
group, knowledge of the advantageous strategy was more evident in the questionnaire
measures and confidence ratings rather than choice behaviour.
The IGT in the switch group can be seen as a controlled dynamic task because
each shift period did not introduce a new payoff scheme as decks only swapped positions
and the overall expected values associated with good and bad decks remained constant.
Participants had to learn first which were the good decks and then apply this knowledge on
subsequent shifts periods. A simple strategy that they could have adopted is to select the
decks with smaller rewards as these decks are advantageous in the long run. In addition,
the administration of the questionnaire coincided with the start of a new shift period
which could signal them about possible changes in the task. Participants seemed to employ
this strategy in periods 3 and 4 as shown by the increase of good deck selections following
4 Confidence Ratings and Wagering 112
an exploration period. However, exploration of the task lasted about 2 blocks of trials
until they started to consistently select cards from the good decks which was guided by
explicit knowledge of the decks’ properties.
5 Cognitive Modelling
The previous chapters demonstrated that choice behaviour in the IGT is not consis-
tent and uniform across experiments. Even though participants learned the advantageous
strategy and selected more cards from the good decks in most experimental conditions,
this outcome was more pronounced in some experiments compared to others. Also, the
mean proportion of selections from each deck indicated significant differences between
experiments. We identified three different choice patterns based on the overall proportion
of choices from each deck: preference for the good decks (decks C and D, e.g., Experiment
1), preference for the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D, e.g., Experiments 6
and 7) and preference for the good decks and the bad deck with infrequent losses (decks
C, D, and B, e.g., Experiments 4B and 8). This variability in choice behaviour arises from
a combination of factors, including learning long-term contingencies, sensitivity to losses
and loss aversion, and the trade-off between exploration and exploitation. Inspection of
choice profiles is not always adequate to identify which of these factors is most responsible
for the observed pattern (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).
Cognitive modelling provides a way to decompose and quantify the underlying psy-
chological processes which drive performance on a task. In the case of the IGT, it is
important to investigate the serial dependencies between successive choices and how a
decision is made based on the interplay of a range of psychological factors. In this chapter,
we will focus on cognitive models for the IGT with an emphasis on reinforcement-learning
(RL) models.
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5.1 Reinforcement learning and the IGT
The main objective of RL models of the IGT is to account for how future decisions
are shaped by the experienced history of previous decisions and their associated payoffs.
In other words, these models try to account for the sequential dependencies between each
current choice and the previous choices and payoffs. Performance on the IGT can be
explained based on the interplay of psychological processes which are quantified by each
model’s parameters (Steingroever, Wetzels, & Wagenmakers, 2013a). RL models employ
three different assumptions about decision-making in the IGT. The first assumption re-
lates to the objective evaluation of wins and losses (if any) after selecting a deck by a
utility function. These utilities serve as input to a learning rule which updates expectan-
cies about the utilities of each deck (second assumption). Hence, on a given trial each
deck is associated with an expectancy which is the product of adjusting all the previous
representations of utility from that deck. The third assumption is that a choice is made
between decks based on these adjusted expectancies. It follows that the higher the ex-
pectancy of a deck, the more likely it will be chosen on a trial. However, this assumption
is not always satisfied as participants’ selections do not necessarily match the expectan-
cies of each deck. Exploration of the task and risk-taking behaviours may lead to choices
that do not follow the formed expectancies. In the next sections we will present different
computational algorithms for each of the three assumptions and describe each model’s
core mechanisms.
5.1.1 Utility
5.1.1.1 Weighted utility function
The translation of the received wins and losses (if any) on trial 𝑡 from deck 𝑗, into
a single value utility 𝑢𝑗(𝑡), is governed by the following utility function:
𝑢𝑗(𝑡) = (1−𝑊 ) · win(𝑡) +𝑊 · loss(𝑡), (5.1)
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where win(𝑡) and loss(𝑡) represent the wins and losses on trial 𝑡 respectively. The free pa-
rameter 𝑊 is the attention to losses or loss aversion parameter which dictates how much
attention is given to losses compared to wins. The value of the parameter ranges between
0 and 1 with higher values indicating more attention to losses (the middle point 0.5 as-
sumes equal weighting of wins and losses). This function (also known as the expectancy
utility function) assumes that evaluations of wins and losses are computed separately and
then summed (Ahn et al., 2008; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).
5.1.1.2 Prospect utility function
According to Ahn et al. (2008), the weighted linear utility function (Equation 5.1)
cannot account for the gain-loss frequency effect observed in experience-based tasks. For
example, the prospect of receiving −10 three times may seem worse for participants
compared to receiving −30 just once, even though both events have the same expected
value (𝐸𝑉 = −30). In order to capture this tendency, Ahn et al. (2008) used the non-linear
value function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992):
𝑢𝑗(𝑡) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑥(𝑡)𝛼 if 𝑥(𝑡) ≥ 0
−𝜆|𝑥(𝑡)|𝛼 if 𝑥(𝑡) < 0 .
(5.2)
Equation 5.2 assumes that participants evaluate only the net outcome of wins and losses
on trial 𝑡, 𝑥(𝑡) = win(𝑡)− loss(𝑡). This function has two free parameters: 𝛼 (0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1)
which defines the shape of the utility function, and 𝜆 (0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 5) which is a loss aversion
parameter. When 𝛼 is close to zero then all positive net outcomes attain the same utility
(i.e., 1) and negative net outcomes obtain the value of the loss aversion parameter (i.e.,
−𝜆). If 𝛼 takes a value of 1, the utility of the positive outcome matches the objective value
of the net outcome, 𝑢𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡), and the negative outcome is weighted by 𝜆. When 𝛼 is
between 0 and 1 then the shape of the utility function is curved. A value of 𝜆 larger than
1 indicates loss aversion, whereas values smaller than 1 suggest risk-seeking behaviour.
As 𝜆 goes to zero, then losses are ignored in the estimation of subjective utility (Ahn et
al., 2008; Ahn, Krawitz, Kim, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2011; Steingroever et al., in press).
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5.1.1.3 Prospect utility with separate evaluation of payoffs
One problem with the prospect utility function (Equation 5.2) is that subjective
utility is estimated based on the net outcome of each trial, 𝑥(𝑡). Thus, if participants
receive the same amount of wins and losses on a given trial, the subjective utility will be
zero regardless of the value of the parameters. However, this may not reflect what par-
ticipants think, as losses can still loom larger than equivalent wins, leading to a negative
subjective utility when the net outcome is zero. The latter is formulated in the following
utility function, which maintains the main features of the prospect utility function (i.e.,
non-linearity and loss aversion) but assumes separate evaluation of wins and losses on
each trial:
𝑢𝑗(𝑡) = [𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑡)]
𝛼 − 𝜆[|𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠|(𝑡)]𝛼. (5.3)
5.1.2 Updating of expectancies
5.1.2.1 Delta learning rule
After the subjective utility 𝑢𝑗(𝑡) has been estimated, the expected utility of deck 𝑗
on trial 𝑡, 𝐸𝑗(𝑡), is updated using the Delta learning rule, also known as the Rescorla-
Wagner rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972):
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1) + 𝐴 · 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) · [𝑢𝑗(𝑡)− 𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1)]. (5.4)
This rule updates only the expectancies of the chosen deck 𝑗 on trial 𝑡 whereas the
expectancies of the unselected decks remain unchanged. The dummy variable 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) takes
a value of 1 if deck 𝑗 is chosen on trial 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. The free parameter 𝐴 (0 < 𝐴 < 1)
determines how much the old expectancy 𝐸𝑗(𝑡 − 1) is updated by the prediction error,
[𝑢𝑗(𝑡)−𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1)]. Large values of 𝐴 indicate strong recency effects and rapid forgetting
(as 𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1) is fully modified by the prediction error, i.e., the new expectancy, 𝐸𝑗(𝑡), is
strongly based on new payoffs/utilities), whereas values of 𝐴 close to zero indicate weak
recency effects and slow forgetting (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Yechiam & Busemeyer,
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2005).
5.1.2.2 Decay reinforcement-learning rule
Another class of updating rules assumes that the expectancies of the unselected
decks can decrease over time due to memory decay. The decay RL rule (Erev & Roth,
1998) takes this assumption into account:
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐷 · 𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1) + 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) · 𝑢𝑗(𝑡). (5.5)
Based on this rule, past expectancies are discounted and the expectancy of a chosen deck
𝑗 on trial 𝑡 is updated by its subjective utility 𝑢𝑗(𝑡). The expectancies of the unselected
decks decay towards zero as a function of time. The recency (or decay) parameter 𝐷
(0 < 𝐷 < 1) determines how much past expectancies are discounted. The interpretation
of the 𝐷 parameter is reversed in this rule as compared to the 𝐴 parameter in the Delta
learning rule: values close to 1 denote weak recency effects and less decay whereas values
close to 0 indicate strong recency effects and rapid forgetting.
5.1.2.3 Mixed updating rule
One issue with the Decay RL rule is that the updated expectancy of the selected deck
can be larger in value than both the previous expectancy, 𝐸𝑗(𝑡 − 1), and the subjective
utility of the current outcome, 𝑢𝑗(𝑡). In other words, the expectancies formed by the Decay
RL rule may not reflect what participants experience in the task. Imagine the following
scenario: the expectancy of deck 𝑗 on trial 𝑡 − 1 is 𝐸𝑗(𝑡 − 1) = 100 and the utility from
the same deck 𝑗 on trial 𝑡 is 𝑢𝑗(𝑡) = 150. With a value of 𝐷 = 1, the expectancy of deck 𝑗
on trial 𝑡 becomes 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 250, which is not consistent with the payoffs that participants
have received.
On the other hand, the updated expectancy of the Delta learning rule is constrained
between the value of the previous expectancy and the utility of the most recent outcome.
Dai, Kerestes, Upton, Busemeyer, and Stout (2014) proposed a new learning rule which
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implements the features of both learning rules:
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐷 · 𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1) + 𝐴 · 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) · [𝑢𝑗(𝑡)−𝐷 · 𝐸𝑗(𝑡− 1)], (5.6)
where𝐷 is the recency/decay parameter, 𝐴 is the updating parameter, and 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) a dummy
variable which denotes whether a deck was chosen on trial 𝑡.
5.1.3 Choice rule
After the formation of the expectancies, the next step involves making a choice
between the decks, which is a probabilistic function of the expectancies of all decks. This
is formulated using the softmax choice rule (or ratio-of-strength rule) which assumes that
the probability of selecting a deck 𝑗 on the next trial 𝑡+1, 𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡+1) = 𝑗], is proportional
to the relative strength of this deck:
𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡+ 1) = 𝑗] =
𝑒𝜃(𝑡)·𝐸𝑗(𝑡)∑︀4
𝑘=1 𝑒
𝜃(𝑡)·𝐸𝑘(𝑡)
, (5.7)
where 𝜃 is a sensitivity parameter which dictates the degree to which choice probabil-
ities match the expectancies. When 𝜃 is zero, then choice behaviour is totally random
(𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑗] = 1/𝑘, where 𝑘 is the number of decks) allowing for exploration
behaviour. On the other hand, large values of 𝜃 allow for a complete match between ex-
pectancies and choice probabilities, indicating that the deck with the highest expectancy
will be chosen more often.
The relationship between response sensitivity and time (i.e., trials in the task) can
be trial-dependent or trial-independent. In other words, sensitivity to expectancies can
increase over time or be independent of the trial number. A trial-dependent sensitivity is
formulated with the following equation:
𝜃(𝑡) = (𝑡/10)𝑐, (5.8)
where 𝑐 (−5 < 𝑐 < +5) is a consistency parameter. If 𝑐 is positive, choices over trials
5 Cognitive Modelling 119
become more deterministic, matching the deck expectancies, whereas negative values of
𝑐 indicate random choice between the decks.
The trial-independent sensitivity (Yechiam & Ert, 2007) assumes that the tendency
to match the deck expectancies is constant across time and is given by the following
equation:
𝜃 = 3𝑐 − 1, (5.9)
where 𝑐 ranges between 0 and 5, with values close to 0 indicating random choice and
values close to 5 suggesting deterministic choice.
5.1.4 Exemplar RL models
Following the previous section, a typical RL model in the context of the IGT con-
sists of three different equations. Each of these equations captures one of the three general
assumptions regarding decision-making in the IGT: utility, learning or updating of ex-
pectancies, and choice. Even though one can use any combination of these equations
to arrive to a model, two specific combinations have been the most popular and exten-
sively used in the literature: the Expectancy Valence Learning model (EVL; Busemeyer
& Stout, 2002) and the Prospect Valence Learning model (PVL; Ahn et al., 2008, 2011).
Table 5.1 shows the equations used by the EVL and PVL models. The EVL has been ap-
plied to numerous datasets to identify key components of decision-making processes and
assess differences between healthy participants and clinical populations (e.g., Busemeyer
& Stout, 2002; Kjome et al., 2010; Stout et al., 2004; Yechiam et al., 2005; Wood et al.,
2005). After the PVL model was developed (Ahn et al., 2008), most studies started to use
this model (e.g., Fridberg et al., 2010; Lorains et al., 2014). In some cases, hybrid versions
of the two models provided a better description of the underlying psychological processes,
such as the PVL-Delta model in which the decay RL rule of the PVL is replaced by the
delta learning rule of the EVL (Fridberg et al., 2010; Steingroever, Wetzels, & Wagen-
makers, 2013b). Table 5.1 also lists the PVL-PU2 model which was recently found to fit
the IGT data better than its competitors (Dai et al., 2014). This model makes use of
the prospect utility function with separate evaluation of wins and losses (second prospect
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utility function, see Equation 5.3; PU2) but the learning and sensitivity rules come from
the PVL.
Table 5.1: Exemplar RL models for the IGT.
Model Utility Learning Sensitivity
EVL Weighted (5.1) Delta (5.4) Dep (5.7, 5.8)
PVL Prospect (5.2) Decay (5.5) Ind (5.7, 5.9)
PVL-Delta Prospect (5.2) Delta (5.4) Ind (5.7, 5.9)
PVL-PU2 Prospect 2 (5.3) Decay (5.5) Ind (5.7, 5.9)
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the equations in the
text. Dep = trial-dependent, Ind = trial-independent.
5.2 Win-Stay/Lose-Shift Models
WSLS models make different assumptions from the RL models about decision-
making processes in the IGT. The most simple form of the WSLS model assumes a
heuristic strategy according to which participants stay with the same deck on trial 𝑡+1 if
the net outcome on trial 𝑡 is greater than 0, and switch randomly to one of the remaining
three decks if the net outcome is negative. The WSLS has two parameters (Worthy,
Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013). The first parameter defines the probability of staying with
the same deck if the net outcome is equal to or greater than 0:
𝑃 [𝐷(𝑡+ 1) = 𝑗 | 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝐷, 𝑡) ≥ 0] = 𝑃 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦|𝑤𝑖𝑛) (5.10)
where 𝑥(𝐷, 𝑡) is the net outcome, 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑡)− 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑡), from deck 𝐷 on trial 𝑡. The probability
of switching after a trial with a positive net outcome is 𝑃 (𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ|𝑤𝑖𝑛) = 1−𝑃 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦|𝑤𝑖𝑛)
which is divided by 3 for each of the remaining three decks. In case of a negative net
outcome, the probability of switching to any of the remaining decks, 𝑃 (𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡|𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠), is
divided by 3 and assigned to the other three decks.
𝑃 [𝐷(𝑡+ 1) = 𝑗 | 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝐷, 𝑡) < 0] = 𝑃 (𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡|𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) (5.11)
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The probability of staying with an option on a loss trial is 1− 𝑃 (𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡|𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠).
5.2.1 The Value-Plus-Perseveration (VPP) Model
The WSLS model introduced an important concept in experience-based decision-
making: perseveration or action inertia. The probability of staying with the same option
if the net outcome on a trial is positive can be seen as a manifestation of inertia, the
tendency of participants to repeat their past selections (Erev & Haruvy, 2005). Similarly,
the decay RL rule (Equation 5.5) incorporates inertia in the sense that the expectancies of
the unselected options decay over time and hence the option which has been selected more
often in the recent trials will be more likely to be selected as its expectancy will increase
compared to the expectancies of the other decks. There are two problems, however, with
the assumption of inertia in the WSLS model and the models which assume a decay
RL rule: first, the WSLS model attributes no value to the expectancies of each deck
(or their average value up to trial 𝑡) as participants make decisions only on the basis
of the previous trial 𝑡 − 1. However, this strategy assumes no learning of the task and
participants surely have some expectations about the decks’ payoffs when they select an
option (Worthy, Pang, & Byrne, 2013). Second, the problem with the decay RL rule is
that inertia/perseveration is confounded with the expectancy of each option. Since both
of these dimensions are represented by a single numerical value, it is very difficult to
ascertain which of these tendencies is responsible for the model’s predictions.
Inertia is a manifestation of risk-taking behaviour (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012b), and
it has been implemented in various cognitive models of experience-based decision making
(e.g., Biele, Erev, & Ert, 2009; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Nevo & Erev, 2012). Worthy,
Pang, and Byrne (2013) presented a model as an extension of the RL models in order
to accommodate inertia. The Value-Plus-Perseveration (VPP) model incorporates two
separate mechanisms to account for inertia and expected value as both of them are
fundamental aspects of decision-making. The VPP model assumes three basic mechanisms
for decision-making in the IGT as in the RL models described above: utility, learning,
and choice. The only difference is that updating or learning of the expected values for
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each deck consists of two different components: expectancy and perseverance strength of
each option. The idea is that participants assign values to an option which are dependent
on the combination of the previous experience with that option (expectancy) and the
tendency to stay with this option (perseveration). The VPP uses the prospect utility
function (Equation 5.2) and the delta learning rule (Equation 5.4) for the estimation of
utilities and expectancies, respectively. The following equation is used for the perseverance
strengths of each option 𝑗 on trial 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗(𝑡):
𝑃𝑗(𝑡) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑘 · 𝑃𝑗(𝑡− 1) + 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) · 𝜖𝑝 if 𝑥(𝑡) ≥ 0
𝑘 · 𝑃𝑗(𝑡− 1) + 𝛿𝑗(𝑡) · 𝜖𝑛 if 𝑥(𝑡) < 0 .
(5.12)
This rule adds 3 parameters to the model: 𝑘 (0 < 𝑘 < 1) is a decay parameter similar
to 𝐷 in the decay RL rule, which dictates how much of the perseverance strength of
each deck decays on each trial. 𝜖𝑝 and 𝜖𝑛 define the impact of positive net outcomes
(𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑡) ≥ 0) and negative net outcomes (𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑤𝑖𝑛(𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑡) < 0),
respectively. Positive values of 𝜖𝑝 and 𝜖𝑛 (−1 < 𝜖𝑝, 𝜖𝑛 < 1) reinforce the tendency to stay
with an option on the next trial, whereas negative values reinforce switching to another
option.
The overall expected value of a deck on a trial 𝑡, 𝑉𝑗(𝑡), is a weighted linear combi-
nation of its expectancy and perseverance strength:
𝑉𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑤𝐸𝑗 · 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) + (1− 𝑤𝐸𝑗) · 𝑃𝑗(𝑡). (5.13)
Values of 𝑤 greater than 0.5 indicate more weighting to the expectancy of each deck and
values less than 0.5 indicate more weighting to the perseverative strength of each deck.
A softmax rule (Equation 5.7) is used to define the probability of selecting a deck on the
next trial, with a trial-independent sensitivity rule (Equation 5.9).
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5.3 Model evaluation
In order to evaluate the candidate RL models, we constructed 18 different models
from the factorial combination of 3 utility functions (Equations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3) × 3 learning
rules (Equations 5.4, 5.5, 5.6) × 2 choices rules (Equations 5.8, 5.9). Using this design,
we can identify which of all the combinations provides the best description of choice
behaviour in the IGT. In addition, we applied the WSLS model and two versions of
the VPP model: one with the Prospect Theory utility function and the second with a
utility function based on Prospect Theory but with separate evaluation of wins and losses
(PU2). We used two model comparison methods to contrast each model: the one-step-
ahead prediction method (post hoc fit method) and a simulation method.
5.3.1 One-step-ahead prediction method
The one-step-ahead method investigates how well a model predicts the choice on the
next trial, 𝑡+ 1, based on each individual’s experience with the task up to and including
trial 𝑡 (i.e., previous sequence of choices, 𝑌𝑖(𝑡), and payoffs associated with these choices,
𝑋𝑖(𝑡); 𝑖 represents each individual). The model predicts the probability that an individual
will select a deck 𝐷𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷}, given his or her history of choices and payoffs,
𝑃𝑟[𝐷𝑗(𝑡+ 1)|𝑋𝑖(𝑡), 𝑌𝑖(𝑡)]. These probabilities are compared to the actual choices of each
individual using the log likelihood (LL) criterion (Ahn et al., 2008; Busemeyer & Stout,
2002). Maximum-likelihood estimation was used to find the best parameter values for
each model by maximising the log likelihood of an individual’s sequence of choices:
𝐿𝐿𝑀,𝑖 =
𝑡−1∑︁
𝑡=1
4∑︁
𝑗=1
ln(𝑃𝑟[𝐷𝑗(𝑡+ 1) | 𝑋𝑖(𝑡), 𝑌𝑖(𝑡)]) · 𝛿𝑗(𝑡+ 1), (5.14)
where𝑀 indicates a model, 𝑛 is the number of trials (in this case is 𝑛−1 because the first
trial is excluded as choice is random), and 𝛿𝑗(𝑡+ 1) is a dummy variable which indicates
whether a deck is chosen on trial 𝑡 + 1. A combination of grid-search with 60 different
starting values for each parameter set and simplex search methods (Nelder & Mead,
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1965) was used to find the best parameter values. The solution (i.e., the combination of
parameter values) which maximised the LL across all starting points was selected.
The goodness of fit of each model was compared with a baseline statistical model
which makes no assumptions about the underlying psychological processes. The Bernoulli
baseline model assumes constant and independent probabilities across trials which reflect
the overall proportion of selections from each deck. For example, if a participant’s overall
proportion of selections from deck A is 0.17, then the Bernoulli model assumes that the
probability of selecting option A on each trial is 0.17. The baseline model is a good
competitor to the cognitive models which can outperform it only if they can explain
sequential dependencies and learning effects. It has three parameters, the probability of
selecting from decks A, B, and C (𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵, 𝑝𝐶 - estimated from each participant’s choice
behaviour); the probability of selecting from deck D is 𝑝𝐷 = 1−(𝑝𝐴+𝑝𝐵+𝑝𝐶). To compare
the models we used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; G. Schwarz, 1978) which
includes a penalty term for additional free parameters:
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 2 · (𝐿𝐿𝑀 − 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)−Δ𝑘 · ln(𝑛) (5.15)
where Δ𝑘 is the difference in the number of parameters between a cognitive model 𝑀
and the baseline model, and 𝑛 is the number of trials. A positive value of the BIC index
indicates that a cognitive model performs better than the baseline model.
5.3.2 Simulation method
The simulation methods constitutes the least demanding model comparison tech-
nique because it is the test with the smallest difference from the original experiment
(Steingroever et al., in press). This method evaluates each model’s ability to reproduce
the observed choice pattern under new payoff sequences by using the estimated parameters
of each individual from one-step-ahead predictions (model fitting). The payoff schedule
used by the simulation method remains the same as in the original experiment, but the
ordering of wins and losses changes in each simulation (in the case of the IGT only the
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ordering of the losses differs as wins are constant for each deck). While the post hoc fit
criterion uses the actual history of choices and payoffs of each participant, the simulation
method attempts to predict the observed pattern by taking no account of participants’
experience with the task. The predictions from the simulation are compared to the actual
choice pattern using a deviance measure such as the mean square deviation (MSD):
𝑀𝑆𝐷 =
1
4 · 𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑡=1
4∑︁
𝑗=1
(?¯?𝑒𝑥𝑝, 𝑗(𝑡)− ?¯?𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑗(𝑡))2, (5.16)
where 𝑛 is the total number of trials, ?¯?𝑒𝑥𝑝,𝑗(𝑡) is the mean proportion of choices from deck
𝑗 on trial 𝑡 across participants’ experimental data, and ?¯?𝑠𝑖𝑚,𝑗(𝑡) is the mean proportion
of choices from deck 𝑗 on trial 𝑡 across all participants’ simulated data. The smaller the
value of the MSD, the better can a model reproduce participants’ actual choices.
5.4 Model fitting
5.4.1 Datasets
We used three different datasets from experiments described in previous chapters to
evaluate the candidate models. Specifically, we chose datasets in which the assessment of
conscious knowledge was based on confidence ratings. We did not include any data from
experiments where we used post-decision wagering as (1) the change in the payoffs after
a wager may have had an effect on participants’ choice behaviour, and (2) wagering was
found to be a poor measure of awareness compared to confidence ratings. In addition,
the differences between the three datasets (see Table 5.2) allow for a number of factors
to be examined. First of all, they differ significantly in terms of overall task performance,
even though performance in Dataset 3 may have been the result of the longer duration of
the task (200 trials). Second, the 200 trials of Dataset 3 may reveal better relative fits as
more trials can significantly affect model fitting, producing better predictions and more
reliable parameter estimates.
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Table 5.2: Description of the datasets used for model evaluations.
Dataset Payoff Schedule Trials Performance N
1: Experiment 6 - CR groups IGT 100 52.70% 78
2: Experiment 7 - CR group Appendix A 100 47.30% 18
3: Experiment 8 - Control Group IGT 200 60.80% 20
Note: Performance indicates the overall proportion of choices from the good decks.
CR = Confidence ratings; N = Sample size.
5.4.2 Model fitting results
First, we looked at the factorial combination of RL models to identify which of the
utility, updating, and choice rules provides the best description of the experimental data.
Table 5.3 shows the mean relative BIC scores (differences between a cognitive model
and the baseline statistical model). Initial inspection of the table suggests that across
datasets all the models outperform the baseline model, apart from the EVL model (EU,
DEL, TD) in Dataset 2. These results indicate that all cognitive models were able to
capture trial-by-trial dependencies and learning effects. Also there is a consistent pattern
across datasets regarding the best model: a model which incorporates a prospect utility
function with separate evaluation of wins and losses (PU2), a decay RL rule (DRL) and
trial-independent sensitivity (TI) outperforms all the other models, even if the differences
between the second and third best models are relatively small.
An interesting result relates to the EVL model which has been used in more than
35 studies to investigate the psychological processes underlying performance in the IGT.
Importantly, most of these studies employed the EVL to assess differences in decision-
making between healthy participants and clinical populations. Our results indicate that
the EVL model’s performance is very poor compared to the other models, suggesting that
its parameters may not reflect the way that people make decisions in the IGT and thus
many of the conclusions and inferences based on this model may be inaccurate. Future
research should consider applying other models instead of the popular EVL.
The next step in our analysis was to collapse the mean BIC scores across utility,
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Table 5.3: Summary of mean BIC scores of the 18 RL models relative to the baseline model
in three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Utility Updating Choice M %(BIC>0) M %(BIC>0) M %(BIC>0)
EU DEL TD 2.06 45 -0.61 28 11.20 55
TI 3.35 55 0.62 33 12.85 65
DRL TD 10.38 68 16.01 67 81.59 75
TI 11.28 78 22.07 72 75.88 85
ML TD 6.96 60 16.72 67 74.20 70
TI 6.94 62 18.07 72 70.65 65
PU DEL TD 5.36 64 5.18 39 23.46 75
TI 6.15 72 6.50 50 19.45 85
DRL TD 5.81 51 12.77 56 80.05 70
TI 11.84 78 20.81 61 84.28 90
ML TD 7.91 62 15.44 56 77.37 90
TI 7.96 69 18.12 61 79.65 85
PU2 DEL TD 5.51 62 4.35 44 22.98 85
TI 5.83 62 5.45 50 20.68 80
DRL TD 6.90 53 15.17 56 87.13 75
TI 12.92 78 22.52 67 89.39 85
ML TD 9.71 64 18.34 56 89.43 90
TI 9.12 72 19.78 56 85.83 90
Note: M = Mean relative BIC score; %(BIC>0) = Percentage of participants whose relative BIC score
is greater than 0; EU = expectancy utility function; PU = prospect utility function; PU2 = alterna-
tive prospect utility function; DEL = delta learning rule; DRL = decay RL rule; ML = mixed learning
rule; TD = trial-dependent sensitivity; TI = trial-independent sensitivity.
learning, and choice rules in order to identify which instantiation within each assumption
provided the best fit. Table 5.4 shows consistent patterns across datasets regarding which
instantiation of each assumption (i.e., utility, learning, and choice) should be used. Even
though this demonstration does not take into account the interactions between assump-
tions, it highlights some of the results we observed by looking at the fit measure of each
model in Table 5.3. Regarding the different utility rules, the alternative prospect utility
function (PU2) outperforms its competitors no matter what learning and choice rules are
used. This result is consistent across the three datasets. Looking at the learning rules,
the delta learning rule is inferior to the other two learning rules which suggests that a
learning rule which does not incorporate decay (and subsequently inertia or persevera-
tion) may not be able to account for the sequential dependencies in the IGT. Finally,
trial-independent sensitivity seems to provide better fits in Datasets 1 and 2 but not in
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Dataset 3 in which the difference is small but in favour of trial-dependent sensitivity.
This can be explained based on the number of trials (200) in Dataset 3: participants’
sensitivity to the expectancies of each deck may increase across trials as they learn about
the values of each deck and make more choices based on the learned expectancies.
Table 5.4: Summary of collapsed mean BIC scores for each utility, learning, and choice rule in
three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Utility EU 6.82 12.14 54.39
PU 7.49 13.12 60.70
PU2 8.31 14.25 65.90
Learning DEL 4.70 3.58 18.43
DEC 9.85 18.22 83.05
ML 8.08 17.73 79.51
Choice TD 6.72 11.48 60.82
TI 8.37 14.87 59.85
Note: EU = expectancy utility function; PU = prospect
utility function; PU2 = alternative prospect utility
function; DEL = delta learning rule; DRL = decay RL
rule; ML = mixed learning rule; TD = trial-dependent
sensitivity; TI = trial-independent sensitivity.
We then focused on the “exemplar” models that have been proposed for the IGT.
The models we compared were the two popular models, EVL and PVL, the PVL-Delta
which has been suggested as a better alternative (Steingroever et al., in press; Stein-
groever, Wetzels, & Wagenmakers, 2013b), and the model we found to perform best
across our datasets, the PVL-PU2 model. In addition, we included the WSLS model and
two versions of the VPP model, one with the prospect utility function, and the second
with the alternative prospect utility function (PU2). To assess the goodness of fit of the
candidate models we used two measures in addition to the mean BIC difference between
the cognitive models and the statistical baseline model: BIC weights and the proportion
of participants best fit by each model. Schwarz (BIC) weights approximate the posterior
probability of the models (assuming equal prior probability). In other words, BIC weights
can be interpreted as reflecting the probability, given the observed data, that a candidate
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model is the best model in the set of models under consideration (Wagenmakers & Farrell,
2004). Table 5.5 contains the different fit measures for each candidate model. Focusing
on the BIC difference score, we see that the PVL-PU2 performs best across datasets.
The WSLS and VPP models do not provide better fits than the RL models tested here
which indicate that the penalty term of the VPP is large given its 8 free parameters.
When we look at the BIC weights a slightly different picture arises: in Datasets 1 and 3
the PVL-PU2 is the best model but in Dataset 2 the WSLS outperforms its competitors.
The discrepancy between the BIC and BIC weights in Dataset 2 is due to the fact than
when the WSLS fits best, it fits significantly better than the other models, resulting in
weights close to 1. This is also evident in the proportion of participants best fit by the
WSLS in Dataset 2: almost half of participants’ behaviour can be best explained based
on a win-stay/lose-shift strategy. Furthermore, the WSLS is the second best performing
model in Dataset 1 as indicated by its BIC weight and the proportion of participants
best fit by it. However, in Dataset 3 there is strong evidence in favour of the PVL-PU2
model in all three fit measures. Only 10% of participants are best fit by the WSLS which
suggests that participants in Dataset 3 focused more on the learned expectancies of each
deck rather than employing a heuristic strategy to make decisions. Overall, it seems that
the PVL-PU2 and the WSLS explain choice patterns better than the other candidate
models and the VPP pays the price of complexity as 8 parameters may be too much
given the limited number of trials in the IGT (usually 100).
Table 5.5: Measures of fit for each candidate model across three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Model BIC wBIC %Best fit BIC wBIC %Best fit BIC wBIC %Best fit
EVL 2.06 0.12 0.14 -0.61 0.07 0.11 11.20 0.06 0.05
PVL 11.84 0.16 0.14 20.81 0.13 0.06 84.28 0.14 0.05
PVL-Delta 6.15 0.14 0.10 6.50 0.06 0.11 19.45 0.11 0.10
PVL-PU2 12.92 0.31 0.35 22.52 0.17 0.11 89.39 0.45 0.60
WSLS 5.44 0.21 0.22 17.41 0.39 0.44 64.95 0.12 0.10
VPP 1.36 0.01 0.01 19.36 0.10 0.11 81.76 0.08 0.05
VPP-PU2 2.90 0.04 0.04 19.89 0.09 0.06 84.18 0.05 0.05
Note: wBIC = BIC weights.
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Figure 5.1 shows the mean predicted choice probabilities (smoothed with a moving
average window of 7 trials) from each model as compared to the observed choice propor-
tions (Data) in Dataset 3. Here, we only included the results from Dataset 3 as the same
interpretation applies to the remaining two datasets (see Appendix C.1). A first glance at
Figure 5.1 suggests that all models capture the pattern of the observed choices, meaning
the rank order of the decks across trials. Then, three distinct patterns can be identified
related to the learning or choice rule of each model. It is evident that the models which
assume decay (PVL, PVL-PU2) and decay + perseveration (VPP) track quite closely
the sequential choices in the observed data pattern. On the other hand, the models using
the delta learning rule (EVL, PVL-Delta) do not provide accurate trial-by-trial tracking
of the observed choices as well as the decay models. The EVL model seems to fit the
data worse than any other model as it predicts that each deck has the same probability
of being selected in the first 50 trials. In the case of the WSLS model, predicted choice
proportions for each deck do not discriminate adequately between the decks. For exam-
ple, the probability of selecting deck A is almost the same as the probability of selecting
deck B, a pattern which is not observed in the original data. In addition, no model can
predict the predominant preference for deck B (up to 60%) in the first 20 trials of the
task even though the models which use a utility function based on Prospect Theory (all
models apart from the EVL and WSLS) approximate this initial tendency.
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Figure 5.1: Mean predicted choice probabilities of each cognitive model as compared to ex-
perimental data in Dataset 3.
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We then looked at the overall proportion of choices from each deck that the candi-
date models predict. This is a rough measure of goodness-of-fit as the candidate models
are not evaluated on the overall proportion of choices but on their ability to predict inter-
trial dependencies (the predictions of the statistical baseline match the overall proportion
of choices from each deck). Figure 5.2 indicates that only the EVL and the WSLS models
mispredict the overall proportion of choices from the bad decks. Specifically, both models
assign higher overall probabilities to deck A compared to the observed proportion and
underestimate the proportion of choices from deck B. The accuracy of the remaining
models in predicting the overall pattern of choices is remarkably good and very close to
the original proportions.
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Figure 5.2: Overall proportion of predicted choices from each deck as compared to experimental
data in Dataset 3.
5.4.3 Simulation performance
The second method we used to compare the adequacy and performance of each
model was a simulation method (see Ahn et al., 2008; Steingroever et al., in press; Yechiam
& Busemeyer, 2005, 2008). According to Steingroever et al. (in press) the simulation
method is more indicative (compared to the post hoc fit method) of whether a model
captures the psychological processes underlying the IGT (we will return to this issue
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in a later section of the present chapter). The simulation method uses the parameter
estimates derived from one-step-ahead predictions to make a priori predictions for the
entire sequence of choices. However, it does not take any feedback from participants’
actual choices (and their intertrial dependency) but generates a choice (and its associated
payoff) based on the model’s predicted probabilities.
We generated 100 simulated datasets for each participant based on their best-fitting
parameters according to each candidate model. These simulations were averaged across
all participants to provide the predicted probability of choice on each trial. The predicted
probabilities were then compared to the observed proportion of choices using the mean
square deviation (MSD) and by visually inspecting models’ predictions and observed
choice behaviour.
Table 5.6 contains MSD scores for each candidate model across the three datasets.
An inspection of the table suggests a different interpretation regarding which model
should be preferred under the simulation method. Across datasets, the models which im-
plement a delta learning rule (PVL-Delta and VPP) perform better under the simulation
method. The PVL-PU2 and the WSLS models, which produced the best fits under one-
step-ahead predictions, seem to not be able to match the observed choice proportions
when no information about participants’ actual choices are fed into the models. On the
other hand, the PVL-Delta model, which produces worse post hoc fits (see Table 5.5),
is able to reproduce the observed choice proportions by relying only on payoff-related
feedback. This result demonstrates that the good performance of the decay models under
one-step-ahead predictions may be due to their reliance on information about partic-
ipants’ past choices. Since the decks which are selected more often receive a “bonus”
while the expectancies of the unselected decks decay towards zero over time, it can be
inferred that decay models can track quite well people’s choices based on observed choice
histories. Consequently, if these models do not receive feedback from participants’ actual
choices and base their predictions only on the received payoffs, then their predictions can
depart from the observed choice proportions. The discrepancy between one-step-ahead
and simulation methods poses another challenge to the goal of model selection.
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Table 5.6: MSD scores of each model between model predictions and experimental data in
three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Model MSD MSD MSD
EVL 108.56 222.42 147.72
PVL 42.40 136.77 147.57
PVL-Delta 38.38 123.08 92.21
PVL-PU2 48.22 148.77 146.57
VPP 40.32 136.38 91.78
WSLS 105.88 191.50 151.78
As can be seen in Figure 5.3 only the PVL-Delta and VPP models can closely
reproduce the observed data pattern. Both models predict increasing preference for the
good decks (C and D) after an exploration period and a steady decrease in selections
from the bad decks (A and B). However, neither of these models can predict the initial
preference for deck B. On the other hand, the PVL and PVL-PU2 models assume that
more choices are made from the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) while they
completely mispredict the preference for deck C. Even though the EVL model predicts
more choices from the good decks, this almost appears after almost 2 blocks of trials in
which predictions between decks are essentially random. Furthermore, it assumes that
more choices are made from deck A compared to deck B. In the case of the WSLS model,
choices between decks are constant and almost random across trials, indicating a failure
to capture the observed pattern with no reliance on participants’ actual history of choices.
Figure 5.4 shows the overall predicted proportion of choices from each deck as
compared to the observed proportion. The best performing models under the simulation
method (PVL-Delta and VPP) fail only to match the proportion of selections from deck
B and this is due to the initial preference for this deck that is not captured by either
model. The decay models fail to capture the observed tendency for more selections from
deck C while all the models provide good predictions regarding choices from deck D.
Both figures provide evidence against the decay RL and the WSLS models and highlight
the inconsistency between the two model comparison methods (post hoc fit criterion
5 Cognitive Modelling 134
and simulation method). We will discuss this discrepancy in more detail in the following
section and explain why these two methods yield inconsistent results.
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Figure 5.3: Simulation performance of the candidate models across blocks of trials with respect
to the experimental data in Dataset 3.
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
A B C D
Deck
P
ro
po
rti
on
Data EVL PVL PVL-Delta PVL-PU2 VPP WSLS
Figure 5.4: Overall proportion of choices from each deck under the simulation method in
Dataset 3.
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5.4.4 Parameter estimates
The ultimate objective of cognitive modelling is to decompose participants’ per-
formance into its constituent psychological and cognitive processes. The parameters of
each model reflect these underlying processes, so the task of identifying a model which
can provide descriptive and explanatory adequacy of the factors that drive performance
becomes of primary importance. However, model comparison is not an easy challenge and
the reliance on a statistical fit index (e.g., BIC) to draw conclusions about psychological
mechanisms in a task may be inappropriate or at least insufficient. For example, we saw
earlier (Table 5.5) that the performance of a large proportion of participants can be ex-
plained based on a simple win-stay/lose-shift strategy even though the BIC score of the
WSLS model was smaller than that of the RL models. More importantly, the simulation
performance of each candidate model revealed a new set of good models highlighting the
discrepancy between the two selection methods employed here. Given these results, a
researcher is left wondering which model should be used to characterise decision-making
processes in the IGT and make inferences based on the estimated parameters. The task
would be somewhat easier if the estimated parameters of each model were close to each
other but this is often not the case, as Table 5.7 shows.
Table 5.7 contains the means and medians of the parameter estimates of four models
across the three datasets. We did not include the EVL model, as it does not perform well
in either of the two model comparison methods, or the WSLS model, as its parameters
are different from those of the RL models and they do not invite a clear psychological
interpretation. All models in the table assume a prospect utility function (PU or PU2)
and trial independent sensitivity. Two of the models incorporate a decay RL learning rule
(PVL and PVL-PU2) and the remaining two use a delta learning rule (PVL-Delta and
VPP). In addition, the VPP model adds four extra parameters to decompose expected
value and perseverative strength of each deck. Overall, the models can be categorised into
two sets, decay and delta models, because the parameter estimates within each category
are close. For example, in Dataset 2 the decay models (PVL and PVL-PU2) assume higher
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loss aversion (𝜆 = 1.35 and 1.76, respectively) compared to the delta models (PVL-Delta
and VPP, 𝜆 = 0.85 and 0.87, respectively). However, this pattern is reversed in Dataset
3, with decay models showing less weighting to losses (𝜆 = 0.69 and 0.82) compared to
the delta models (𝜆 = 1.25 and 1.90).
With regards to the sensitivity parameter 𝑐 the delta models assume that par-
ticipants’ choices are more deterministic (all values of 𝑐 > 2) and consistent with the
expectancies of each deck across datasets (higher values of 𝑐 indicate that decks with
higher expectancies are more likely to be selected) whereas decay models assume less de-
terministic behaviour (all values of 𝑐 < 1). Similar differences between learning rules can
be found in other parameter values such as the reward sensitivity parameter 𝛼. Given this
inconsistency in parameter values across models, the conclusions about the underlying
psychological mechanisms can be different depending on the model that one uses to ex-
plain performance in the IGT. For example, do people exhibit loss aversion behaviour or
not? Similarly, do people’s choices follow the learned expectancies or are their selections
more random? These questions can take different answers depending on the parameters
of the model that one chooses to use.
5.5 To simulate or not?
The inconsistency between the two model comparison methods, post hoc fit criterion
and simulation, has been observed in many IGT model comparison studies (e.g., Ahn et
al., 2008; Steingroever et al., in press; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2008; Yechiam & Ert, 2007).
Ahn et al. (2008) suggested that, given this discrepancy, one should select a model based
on the objectives one wants to achieve. If the objective is to make short-term predictions
and evaluate participants’ decisions based on the experience they have had with the task
(history of choices and associated payoffs) then the decay RL models should be chosen.
On the other hand, if one wants to maximise long-term predictions (i.e., performance
on a new gambling task that participants have never experienced) then models which
implement a delta learning rule should be favoured.
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Table 5.7: Parameter estimates from four different models across three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
PVL 𝑀 𝑀𝑑𝑛 𝑀 𝑀𝑑𝑛 𝑀 𝑀𝑑𝑛
𝛼 0.44 0.39 0.45 0.25 0.20 0.01
𝜆 1.44 0.96 1.35 0.61 0.69 0.01
𝐷 0.74 0.89 0.61 0.63 0.73 0.79
𝑐 0.38 0.22 0.46 0.32 0.53 0.61
PVL-Delta
𝛼 0.61 0.63 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.67
𝜆 1.47 0.91 0.85 0.33 1.25 0.88
𝐴 0.22 0.04 0.31 0.10 0.08 0.02
𝑐 2.59 1.80 1.39 1.02 2.72 2.21
PVL-PU2
𝛼 0.38 0.28 0.43 0.22 0.19 0.01
𝜆 1.96 1.31 1.76 0.86 0.82 0.56
𝐷 0.73 0.87 0.58 0.62 0.68 0.75
𝑐 0.38 0.26 0.46 0.35 0.55 0.57
VPP
𝛼 0.61 0.69 0.58 0.56 0.50 0.45
𝜆 1.59 0.81 0.87 0.14 1.90 1.37
𝐴 0.17 0.04 0.32 0.16 0.27 0.02
𝑘 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.55 0.61
𝑒𝑝 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.57 0.79
𝑒𝑛 -0.02 -0.09 -0.29 -0.42 0.20 0.42
𝑉 0.72 0.84 0.49 0.44 0.72 0.82
𝑐 2.33 2.05 1.69 1.70 2.02 1.95
Note: 𝑀 = mean; 𝑀𝑑𝑛 = median.
Steingroever et al. (in press) suggested that “the simulation method seems to rep-
resent a more stringent and challenging test of absolute model performance than the post
hoc absolute fit method because the simulation method relies on predicting the entire
sequence of choices for another payoff sequence that could have been observed”. They
argue that the post hoc fit criterion is inferior in that it may only be able to reproduce the
observed behavioural pattern by mimicking participants’ previous choices, indicating that
the estimated parameters may be biased by factors that do not invite a clear psychological
interpretation. They also suggested that the models which show better simulation per-
formance (e.g., PVL-Delta) should be preferred to decompose and analyse participants’
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choice behaviour and underlying psychological mechanisms.
In the remainder of this section, we argue against the idea that the inconsistency of
model comparison methods is a failure (that is, one technique is better than the other -
or more indicative - at disentangling the psychological processes that drive performance
on the IGT). Instead, as we outline, such inconsistency in the results should be ex-
pected given the difference in approach of these two methods: The post hoc fit criterion
uses participants’ previous history of choices and experienced payoffs to make predictions
about subsequent trials, whereas the simulation method relies on the generation of new
histories for choices and payoffs. Second, while we agree that the simulation method is
important, we argue that the post hoc fit criterion also has value in that its parameters
are meaningful and provide useful psychological insight. Also, we outline and present
theoretical and practical arguments for why relying solely on simulation performance in
an experience-based decision-making setting may lead to misleading conclusions.
5.5.1 Sequential dependencies
The main objective of RL models of the IGT is to account for how future decisions
are shaped by the experienced history of previous decisions and their associated payoffs.
This is how learning occurs, and these models are evaluated on how well they capture
learning effects throughout an individual’s observed choice history. In other words, these
models try to account for the sequential dependencies between each current choice and
the previous choices and payoffs. In fact, all RL models share the assumption that the
dependence of a current choice on previous choices is fully mediated by the payoffs (and
not the past choices) experienced as a consequence of these previous choices. Thus, to
predict a future choice, one only needs to consider the history of experienced payoffs.
In the simulation method, the parameters from the post hoc fit criterion, conditional
upon observed choices and payoffs, are used to simulate a set of new choice and payoff
sequences. Model selection is then based on the match between the marginal probabilities
of the artificial choices in this simulated set and the proportions of observed choices.
However, by marginalising over the simulated payoff sequences and focusing only on the
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choice probabilities, the method ignores the fundamental objective of RL models, which
is to account for sequential dependencies between choices (i.e., how choices are shaped by
experience). Furthermore, by considering their ability to reproduce (postdict) marginal
probabilities in the same dataset as used for model estimation, the simulation method
can favour models that are unlikely to generalise to new datasets. For example, consider
a model with one parameter, which identifies a sequence of choices within the set of
all possible choice sequences. The model predicts that a choice sequence displayed by a
participant will be identical to the sequence identified by the parameter value. While, for
a standard IGT with 100 trials and 4 choice alternatives, the parameter has 4100 possible
values, estimation is easy once a participant’s complete choice sequence is known. Because
the model is not stochastic, it will reproduce, for each participant, their choice sequence
exactly, regardless of the payoff sequence generated in the simulations. Averaging over
participants, such simulations will perfectly reproduce the observed choice probabilities.
Nevertheless, most people will agree that this is not an overly useful model: it predicts
that people make exactly the same choices when performing the task another time and
it can only postdict choices, not predict subsequent choices from the previous history.
Because of this inability to make one-step-ahead predictions, the post hoc fit method,
unlike a simulation method that estimates a model and evaluates simulation performance
with the same data, will clearly disfavour this model.
5.5.2 Individual differences and research applied to clinical
populations
The IGT has been used extensively as a neuropsychological test to assess decision-
making in clinical populations. Thus, it is of great importance to derive a model that can
offer informative conclusions regarding individual differences in the underlying psycho-
logical processes. This can enable researchers to identify key differences between clinical
groups and healthy controls and make strong connections between neurophysiology and
behaviour, leading to a better characterisation of the psychological symptoms of the dis-
order under investigation (Stout et al., 2004; Yechiam et al., 2005). A serious drawback
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of the simulation method is that it evaluates the average model prediction and ignores
the fact that different models are required to fit different individuals. This was evident in
the post hoc fit results where large proportions of participants were best fit by different
models (see Table 5.5).
A fundamental goal of clinical research is to establish an explanatory framework for
particular clinical groups, to connect pathological behaviour to patterns of behaviour on
clinical and cognitive experimental tasks, and to map these deficits to neurophysiological
mechanisms. Computational models serve as the intermediate step between the brain and
observed behaviour where performance on a task can be decomposed into its constituent
cognitive processes and mapped to neural mechanisms (Busemeyer et al., 2003). In this
regard, model comparison should also be informed by psychological measures from rele-
vant clinical assessments, which will facilitate the selection of the best models. In other
words, a good model will not only perform well on a quantitative statistical index (e.g.,
goodness of fit) but will also provide explanations and make connections to findings or
observations from the existing literature and to validated characteristics of a particular
clinical sample. For example, if the model parameters are correlated with clinically rele-
vant characteristics derived from psychometric scales and personality questionnaires, then
the model can serve as a good representation of the underlying psychological processes.
Also, another criterion to assess model performance is individual parameter consistency;
that is, comparison of correlations of model parameters estimated from the same individ-
ual in more than one task. This is an important step toward the identification of “stable”
internal characteristics that drive performance on different tasks and can be used as an
extra assessment of model performance (Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2008). This stability of
the internal characteristics guiding individual performance across somewhat disparate
tasks helps to reinforce psychological explanations regarding underlying pathology in in-
dividuals.
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5.5.3 Generalisation, biases, and inertia
One of the most fundamental properties of a good model is its ability “to make
predictions about what will be observed in the future or generalisations about what
would be observed under altered circumstances” (Shiffrin et al., 2008, p. 1249). Similar
views have been expressed by other researchers who have discussed the importance of
generalisation in identifying a good candidate model and who have introduced methods
to assess a model’s generalisability, such as the minimum description length (Pitt, Kim, &
Myung, 2003; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002) and the generalization criterion (Busemeyer
& Wang, 2000). If an (estimated) model is to reliably predict behaviour in new settings,
it should apply independently of task-specific effects, biases that may arise from the
experimental setup, and idiosyncratic strategies or heuristics individuals may adopt to
deal with uncertainty. In experience-based tasks there are two sources of information that
drive participants’ choices: frequency of past choices from different options and payoffs
experienced from sampling each of these options (Yechiam & Ert, 2007). A bias-free model
(one that generalises efficiently) has to base its predictions only on past payoffs. We note
that this is logical because the parameters of the RL models under investigation measure
underlying psychological processes related to how participants respond to the payoffs they
experience. However, we argue that the goal of predicting behaviour in different contexts
is not well served by simulation methods.
Adding to this argument, Erev and Haruvy (2005) distinguish between two types
of predictions in descriptive learning models: first, predictions for a task that are based
on the interaction of a participant with that same task (within-game predictions), and
second, predictions for different tasks with which participants are unfamiliar (new-game
predictions). Following this distinction, the post hoc fit criterion is a within-game predic-
tion, whereas the simulation method can be seen as a new-game prediction. Steingroever
et al. (in press) argue that the simulation performance of a model should be of greater
importance when our goal is to find the best model or assess the psychological processes
underlying performance on the IGT. While the simulation method is indeed an important
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comparison technique, we present arguments why (a) simulation is a crude generalisation
test, which (b) may not reflect stable psychological processes.
5.5.4 Not a direct generalisation test
Steingroever et al. (in press) suggest that the simulation method provides a good
test of generalisability because it assesses models’ predictions under new payoff sequences
that participants have not encountered. To make these new predictions, the simulation
method uses the best-fitting parameters from one-step-ahead predictions (post hoc fit cri-
terion). Two possible problems may arise from the application of the simulation method:
first, the use of parameters that optimise one-step-ahead predictions to predict new un-
observed choice sequences (new-game predictions) might be far from ideal because these
parameters carry information about participants’ history of experience with the task and
serial dependencies. In other words, the use of parameters estimated with the post hoc
fit method could result in a considerable underestimation of a model’s simulation perfor-
mance. Future research can examine the benefits of the simulation method (i.e., model
predictions under novel conditions/payoff sequences) by using simulated participants to
estimate the model parameters at an individual or aggregate level (a common practice in
other experience-based tasks, see Erev & Barron, 2005; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011). Then,
these parameters can be compared with those from the one-step-ahead method (and the
model predictions of each method) in order to provide better inferences regarding the
level of generalisability and utility of each model.
The second point is related to model complexity, a model’s capacity to fit different
patterns of data (Pitt & Myung, 2002). Complexity is dependent on two different fac-
tors that affect model fit: the free parameters of the model and its functional form; that
is, how the parameters and the mathematical equations are combined (Myung, 2000).
Complexity is a very important concept in model comparison and is related to the gen-
eralisability of the model. The simulation method does not take into account either of
the two factors described earlier. For example, the EVL model has 3 free parameters,
whereas the PVL and the PVL-Delta have 4. Even though the differences in simulation
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performance between the PVL and PVL-Delta models cannot be ascribed to differences
in the number of parameters or their functional form (there are qualitative differences in
the patterns of choices that the two models predict), it could be the case that more (or
less) complex models can be applied to IGT data such as the VPP model which has 8
parameters.
The question is how does one deal with complexity in model comparison? While
there are a few techniques to capture complexity (see Pitt et al., 2002), we propose the
use of the generalization criterion (GC) method (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). The reason
is that the GC is a better and more sophisticated modification of the cross-validation
method and is sensitive to both factors of complexity (Pitt & Myung, 2002). Also, it has
already been applied for model comparison in experience-based tasks (see Ahn et al., 2008;
Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2008). A critical difference between the GC and the simulation
method is that the former uses the participants’ actual choice and payoff histories (i.e.,
there is intermediate feedback from participants’ choices), whereas the latter takes no
input from what participants have actually selected and observed. Hence, when we assess
model generalisability, the GC is a more appropriate method because it deals with the
concept of model complexity and also takes into account how participants’ future choices
are dependent on their actual choice and payoff histories.
The application of the criterion is straightforward: there are two experimental con-
ditions or datasets. The first serves as the calibration set and the second as the test set.
A model is fitted on the calibration set, and the estimated parameters are used to predict
the data in the test set. Finally, the predictions of each of the candidate models in the
test set are compared to assess the empirical validity of these models. Ahn et al. (2008)
used the GC to evaluate different RL models in the context of experience-based decision-
making. Specifically, the same group of participants completed two tasks, the IGT and
the Soochow gambling task (SGT; Chiu et al., 2008), and the models were compared on
their ability to predict one task’s choices based on the estimated parameters of the other
task. Using the GC, Ahn et al. found that the same pattern of results emerged as in the
one-step-ahead prediction method; that is, the PVL model with the decay RL rule was
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the best-performing model (but see Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2008).
One disadvantage of the use of the GC method is that it “places very demanding
requirements on the researcher” (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000, p. 187), because it requires
that the same participants perform a second independent task (similar to the first) based
on a new experimental design (e.g., different payoff schedule). This is the reason why we
did not apply the GC method in our model comparison assessment as participants in our
experiments only performed the IGT.
5.6 Equal Payoff Series Extraction (EPSE)
In this section we return to the inconsistency in results between the post hoc fit
criterion and the simulation method and we attempt to explain the reasons for this in-
consistency. As previously mentioned, RL models derive one-step-ahead predictions from
two different sources of information: past history of choices and past payoffs associated
with choices. When models make predictions, they do not equally weigh these two sources
of information: it is a possibility that certain models rely more on past choices to make
accurate predictions while other models rely more on past payoffs. For this reason, the
performance of models which rely least on past choices to predict the next choice will be
superior under a method which does not take into account participants’ actual choices
such as the simulation method. For example, the decay models tested here may strongly
base their predictions on past choices, because the expectancies of the unselected decks
decay towards zero across time. This could be the reason why the decay models show
poor simulation performance.
Yechiam and Ert (2007) addressed the issue of reliance on past choices by comparing
two models in three different experience-based tasks (none of which was the IGT): the
EVL and the EVL with a decay RL learning rule. They found that the model with the
decay RL rule relied strongly on past choices which led to poor generalisability and inferior
predictions under new payoff conditions. Here, we try to re-address the issue of reliance
on past choices by extending Yechiam and Ert’s analysis to include 2 additional utility
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functions (Prospect Theory utility functions: PU and PU2) and 1 additional learning rule
(mixed learning rule: ML). We also tested the WSLS and VPP models. The technique we
used was identical to Yechiam and Ert’s equal payoff series extraction method (EPSE).
The EPSE uses artificial participants to assess the degree of reliance on past choices. For
each “real” participant performing the task, there is an artificial one whose choices are
identical to those of the real participant but whose payoffs are made to be equal for all
options/decks, matching the average amount of wins and losses of the real participant
across all trials. Hence, if the models do not base their predictions on past choices, then
they should not be able to predict an artificial participant’s future choices under the
EPSE method, because there is no discrimination in the received payoffs.
Each model’s parameters were estimated for each artificial participant using the
one-step-ahead prediction method and the measure fits (BIC) were compared to the fits
of the real participants. Following this, we fit again all 18 RL models (i.e., the factorial
combination of 3 utility functions, 3 learning rules, and 2 choice sensitivity rules), plus
the WSLS and VPP models. While the results may reveal differences mainly between
the learning rules (as in Yechiam and Ert’s, 2007, study), it is possible that the reliance
of each learning rule on past choices may depend on its interaction with different utility
functions and choice rules.
Table 5.8 contains the mean relative BIC (= 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑀 − 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒) for each model
across the three datasets. Positive values indicate better fits of the cognitive model, while
negative values suggest that the statistical baseline model provided better fits. Two main
patterns can be observed: first, the delta learning rule (DEL) has poorer fits under the
EPSE method no matter what utility function or choice rule it is combined with. The
effect is more pronounced when it is combined with the prospect utility function (PU).
The PU function produces worse fits than any other utility function while the expectancy
utility (EU) and the alternative prospect utility (PU2) function perform better in the
EPSE method than in the original post hoc fit when they are combined with a decay RL
learning rule (DEC) and trial-dependent sensitivity (TD). This result indicates that these
models can rely only on past choices to make predictions about participants’ future choices
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and that information about the actual received payoffs does not improve their predictions.
While moderate reliance on past choices can be beneficial for RL models to adjust their
predictions and track participants’ actual choices, strong or absolute dependency on the
history of choices (or absence of discriminative ability between the decks based on their
associated payoffs) could make such models inappropriate to measure stable internal
characteristics of each individual. Instead, these models may only reflect mimicry of past
choices.
Table 5.8: Summary of BIC scores of the 18 cognitive models relative to the baseline model
under the post hoc fit and EPSE methods in three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Utility Updating Choice Orig. Fit EPSE Orig. Fit EPSE Orig. Fit EPSE
EU DEL TD 2.06 -1.64 -0.61 -4.63 11.20 6.92
TI 3.35 -3.84 0.62 -4.76 12.85 4.03
DRL TD 10.38 12.01 16.01 23.73 81.59 93.04
TI 11.28 -3.84 22.07 21.00 75.88 88.39
ML TD 6.96 6.90 16.72 18.95 74.20 86.69
TI 6.94 5.13 18.07 17.54 70.65 84.40
PU DEL TD 5.36 -13.36 5.18 -21.68 23.46 -20.09
TI 6.15 -15.34 6.50 -22.11 19.45 -22.04
DRL TD 5.81 -7.12 12.77 -11.91 80.05 47.73
TI 11.84 -11.05 20.81 -13.62 84.28 40.68
ML TD 7.91 -11.40 15.44 -15.95 77.37 42.76
TI 7.96 -13.98 18.12 -17.63 79.65 36.99
PU2 DEL TD 5.51 -6.09 4.35 -9.08 22.98 2.53
TI 5.83 -8.44 5.45 -9.37 20.68 -1.26
DRL TD 6.90 7.45 15.17 19.67 87.13 88.87
TI 12.92 4.28 22.52 16.40 89.39 83.09
ML TD 9.71 2.98 18.34 14.79 89.43 83.85
TI 9.12 0.57 19.78 12.94 85.83 79.11
Note: EU = expectancy utility function; PU = prospect utility function; PU2 = alternative
prospect utility function; DEL = delta learning rule; DRL = decay RL rule; ML = mixed learn-
ing rule; TD = trial-dependent sensitivity; TI = trial-independent sensitivity; Orig. Fit = Orig-
inal fit, Fit based on received payoffs; EPSE = Equal payoff series extraction, Fit based on
average payoffs.
We then collapsed the mean relative BIC measures for each utility, learning and
choice rule under both methods (original fit and EPSE) and calculated their numerical
difference across datasets (Table 5.9). High positive difference scores (Diff. column in
Table 5.9) indicate worse fits under the EPSE compared to the original fit method,
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suggesting less reliance on past choices and weak choice mimicry effects. Regarding utility
functions, the prospect utility function is strongly affected by the lack of information
about real payoffs whereas the expectancy utility function can make accurate predictions
when discriminative information about payoffs is eliminated. The latter does not mean
that different utility functions reveal different levels of reliance on past choices but rather
when they are combined with learning rules, their interaction produces weak or strong
reliance on past choices. As expected, the decay learning rule produced the smallest
difference score suggesting that its predictions relied more on previous choices compared
to its competitors. This is in accordance with Yechiam and Ert’s (2007) analysis in which
they showed that the decay RL learning rule produced superior post hoc fits but poor
simulation performance because the component in the post hoc fit that was dependent on
past payoffs was smaller compared to the delta learning rule. Comparison of the choice
sensitivity rules revealed that models which use the trial-dependent sensitivity rule tend
to rely more on previous choices than models with the trial-independent sensitivity.
Table 5.9: Summary of collapsed mean BIC scores for each utility, learning, and choice rules
under the post hoc fit and EPSE methods in three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Orig. Fit EPSE Diff. Orig. Fit EPSE Diff. Orig. Fit EPSE Diff.
Utility EU 6.82 4.65 2.18 12.14 11.97 0.17 54.39 60.58 -6.19
PU 7.49 -12.04 19.53 13.12 -17.15 30.27 60.70 21.01 39.70
PU2 8.32 0.13 8.19 14.25 7.56 6.70 65.90 56.03 9.87
Learning DEL 4.70 -8.12 12.82 3.58 -11.94 15.52 18.43 -4.98 23.42
DEC 9.85 2.49 7.36 18.22 9.21 9.01 83.05 73.64 9.41
ML 8.08 -1.63 9.72 17.73 5.11 12.62 79.51 68.97 10.54
Choice TD 6.72 -1.14 7.86 11.48 1.54 9.93 60.82 48.03 12.78
TI 8.37 -3.70 12.07 14.87 0.04 14.83 59.85 43.71 16.14
The results in Table 5.10 explain why the PVL-Delta model manifested good simu-
lation performance, as it has the worst fit in the EPSE method across the three datasets.
This indicates that PVL-Delta’s reliance on past choices is minimal which explains its
good performance in methods of generalisability (simulation method). On the other hand,
the PVL-PU2 seems to base its predictions almost exclusively on the history of past
choices as its fit under the EPSE method is only slightly worse than the original fit.
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The same also applies to the WSLS model which can reproduce the observed choices
without any access to information about received payoffs. An interesting finding of the
present analysis relates to the pattern of results of the PVL and VPP models under both
methods. While the PVL model has the second worst fit under the EPSE method, its
simulation performance is no better than that of the VPP model which under the EPSE
method seems to perform quite well. Based on the results of Table 5.10, one would expect
a close relationship between performance in the simulation and the EPSE methods: the
worse the fit under the EPSE method, the better the performance under the simulation
method. However, this is not observed in the case of the VPP model. It performs well
under both methods which may be due to the fact that it divides the expectancy of each
deck into two different components: expected value and perseverative strength. Having
this extra manipulation, the VPP model can adaptively predict choices under any model
comparison method.
Table 5.10: Mean relative BIC scores for each candidate model under the post hoc fit and
EPSE methods across three datasets.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Model Orig. Fit EPSE Orig. Fit EPSE Orig. Fit EPSE
EVL 2.06 -1.64 -0.61 -4.63 11.20 6.92
PVL 11.83 -11.05 20.80 -13.62 84.28 40.68
PVL-Delta 6.14 -15.34 6.49 -22.12 19.45 -22.04
PVL-PU2 12.91 4.28 22.51 16.40 89.38 83.09
WSLS 5.45 2.43 17.42 13.56 64.96 60.57
VPP 1.36 -9.93 19.31 5.13 81.73 67.64
5.7 Model and parameter recovery
5.7.1 Model recovery
In order to test the general identifiability of each model and how flexible they
can be in mimicking the data generated by a competing model, we conducted a model
recovery analysis (for similar approaches see Berry, Shanks, Speekenbrink, & Henson,
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2012; Steyvers et al., 2009; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & Iverson, 2004; Worthy,
Hawthorne, & Otto, 2013). Model mimicry is an important concept in model comparison
studies as it assesses the degree to which a candidate model can be excessively adaptive
and flexible in explaining data patterns that have been produced by a different model.
This is best explained by using two different non-nested models: model 𝐴 and model
𝐵. Assuming that model 𝐴 is the “true” model which has generated the data, then it
follows that this model should be able to provide the best fits for the data it generated
(it successfully recovers the data that it produced) as compared to its competitor, model
𝐵. If, however, model 𝐵 gives better fits than model 𝐴 (given that model 𝐴 is the true
model), then model 𝐵 is an overly flexible model which can mimic a wide range of data
patterns. Model recovery analysis in not only useful in assessing a model’s flexibility but
it also provides a good means to ensure that the model selection measurement (e.g., BIC)
is valid at discriminating and selecting between competing models.
In the present model recovery analysis, we compared 5 different models (EVL, PVL,
PVL-Delta, PVL-PU2, and VPP). We used the best fitting parameters of each participant
under each model to generate 100 simulated datasets. The next step is to fit the simulated
datasets with all the models, including the one which generated the data. This procedure
is applied to each model. Then, each model is assessed on how well it can recover the
datasets that it generated. The procedure we followed is local or data informed as it uses
real experimental data to assess model recovery (see Wagenmakers et al., 2004). The
global approach is to generate simulated datasets based on random sampling from the
parameter space (i.e., from within the boundaries of parameter values) of each model,
which can go a step beyond idiosyncrasies found in experimental data and provide an
unbiased assessment of model recovery and mimicry. However, the global approach risks
basing conclusions about model recovery on implausible data patterns (i.e., data patterns
that have not been observed in the literature).
We used the best fitting parameters from Dataset 3 which resulted in 2,000 sim-
ulated datasets for each model (20 participants × 100 replications). The assessment of
each model’s recovery ability is performed using confusion matrices, that is the percentage
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of correctly recovered models for simulated datasets. Table 5.11 contains two measures
of model recovery. The first is the percentage of recovered datasets of the model that
generated the data. Perfect recovery is achieved when the diagonal of the matrix is 100,
which means that each model is able to fully recover the datasets that it generated. In the
present analysis, this is only true for the EVL model as it recovers 97.65% of the datasets
it produced. The VPP and the PVL models recover less than half of their generated
datasets, indicating that other models can mimic the data patterns they produce. Specif-
ically, the PVL-PU2 model is highly flexible and can explain a substantial percentage
of datasets generated by the PVL and VPP models (31.18% and 43.97%, respectively).
The poor model recovery of the VPP can also be ascribed to its complexity as it has 8
parameters and the penalty term is higher for this model. Overall, this analysis has two
main conclusions: first, the EVL model is quite distinct from the other models and the
data patterns it can explain. Second, recovery performance is not clear between the PVL,
PVL-Delta and PVL-PU2 models because their assumptions are quite similar leading to
significant predictive overlap.
When looking at the mean BIC of each model (second part of Table 5.11) a clearer
picture emerges. Numbers in parentheses indicate the rank of the BIC values so a rank
of 1 suggests that the model had the best BIC value for the datasets it generated. Apart
from the VPP model, all the other models provided the best BIC for the datasets they
generated indicating good recovery performance and also that the BIC is an adequate
measure for selecting between models. It can also be seen that the PVL and PVL-PU2
models show similar behaviour and ability to fit data that were generated by each other
because their mean BIC values are very close. However, the PVL-PU2 seems to be more
flexible and can fit better datasets that were generated from the PVL model.
5.7.2 Parameter Recovery
The final step in cognitive modelling analysis is to use the estimated parameters of
the “best” candidate model to make inferences about the underlying psychological and
cognitive processes. Hence, it is important to examine whether these parameters can be
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Table 5.11: Model recovery performance of each candidate model.
Percentage of recovered simulated datasets
True Model EVL PVL PVL-Delta PVL-PU2 VPP
EVL 97.65 0.40 0.75 1.20 0
PVL 8.56 45.75 14.46 31.18 0.05
PVL-Delta 13.20 15.70 57.35 13.55 0.02
PVL-PU2 9.50 9.40 5.35 75.75 0
VPP 6.60 15.75 10.66 43.97 23.01
Mean BIC
EVL 467.76 (1) 487.37 (3) 490.10 (4) 481.86 (2) 496.44 (5)
PVL 450.11 (5) 375.35 (1) 421.95 (4) 377.41 (2) 395.51 (3)
PVL-Delta 447.70 (4) 440.00 (2) 437.01 (1) 443.13 (3) 454.07 (5)
PVL-PU2 488.36 (5) 397.07 (2) 475.04 (4) 387.48 (1) 406.91 (3)
VPP 450.08 (5) 393.51 (3) 435.53 (4) 386.39 (1) 390.93 (2)
estimated accurately and reliably (Wetzels, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, &Wagenmakers,
2010). In other words, the question is how well a certain model can recover the parameters
that were used to generate simulated datasets. The procedure is identical to the model
recovery analysis: the best fitting parameters of each participant under each model are
used to generate 100 simulated datasets. Then, these datasets are fitted again using the
same model and the estimated parameters of the simulated datasets are compared to the
parameters that were used to generate the datasets in the first place.
Here, we will focus on the PVL-PU2 and the PVL-Delta models which showed the
best performance under the post hoc fit criterion and the simulation method, respectively.
Figure 5.5 shows recovery performance for each parameter of the PVL-PU2. Red dots
indicate the parameter values that were used to generate the simulated datasets (for each
participant), and the black dots indicate the mean parameter values of the 100 fitted
simulated datasets. When black dots are not visible, it means that there is an overlap of
the true and the simulated parameter values, suggesting good recovery performance. Par-
ticipants (x-axis) are ranked on the basis of their parameter values. The solid horizontal
line indicates the overall mean of the true parameter value, and the dashed horizontal
line indicates the overall mean of the simulated parameter value. Figure 5.5 shows good
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recovery for the recency, 𝐷, and response consistency, 𝑐, parameters. Recovery for these
two parameters is unbiased, as the simulated parameters closely match the true parameter
values for each participant, and the overall means (horizontal lines) are almost identi-
cal. Similarly, the loss aversion parameter, 𝜆, shows relatively good recovery. However,
parameter recovery for the reward sensitivity parameter, 𝛼, was not as good as for the
other parameters of the model. Not only are the parameters not well estimated, but the
density plots were quite broad, indicating increased variability in the estimation of this
parameter. One possible explanation of this pattern is that the method for estimating
the parameter values (i.e., maximum-likelihood estimation, MLE) is inadequate. The true
parameter value of the first 14 ranked participants is virtually zero which is the lower
bound of this parameter (0 < 𝛼 < 1). This is common problem with maximum likeli-
hood estimation, as estimated parameters “hit” the boundaries of the parameter space
(Wetzels et al., 2010). To avoid this, other estimation techniques could be employed in-
stead of MLE, such as hierarchical Bayesian estimation which overcomes such problems
(see Ahn et al., 2011; Steingroever et al., in press).
Figure 5.6 shows parameter recovery performance of the PVL-Delta model. The
payoff sensitivity parameter shows better recovery compared to the PVL-PU2 model,
whereas the loss aversion parameter is recovered as well as in the PVL-PU2. On the
other hand, the response consistency parameter shows increased variability (broad density
plots) and poor recovery, as was the case for the PVL-PU2 model. Overall, the two
models indicate relatively good parameter recovery suggesting that their parameters can
be used to explain the psychological phenomena underlying the IGT. There might be a
potential problem with the payoff sensitivity parameter in the PVL-PU2 model, which
could potentially be overcome using a Bayesian estimation framework.
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Figure 5.5: Parameter recovery performance of the PVL-PU2 model in Dataset 3. Red and
black dots indicate true parameter values and means of the parameter values for the simulated
datasets, respectively. Solid and dashed horizontal lines indicate the overall mean of the true
and simulated parameter values, respectively.
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Figure 5.6: Parameter recovery performance of the PVL-Delta model in Dataset 3. Red and
black dots indicate true parameter values and means of the parameter values for the simulated
datasets, respectively. Solid and dashed horizontal lines indicate the overall mean of the true
and simulated parameter values, respectively.
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A potential issue with the previous analysis is that the number of trials (200 in
Dataset 3) may have led to better parameter estimates, as the models have more infor-
mation to adjust their parameter values. We applied the same analysis in Dataset 2 which
consists of 100 trials (typical of the IGT) and we observed similar recovery performance.
Figure 5.7 shows parameter recovery performance of the PVL-PU2 model in Dataset 2,
which is quite similar to that observed in Dataset 1. Again, there are some problems with
the payoff sensitivity parameter but overall the number of trial seems not to be a major
factor in determining a model’s parameter recovery performance.
PVL-PU2 in Dataset 2
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Figure 5.7: Parameter recovery performance of the PVL-PU2 model in Dataset 2. Red and
black dots indicate true parameter values and means of the parameter values for the simulated
datasets, respectively. Solid and dashed horizontal lines indicate the overall mean of the true
and simulated parameter values, respectively.
6 Modelling Confidence
The relationship between decision accuracy, choice certainty or confidence, and reac-
tion times has been extensively investigated since the early days of psychological research
(e.g., Henmon, 1911; Volkmann, 1934). These early investigations showed that all three
components of a decision process are closely related, for example, reaction times become
faster as confidence about one’s decision increases (also see Petrusic & Baranski, 2003),
and choice accuracy is positively correlated with decision confidence (e.g., Baranski &
Petrusic, 1998; Dougherty, 2001). Most of these studies examined psychological effects
and decision processes in the domain of perceptual decision-making. However, little is
known about the interplay of decision accuracy and confidence in sequential economic
decisions as in the case of experience-based decision-making. Importantly, behaviour in
decisions-from-experience is shaped by learning mechanisms and subsequent choices are
dependent on the previous history of choices and associated payoffs. Hence, the level of
confidence after each selection in experience-based tasks does not necessarily constitute a
momentary evaluation of the quality of the selection, but instead reflects the accumulated
experience (or learning) with this selection across time.
The purpose of the present chapter is to provide a formal description of confidence
judgments in the context of the IGT. The results of previous experiments (e.g., Experi-
ment 8) suggested a close link between choice behaviour and confidence ratings, meaning
that decks with positive overall expected values (i.e., good decks) received higher confi-
dence ratings compared to decks with negative overall expected values (i.e., bad decks).
In addition, ROC analyses revealed good metacognitive discriminability indicating that
good decisions were made under conditions of increased confidence. Despite the useful-
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ness of these analyses, they can only be seen as post hoc or descriptive assessments of the
relationship between choice and confidence. In other words, they do not inform us about
the process that generates a certain confidence judgment or the psychological mechanism
based on which participants assign confidence ratings to their first order decisions (i.e.,
deck selections).
In order to provide an explanatory framework for confidence judgments in the IGT,
we developed a computational model that is dependent on the choice predictions gen-
erated by the RL models. Given the close relationship between choice and confidence,
we hypothesised that there is a connection between the output of the RL models that
we tested in the previous chapter and the mechanism that gives rise to confidence judg-
ments. The results of the choice modelling analyses suggested that certain RL models
can capture the dynamics of choice in the IGT and participants’ preferences about the
decks. Hence, if the same mechanism is responsible for both choice and confidence, then
there should be a direct mapping between the predictions of RL models and confidence
ratings.
6.1 The model
We constructed a model which allows for a direct mapping of the predictions of a
certain RL model onto confidence ratings. RL models predict the probability of a deck
𝑗 being selected on the next trial 𝑡 + 1, 𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑗], given the history of previ-
ous choices and associated payoffs. This probability reflects the relative expectancy of
a deck, that is, its expectancy (or average adjusted expected value up to and including
trial 𝑡) compared to the expectancies of the other decks. We used these probabilities as
the relative strength of each deck upon which a confidence rating is based. The rationale
behind our confidence model is that decks with high relative strength will receive high
confidence ratings. However, the relationship between relative strength and confidence
may not always be deterministic, thus, in order to account for uncertainty and variability
in confidence judgments, we employed a normal distribution function over each selected
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deck’s relative strength. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 6.1: the mean of this nor-
mal distribution is 𝜇 = 𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑗] and the variance, 𝜎2, is a free parameter estimated
from the data. The next parameter of the model is the position of the middle criterion,
𝐶2−3, whereas the positions of the other two criteria, 𝐶1−2 and 𝐶3−4, can be estimated
given the last parameter of the model, 𝑑, which defines the constant distance between
criteria. The probability of a confidence rating 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑖 on trial 𝑡, following selection of
deck 𝑗 and its relative strength is given as:
𝑃𝑟(𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑖 | 𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑗]) = Φ
(︂
𝑐𝑖 − 𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑗]
𝜎2
)︂
−Φ
(︂
𝑐𝑖−1 − 𝑃𝑟[𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑗]
𝜎2
)︂
,
(6.1)
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function. The confidence ratings are de-
fined as follows: 𝑐0 = −∞, 𝑐1 = 𝐶2−3 − 𝑑, 𝑐2 = 𝐶2−3, 𝑐3 = 𝐶2−3 + 𝑑, 𝑐4 = ∞. The
parameters of the model (𝜎2, 𝐶2−3, 𝑑) were determined by maximising the log likelihood
of an individual’s confidence ratings across all trials of the task:
𝐿𝐿𝑀 =
𝑡∑︁
𝑡=1
4∑︁
𝑗=1
ln(𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑖 |𝐷𝑗(𝑡)]) · 𝛿𝑖(𝑡), (6.2)
where 𝛿𝑖 is a dummy variable that is 1 if confidence rating 𝑖 is placed on trial 𝑡 and 0
otherwise.
C1−2 C2−3 C3−4
d d
Relative Strength
Pr [D (t) = j]
Figure 6.1: Graphical illustration of a hypothetical distribution based on which the probability
of a certain confidence rating is estimated.
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6.2 Model fitting results
In order to evaluate the model and its predictions we used the data from the two
groups of Experiment 8 (Control and Switch). The use of the data from the switch group
will allow us not only to evaluate the confidence model but also to examine how well the
RL models perform in explaining choice behaviour in a controlled dynamic variation of
the IGT. We used two RL models to generate the relative strength of each deck on each
trial (using the best fitting parameters from each individual): the PVL-PU2 and the PVL-
Delta models, which were found to provide the best descriptions of the choice data under
the post-hoc fit and the simulation method, respectively. The reason for using the PVL-
Delta model is that its predictions (i.e., relative strengths) rely more on payoff-related
information compared to the PVL-PU2 which was found to strongly base its predictions
on the history of past choices. Given that our hypothesis attempts to relate the value of
each deck with its associated confidence, it could be the case that models that mimic past
choices may distort the results regarding confidence by introducing biases (such as inertia
or perseveration) which have nothing to do with the relative strength of each deck.
6.2.1 Control group
Table 6.1 contains the fit measures of choice and confidence models, and the pa-
rameters of the confidence model. The goodness of fit column shows the mean BIC scores
relative to a statistical baseline model. As in the case of the choice models, the mean
score for the confidence model represents the difference of its predictions from those of
the baseline model, which assumes that the predicted probability of a confidence rating
on each trial reflects the overall proportion of each confidence rating across all trials of
the task. Thus, a positive score indicates that the cognitive confidence model is superior
to the baseline model. It can be seen that the confidence model outperforms the baseline
model under both RL models. However, the predictions from the PVL-Delta model seem
to provide better input to the confidence model compared to PVL-PU2 model, as the
BIC score of the confidence model given predictions from the PVL-Delta is higher (73.20
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compared to 62.98).
Table 6.1: Mean relative BIC scores for the choice and confidence models and estimated
parameters of the confidence model in the control group of Experiment 8.
Model Goodness of Fit Parameters
Choice Confidence 𝐶2−3 𝑑 𝜎2
PVL-Delta 19.45 73.20 0.27 1.05 0.47
PVL-PU2 89.39 62.98 0.35 2.47 1.10
The question is why does this pattern emerge given that the PVL-PU2 model can
perform better in predicting choice behaviour? A possible answer comes from inspecting
the predicted probabilities of each model (PVL-Delta and PVL-PU2). Figure 6.2 shows
that the predictions of the PVL-Delta model capture the rank ordering of the decks but
they do not account for small changes in the predicted probabilities on a trial-by-trial
basis. On the other hand, the PVL-PU2 accurately predicts the noisy changes in the
observed choice probabilities and this is why it fits the data better than its competitor.
However, participants’ confidence ratings may depend on a more general representation
of the value of each deck which does not conform to the trial-by-trial dynamics, which can
also reflect exploratory behaviour. Therefore, the confidence model with relative strengths
from the PVL-Delta provides a better description of participants’ confidence judgments.
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Figure 6.2: Mean predicted choice probabilities of the PVL-Delta and PVL-PU2 models in
the control group of Experiment 8.
Figure 6.3 shows the confidence model predictions relative to participants’ data
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regarding the proportion of each confidence rating after selection of each of the four decks.
It is evident that the confidence model is able to capture the rank order of each confidence
rating and its predictions are very close to the observed behavioural pattern. Figure 6.4
shows the mean confidence rating for each deck across blocks of 50 trials (solid colours)
and the model’s predictions (transparent colours), which yield a similar interpretation as
in Figure 6.3: the model accurately predicts that good decks receive higher confidence
ratings as participants accumulate more evidence about the value of these decks. Similarly,
participants give lower ratings to the bad decks, and as their relative strength decreases
over time, the confidence model adequately captures this tendency and assigns lower
confidence ratings to the bad decks.
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Figure 6.3: Observed proportions (Data) and predicted mean probabilities (Confidence Model)
of confidence ratings after selecting each deck (A, B, C, and D).
Overall, the modelling results suggest that confidence ratings can be mapped onto
and explained by the relative strength of each deck. This indicates that participants’
knowledge about the task (as indexed by their confidence judgments) closely tracks the
learned values of each deck and their relative strength, indicating a close connection be-
tween learning and awareness. By using a simple model to explain participants’ metacog-
nitive reports, we obtained evidence supporting the idea that confidence arises from the
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same mechanism that is responsible for learning the deck values and expectancies. Our
results highlight the fact that choice behaviour and confidence are closely related and
complementary components of the same underlying decision-making process.
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Figure 6.4: Observed (Data) and predicted (Confidence Model) mean confidence ratings for
each deck across blocks of trials in the control group of Experiment 8. For each pair of colours,
the darker one refers to the data and the lighter one to the model predictions.
6.2.2 Switch group
Examination of choice behaviour and confidence in the switch group poses two chal-
lenges: the first relates to whether RL models are able to capture the dynamics of the
environment and adjust their predictions according to the new deck contingencies that
each shift period introduces. The second challenge is whether the proposed confidence
model can account for changes in confidence ratings across shift periods. The behavioural
results of the switch group (see Figure 4.14: A and B) showed that participants discrim-
inated in shift periods 3 and 4 between good and bad decks and gave higher confidence
ratings to the good decks. The question is whether the cognitive models for choice be-
haviour and confidence ratings can make accurate predictions and capture these effects.
The first step was to fit the PVL-Delta and PVL-PU2 models to the choice data
of the switch group. The procedure was identical to the one described in Section 5.3.1
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(one-step-ahead predictions). Table 6.2 lists three different measures of fit (relative BIC
score, BIC weights, and proportion of participants best fit) for the two RL models. The
results resemble those of the control group, that is, the PVL-PU2 model provides better
predictions compared to the PVL-Delta model regarding the observed choice pattern.
However, the difference between the two models can no longer be ascribed to changes
in the trial-by-trial micro-adjustments of the PVL-PU2 model to capture as accurately
as possible the observed choice pattern (as was the case in the control group). Figure
6.5 shows differences between the two models regarding the rank ordering of decks. For
example, the PVL-Delta model predicts more selections from the bad deck with infrequent
losses in blocks 3 and 4 (original deck B) whereas the PVL-PU2 model correctly predicts
the observed behavioural pattern (i.e., more selections from the good decks). It is possible
that in such dynamic environments, some degree of reliance on previous choices can
be beneficial as it can give a “boost” to the models to accurately predict subsequent
choices. Hence, the PVL-PU2 model, which incorporates a decay RL rule, can closely
track participants’ choices, compared to the PVL-Delta model.
Table 6.2: Measures of fit for the choice and confidence models and estimated parameters of
the confidence model in the switch group of Experiment 8.
Model Goodness of Fit Parameters
Choice Confidence
BIC 𝑤BIC % Best Fit BIC 𝐶2−3 𝑑 𝜎2
PVL-Delta 20.61 0.08 0.05 114.59 0.59 0.53 0.59
PVL-PU2 86.53 0.92 0.95 140.97 0.56 0.63 0.49
As expected, the confidence model fits the data better when it takes as input the
relative strength of each deck as predicted by the PVL-PU2 model (see Table 6.2 - Con-
fidence column). The difference in the choice pattern predicted by each of the two RL
models is responsible for the better predictions of the confidence model under the PVL-
PU2 (higher BIC score compared to the PVL-Delta). Figure 6.6 shows the behavioural
data and model predictions regarding the mean confidence ratings following selections
from each deck. The model accurately predicts the rank order of the mean ratings after
selections from good and bad decks and its predictions are very similar to the ratings that
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participants assign to each deck. However, the model cannot reach the mean confidence
rating of the good deck with frequent losses in blocks 3 and 4, as it predicts slightly lower
ratings for this deck. Similarly, the model mispredicts the low mean rating following selec-
tions from the bad deck with infrequent losses in block 4, as it assigns a somewhat higher
mean rating to it. Nevertheless, in the cases of mispredictions, the difference between
observed data and model predictions are relatively small (≈ 0.25).
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Figure 6.5: Mean predicted choice probabilities of the PVL-Delta and PVL-PU2 models in
the switch group of Experiment 8.
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Figure 6.6: Observed (Data) and predicted (Model) mean confidence ratings for each deck
across blocks of trials in the switch group of Experiment 8. For each pair of colours, the darker
one refers to the data and the lighter one to the model predictions.
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As in the control group, the confidence modelling results from the switch group
suggest a very close link between choice behaviour and confidence ratings. More selections
from the good decks are accompanied by higher confidence ratings and the model is able
to capture this effect as it bases its predictions on the relative strength of each deck. In
other words, decks with higher expectancies and relative strength are selected more often
and receive higher ratings. Even in situations of high uncertainty (as in the switch group)
where decks payoffs are not constant and deck quality (good or bad) changes over time,
participants seem to rely on cognitive strategies to learn the values of the decks and make
decisions. The same mechanism generates confidence ratings. This suggests that choice
and awareness in the context of the IGT and other experience-based tasks are closely
related, indicating that there is little evidence to support the view that learning to make
advantageous decisions is dissociable from conscious awareness.
6.3 Discussion
The main objective of the present chapter was to develop a model which can ac-
count for confidence ratings in the context of the IGT. The general idea was based on
the behavioural results of previous experiments which suggested that choice and confi-
dence are closely related. Decks with positive overall expected values tend to be selected
more often and participants’ confidence judgments track this preference. The input of
the confidence model was the relative strength of each deck as predicted by the choice
RL models. The main results indicated that if the predictions of the RL models are in
accordance with the observed choice pattern, then the confidence model can accurately
predict the way that participants use the confidence scale.
Our results are in agreement with a range of studies in the decision-making literature
that have established a close link between choice and subjective confidence. For exam-
ple, Pleskac and Busemeyer’s (2010) two-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) model
suggests that a single dynamic and stochastic cognitive process (evidence accumulation
as in a random walk/diffusion process) can give rise to the three components underlying
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a decision process: choice, reaction time, and confidence. In a recent neuroscience study,
De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, and Dolan (2013) demonstrated that neural activity in
the VMPFC brain area represents both choice and confidence, implying that these two
components are separate behavioural aspects of the same underlying decision process.
Similarly, other studies have shown that brain areas responsible for value computation
also code neural signals related to choice certainty and confidence (e.g., Kepecs, Uchida,
Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). Our confidence model is built on these
ideas and the behavioural results from our experiments to provide a simple yet functional
account of how confidence arises in the context of experience-based decision-making.
6.3.1 The importance of a reliable choice model
The modelling results of the present chapter highlight the importance of the model
comparison analyses in Chapter 5 and underline the pitfalls of using an “erroneous”
model to account for the observed choice pattern. The results from the PVL-Delta model
in the switch group showed that this model cannot accurately predict the rank ordering of
decks (see Figure 6.5) leading to inferior predictions regarding the confidence judgments
compared to its competitor, the PVL-PU2 model. Had we used the PVL-Delta model to
predict each deck’s relative strength, the confidence model’s predictions would have not
accurately captured participants’ confidence ratings.
As we mentioned earlier, good simulation performance does not always dictate that a
model can reliably assess the mechanisms underlying choice. Learning to make decisions
is dependent on the history of each individual’s experience with the task and model
comparison techniques which do not take this into account may fail to identify the best
model. The inadequacy of the PVL-Delta model to correctly predict participants’ choice
behaviour in the dynamic variant of the IGT indicates that one should always look at a
model’s predictions before using it to make inferences about the underlying psychological
and cognitive processes. The relative success of the PVL-PU2 may have been the result
of reliance on the history of past choices to make accurate predictions, but this tendency
could be beneficial in dynamically changing environments. Overall, the selection between
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candidate models must adhere to the participant’s objectives and what she wants to
achieve.
6.3.2 Limitations and future research
In the present formal analysis of participants’ metacognitive judgments, we chose
to examine the relationship between the relative strength of each deck and confidence
ratings, because the latter was found to be sensitive in capturing participants’ acquired
knowledge of the task. A similar assessment could also be applied to wagering data and
might shed light on the problematic aspects of this measure. For example, an explanation
for why wagering is not as sensitive as confidence ratings is loss aversion. A possible way to
tackle this and explain wagering judgments is to make the model’s predictions dependent
on some measure of the degree of loss aversion for each individual (for instance, the
loss aversion parameter in the prospect utility function). In the context of our proposed
model this could mean that the placement of the criteria for each wagering amount is
more conservative.
A possible limitation of our modeling analysis is that model predictions and param-
eter estimates come from two separate model fitting procedures: first, the RL models are
fitted to the choice data and then their predictions are used as input for the confidence
model (second model fitting). We chose to apply this two-stage procedure in order to avoid
any interactions between parameter estimates of the two models that could potentially
distort model predictions for both choice behaviour and confidence ratings. Ideally, the
parameter estimates of the RL and the confidence models would not interact as they mea-
sure different components of the decision-making process. Hence, our two-stage approach
can be justified as an exploratory way to provide a simple formal account of confidence
judgments.
Finally, a significant contribution to understanding choice and confidence is to in-
clude reaction times as part of the experimental design. Even though the relation be-
tween reaction times, choice, and confidence may not be easily identifiable in the context
of experience-based decision-making (choices are not independent events/trials), it could
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still be useful to examine this and make use of a different modelling framework that ac-
counts for all components of the decision-making process (e.g., modifications of Decision
Field Theory, Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993, to account for confidence judgments).

7 General Discussion
The aim of this thesis was to examine the role played by unconscious or im-
plicit influences on decision-making under uncertainty and specifically in the context of
experience-based decision-making and the IGT. The results of the experiments reported
here do not any offer any support for the claims that learning to make advantageous
decisions can occur in the absence of awareness (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Persaud et
al., 2007). As noted in the Introduction, research evaluating awareness in the IGT has
formed a prominent and major element of the wider claim that unconscious thoughts
or signals can influence choice, a fundamental theoretical idea most famously advocated
and defended by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). The present work therefore bolsters recent
suggestions (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2014) that it is premature to assign a fundamental
role to such processes in theories of decision-making.
The purpose of the behavioural experiments was twofold: first, to evaluate post-
decision wagering as a sensitive and direct method of awareness, and secondly to investi-
gate whether claims about implicit influences on decision-making are valid. A careful ex-
amination of wagering in comparison with other measures of awareness such as confidence
ratings and quantitative questions also allowed us to explore the type of information that
is essential for optimal decision-making and how participants use their acquired knowl-
edge to make decisions in uncertain environments. The computational modelling analyses
complemented the main behavioural results, showing a direct connection between learning
of the advantageous strategy and participants’ metacognitive reports.
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7.1 Summary of results
Experiments 1 and 2 were near exact replications of Persaud et al.’s (2007) study.
However, we only replicated the results relating to the quantitative questioning group of
Experiment 1 where deck selection and advantageous wagering exceeded chance at the
same time. In contrast to Persaud et al.’s results, the same pattern was observed in both
experiments in groups that were asked only to make a wager after their deck selection,
suggesting no dissociation between choice and wagering.
Chapter 3 examined the influence of different pay-off matrices on wagering strategies
and two potential response biases: dominance of high wagers and loss aversion. Experi-
ment 3 demonstrated that a simple change in the weights of the pay-off matrix can make
wagering more sensitive (compared to the original pay-off matrix). Experiment 4 showed
that even though wagering closely tracked learning of the advantageous strategy under
the pay-off matrix proposed by Clifford et al. (2008), it underestimated participants’ ac-
quired knowledge as compared to their quantitative questions reports. The claim that
loss aversion modulates wagering strategies was tested in Experiment 5. Even though a
preference for the good decks appeared very early in the task, participants’ wagers did
not follow this tendency showing an effect of the high weights in the pay-off matrix.
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to compare wagering to another subjective measure
of awareness, confidence ratings. In Experiment 6, we compared wagering with confi-
dence ratings in an attempt to identify structural differences between the two measures
and to provide a better examination of knowledge assessment in the IGT by employing
a 4-point confidence scale. While both confidence scales (binary and continuous) showed
conscious knowledge of the advantageous strategy in the IGT, this was not the case for
wagering. Thus wagering is a less sensitive measure of awareness than confidence rat-
ings. Also, knowledge in the IGT seems to be conscious: When we applied the guessing
criterion (Dienes et al., 1995) to our data, there was no evidence of unconscious process-
ing. Experiment 7 tested binary and continuous versions of wagering against confidence
ratings. Confidence ratings and 4-point wagering indicated that participants made ad-
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vantageous selections under situations of conscious knowledge but binary wagering failed
to detect such a relationship, indicating that the use of wagering in a continuous manner
may allow participants to use the scale more efficiently. However, the guessing criterion
analysis on the 4-point wagering showed that participants used the lowest point of the
scale more often compared to confidence ratings. While this might be taken as evidence
that 4-point wagering can detect some unconscious learning in participants’ decisions, an
alternative explanation of this effect is that wagering is affected by loss aversion, leading
participants to place low wagers even in situations of increased confidence. Experiment 8
demonstrated that conscious knowledge (as indexed by confidence ratings) is responsible
for guiding decisions even in a dynamic version of the IGT where deck payoffs change
periodically.
Chapters 5 and 6 provided a formal analysis of choice behaviour and confidence
judgments, respectively. In Chapter 5, the computational modelling analysis of choice data
using different model comparison techniques highlighted the importance of employing a
reliable model to decompose the underlying psychological processes, and identified certain
requirements that a good model needs to satisfy. Finally, the confidence model that
we developed to account for participants’ confidence ratings in Chapter 6 showed the
strong relationship between choice and metacognition, suggesting that both processes are
different manifestations of the same decision mechanism.
7.2 Measures of awareness
The task of validating measures and methods of assessing awareness is an important
endeavour within psychological science as from the very beginnings of experimental psy-
chology, researchers have been interested in the distinction between conscious and uncon-
scious mental states (Dienes, 2008). This thesis put post-decision wagering under careful
scrutiny because it is a method that supposedly removes biases and complications associ-
ated with verbal judgments of conscious knowledge. It has been extensively employed as
a probe of conscious knowledge in several areas of experimental psychology such as per-
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ceptual decision-making and subliminal perception (e.g., Koriat, 2011; Nieuwenhuis & de
Kleijn, 2011; Persaud et al., 2011; Persaud & McLeod, 2008; Sandberg, Bibby, Timmer-
mans, Cleeremans, & Overgaard, 2011), implicit learning (e.g., Haider, Eichler, & Lange,
2011; Mealor & Dienes, 2012; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012), and value-based decision-making
(e.g., Lueddeke & Higham, 2011; Wang et al., 2012). Also, it has been used to study
awareness in non-human animals (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Middlebrooks & Som-
mer, 2011) and children (Miller, Brownell, & Zukier, 1977; Ruffman, Garnham, Import,
& Connolly, 2001) where traditional confidence scales can be difficult to use.
Despite its extensive use, post-decision wagering has been found to be inferior to
other traditional methods such as confidence ratings in terms of scale sensitivity and
exhaustiveness. One major criticism refers to the fact that wagering is affected by loss
aversion, leading participants to adopt more conservative criteria in the expression of
their knowledge. Although that means foregoing large gains, wagering low minimises the
likelihood of large losses, even when one has some confidence about which are the good
decks. There is now widespread consensus that the application of wagering distorts mea-
surements of conscious content and hinders expression of awareness (e.g., Sandberg et
al., 2013; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012). In addition, even when
wagering is used in a continuous manner participants select the extreme points of the
scale (i.e., the lowest and highest wagering amount) in a dichotomous manner, as this be-
haviour may allow for maximisation of earnings (Sandberg et al., 2010; Wierzchon´ et al.,
2012). If access to conscious knowledge has a graded character, then clearly post-decision
wagering has a disadvantage in detecting changes in participants’ metacognitive ability.
The results of our experiments showed that indeed loss aversion affects participants’ wa-
gering behaviour. For example, in Experiment 5, even though participants demonstrated
increased ability to discriminate between good and bad decks, they mainly placed low
wagers in order to avoid large losses (which could occur even in selections from the good
decks) given the high weights in the pay-off matrix associated with high wagering.
Comparisons between wagering and other measures of awareness such as confi-
dence ratings and quantitative questions showed that wagering is a less sensitive method
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(e.g., Experiments 4, 6, and 7). It is possible that wagering is more sensitive to the
emotional/motivational components of decision-making and thus a poor indicator of the
acquisition of conscious knowledge. For example, it may assess the willingness of partici-
pants to engage in risk-taking behaviour which is not related to their acquired knowledge
about the decks. Moreover, Pasquali, Timmermans, and Cleeremans (2010) argued that
advantageous wagering can be acquired in the absence of awareness which would make
it an unsuitable measure of awareness in the IGT. The overall utility of post-decision
wagering as a reliable measure of awareness needs to be further examined under different
settings (e.g., different pay-off matrices, no-loss gambling in order to remove the effect of
loss aversion) and other experimental conditions, as it seems to be unsuitable in a context
(the IGT) where the first-order task also involves gambling.
The results of the present thesis only extend to the IGT and further evaluations of
post-decision wagering are needed using different behavioural tasks or populations. For
instance, Persaud et al. (2007) reported a dissociation between awareness (as measured by
wagering) and behaviour in three different tasks: artificial grammar learning, blindsight,
and the IGT. However, our findings are consistent with other studies which have shown
that wagering is no more reliable or exhaustive than confidence ratings (e.g., Dienes &
Seth, 2010; Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 2013).
It is important to emphasise that although our conclusions are very different from
those of Persaud et al. (2007), this is not because of any substantial disagreement about
the fundamental data patterns. On the contrary, we were able to reproduce the key finding
they reported - a lag between deck discrimination and the onset of advantageous wagering
- in the simple wagering group of Experiment 3 and the wagering group of Experiment 6.
It is true that the conditions in which we obtained this pattern were slightly different from
those in which Persaud et al. obtained it (for example, in our studies it depended on using
the original IGT payoff schedule) and that in the no questioning group of Experiment 1
we did not obtain it, despite the fact that this group comprised a near-exact replication
of Persaud et al.’s experiment, suggesting that some subtle procedural factors influence
whether or not a lag occurs. Where we are in disagreement is in the interpretation of
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this lag. Whereas Persaud et al. took it as evidence of unconscious influences in decision
making that drive deck selections before participants become aware and able to wager
adaptively, we take the lag as evidence of the insensitivity of wagering. Our case for this
conclusion rests on the finding that the lag was eliminated or indeed reversed as a result
of (1) a minor change in the payoff matrix in the modified wagering group of Experiment
3, (2) a switch from a binary wager response to either a binary or a 4-point confidence
response in Experiments 6 and 7, and (3) employing explicit verbal questions such as “if
you could only select cards from one of the decks until the end of the game... which of
the four decks would you pick?” to assess awareness.
Confidence ratings, on the other hand, seem to reliably assess the level of knowledge
about the task that participants have acquired. Even in situations where the payoffs and
quality of the decks change (switch group in Experiment 8), participants’ confidence
ratings are in general agreement with their selections. The fact that confidence ratings
do not change the received payoffs on each trial (as in the case of wagering) makes them
a more reliable and sensitive measure in the context of the IGT, as participants can
directly report their awareness without thinking of the consequences of the use of the
scale. Also, our confidence model (Chapter 6) indicated a strong association between the
relative strength of each deck and confidence judgments. It will be interesting for future
research to apply the same formal analysis to wagering and identify what aspects of the
decision-making process it measures.
7.3 Emotion, uncertainty, and awareness
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) re-introduced the idea that emotional sig-
nals are beneficial to reasoning processes and decision-making. The main claim was that
these emotional signals or somatic markers help people make decisions in situations of
uncertainty as they carry information about the quality of available choices and drive par-
ticipants’ decisions in the absence of conscious awareness. The emotions-as-input account
(Davis et al., 2009) has been challenged by recent studies (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2013;
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Gutbrod et al., 2006; see also section 1.3.3) which suggested that these covert somatic
markers may be the result of acquired conscious knowledge about the task (emotions-
as-outcome account) rather than its generating force (Newell & Shanks, 2014). Hence,
somatic markers may perform overtly and consolidate or reinforce a cognitive representa-
tion about the value of an available choice. Another possibility is that the somatic markers
(as indexed by SCRs) code the uncertainty or riskiness associated with an option (Davis
et al., 2009; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Tomb et al., 2002; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Fernie
and Tunney (2013) noted that explicit knowledge and awareness of risk for the bad decks
(where the variance in the payoffs is higher compared to the good decks) may generate
higher SCRs for these decks. This is in accord with Tomb et al. (2002) who found that it
is the uncertainty/variance in the payoffs and not the overall quality of a decision (good
or bad) that is responsible for higher somatic activity.
In the light of recent evidence, the relationship between SCRs and performance on
the IGT (i.e., higher somatic activity leads to better performance on the task, e.g., Carter
& Smith Pasqualini, 2004; Oya et al., 2005) may be seen as the result of the development
of conscious knowledge about the task and not that anticipatory SCRs precede the emer-
gence of knowledge. However, Wagar and Dixon (2006) presented evidence that affective
information developed before participants behaviourally discriminated between good and
bad decks and had conscious knowledge of the task. Even though the onsets of aSCRs
(between trials 20-30) and good deck selections (between trials 30-40) in their study are
very close to each other, Wagar and Dixon suggested that increased riskiness in the bad
decks may have driven the early development of differential SCRs. But this surely means
that participants had some knowledge (not yet conceptual) that the bad decks returned
high magnitude losses. In another study, Guillaume et al. (2009) observed that conscious
knowledge and aSCRs correlated with task performance, but not with each other. As
these authors suggested, the lack of correlation between knowledge and somatic activity
may have been the result of low statistical power. In addition, assessment of participants’
knowledge was only assessed at the end of the IGT which did not allow for a direct com-
parison between the development of aSCRs and explicit knowledge and failed to satisfy
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the immediacy property of an accurate assessment of conscious knowledge (e.g., Lovibond
& Shanks, 2002; Newell & Shanks, 2014).
In the experiments reported here we did not measure participants’ somatic activity
through SCRs, but we focused on whether differentiation between good and bad decks
is accompanied by explicit knowledge of the deck contingencies. Emotional information
may play a significant role in shaping decision strategies but this largely depends on the
definition and functional properties of emotion and the methods that are used to measure
somatic or emotional activity. It may be the case that conventional SCRs cannot fully
assess the richness of emotional information (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2014). In addition,
more sophisticated model-based analyses of SCRs are needed in order to decompose and
understand what this measurement reflects (e.g., Bach & Friston, 2013).
7.4 Decision-making in the IGT
Early observations regarding decision-making of healthy individuals in the IGT sug-
gested that participants predominantly chose the good decks C and D after an exploration
phase (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994, 1999). When losses started to accumulate from the bad
decks A and B, which were initially thought as good because they returned high rewards,
participants switched to the good decks and this preference continued until the end of
the task. In addition, choice behaviour within good and bad decks was uniform, indicat-
ing that the preference for the good decks was driven by the positive overall expected
values associated with these decks regardless of other factors such as the probability and
magnitude of losses.
However, these early assumptions about the IGT have been questioned in light of
recent experimental evidence (see also section 1.2.1). Many IGT studies have demon-
strated that participants’ choice behaviour is mainly guided by a loss-frequency effect,
meaning that they prefer the decks which produce infrequent losses despite the fact that
these losses are numerically high (e.g., Lin et al., 2007; Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann,
et al., 2013). Also, there is no clear exploration-exploitation trade-off and participants
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do not exploit the most profitable decks but instead go back to select cards from the
disadvantageous decks, especially deck B.
The results from the present experiments are broadly in line with these findings. In
the experiments that used the standard IGT payoff schedule, participants’ choices were
predominantly guided by loss frequency, and deck D was selected more often than any
other deck. The interesting finding is that deck B, which is a disadvantageous deck, was
selected as often as deck C, even though the latter has a positive expected value, and in
some cases was selected as often as deck D (e.g., see Experiments 6 and 7). In fact, a
clear preference for the good decks was only observed in Experiment 1, where participants
selected decks C and D more often than decks A and B.
Most IGT studies report only a weak overall preference for the good decks, between
50% and 60% (Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, et al., 2013), with continued sampling
from deck B. The results from our experiments, where we employed a payoff structure
similar or identical to the original IGT, are in reasonable accordance with these per-
centages. However, in the experiments reported here, we assessed awareness concurrently
(wagering, confidence ratings, and questionnaire) with decision-making and this may have
had a reactive effect on deck-selections, making participants more attentive to the deck
payoffs. For instance, participants may focus more on the task knowing that they will
have to answer specific questions about the decks. Similarly, Cella et al. (2012) argued
that the systematic assessment of participants’ awareness may facilitate performance on
the IGT.
The same also applies to wagering as the tendency to maximise winnings can in-
crease participants’ motivation to perform well in the task (Sandberg et al., 2010). In fact,
Szczepanowski et al. (2013) found that performance on a cognitive task (detection of fear-
ful faces) was increased when post-decision wagering was simultaneously used as a probe
of conscious knowledge, suggesting that financial incentives can motivate participants to
perform better on the primary task. Another aspect of using post-decision wagering is
the magnitude change in payoffs, as wagers in our tasks were employed as multipliers of
the actual deck payoffs. Better ability to discriminate between good and bad decks has
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also been observed in other IGT studies in which participants’ awareness was assessed at
the same time as their decision-making performance (e.g., Dymond, Bailey, Willner, &
Parry, 2010; Evans et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Persaud et al., 2007; Wagar
& Dixon, 2006).
Our results also show that participants can be sensitive to differences among the
decks regarding their overall expected value. In Experiment 4A, the most profitable deck
(deck C) was favoured and there was no overall difference between the decks with a
negative total outcome. The key finding of this experiment was that participants were
able to grasp the payoff structure very early in the task, which suggests that difficulties
participants experience in the classic IGT may be associated with its idiosyncrasies. First,
when participants encounter the initial loss in deck B on trial 9, they may think of it
as a rare event and hence keep selecting cards from this deck. Secondly, the concurrent
presentation of wins and losses might make it harder to acquire the optimal strategy.
Thirdly, it has been shown that 100 trials are not sufficient for participants to learn and
exploit the advantageous decks (Fernie & Tunney, 2008; Wetzels et al., 2010).
7.5 Insights from cognitive modelling
The purpose of the cognitive modelling analyses in Chapter 5 was twofold: first,
to examine whether RL models can provide a good description of the observed choice
patterns, and second, to compare the candidate models using different methods and as-
sessments such as the post hoc fit method, the simulation method, the degree of reliance
on past choices (EPSE) method, model recovery, and parameter recovery. These analyses
provided a thorough examination of recently debated topics in cognitive modelling of IGT
data including which model should be preferred (e.g., Steingroever, Wetzels, & Wagen-
makers, 2013a; Worthy, Pang, & Byrne, 2013), the inconsistencies in model comparison
techniques (e.g., Ahn et al., 2008; Steingroever et al., in press), and parameter recovery
and identifiability (e.g., Wetzels et al., 2010). Even though we did not propose a single
model which can be used to decompose and explain differences in performance on the IGT
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(e.g., between clinical and healthy groups of participants), we highlighted the importance
of a thorough assessment of the candidate models and suggested additional tests of model
adequacy such as parameter consistency and generalisation at the individual level.
7.5.1 Choice mimicry and reliance on past choices
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the selection between competing models for the IGT
is not an easy task. Different model comparison techniques indicated that the use of
a specific model depends to a substantial extent on one’s objectives; that is, whether
one wants to achieve short-term or long-term predictions about choice behaviour in the
IGT. One possible explanation of the discrepancy between model comparison techniques
(e.g., post hoc fit and simulation methods) lies in the degree of reliance of each model
on the actual history of choices that participants make. Models which implement the
decay RL rule provide better predictions under the post hoc fit method because they
mimic participants’ choices whereas models with the delta learning rule rely more on
payoff related information and achieve better predictions under the simulation method.
This hypothesis was tested using the EPSE method by Yechiam and Ert (2007) and the
results revealed that this could explain the difference between the two methods.
In technical terms, the choice mimicry component of the decay RL rule lies in the
fact that it favours decks which have been selected more often, while the expectancies of
unselected decks decay towards 0. Hence, decks with higher expectancies are more likely
to be selected on the next trial. The rate of decrease in expectancies depends on the
decay parameter 𝐷 (see Equation 5.5). If 𝐷 has a value of 0, then the expectancy of the
selected deck 𝑗 takes the value of the subjective utility of the received payoffs, 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑢𝑗,
whereas the expectancies of the unselected decks become 0. If choices are deterministic
(i.e., decks with high expectancies are more likely to be selected) then a 𝐷 of 0 suggests
complete mimicry of previous choices. Inspection of the mean value of 𝐷 in the PVL-PU2
model across the three datasets of Chapter 5 (0.73, 0.58, and 0.68, respectively; see also
Table 5.7) suggests that complete mimicry of past choices was not observed. In addition,
consider the case of the switch group of Experiment 8 where decks’ payoffs changed every
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50 trials. The PVL-PU2 (decay RL rule) model could accurately predict the rank ordering
of the decks whereas the PVL-Delta (delta learning rule) failed to achieve a good level of
prediction (see Figure 6.5). Hypothetically, this difference could be explained based on
the strong reliance of the PVL-PU2 model on past choices. However, the value of 𝐷 in
the switch group was 0.50, indicating that the predictions of the PVL-PU2 model were
not exclusively the result of choice mimicry.
Overall, choice mimicry or reliance on past choices may not be the only factor that
drives accurate model predictions as in the case of the PVL-PU2 model. Future research
can attempt to carefully assess this issue and tease apart the psychological processes that
drive performance on the IGT.
7.5.2 Reinforcement-learning and alternative accounts
The results of the computational modelling analyses of choice data in Chapter 5
suggested that a simple reinforcement-learning strategy can account for choice behaviour
in the IGT. The main mechanism of RL models is the formation of expectancies about the
values of each deck which subsequently drive deck selection. Another assumption relates
to the subjective experience of received payoffs which takes into account the asymmet-
ric evaluation of wins and losses. The trade-off between exploration and exploitation is
governed by a consistency/temperature parameter in the softmax rule. The fact that RL
models provide a good account of choice dynamics in the IGT does not necessarily mean
that people employ reinforcement-learning mechanisms to make decisions. For example,
a simple heuristic strategy based on “win-stay/lose-shift” accounted for the performance
of a large proportion of participants (see Table 5.5).
Alternative theories and modelling approaches have been proposed which depart
from RL principles. For example, the Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT; Gonzalez
et al., 2003; Lejarraga et al., 2010) assumes that people store instances of payoffs in their
memory and that choice is based on the sum of all the instances of an option weighted by
their probabilities of retrieval. A similar account of the way that people retrieve instances
or experiences is the Explorative Sampler Model by Erev, Ert, and Yechiam (2008). On
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each trial, people enter one of two possible response states: exploration or exploitation
where exploration implies random choice (Nevo & Erev, 2012, added inertia as a third
response state). Choice in exploitation mode depends on each option’s subjective value
which is calculated as the average payoff of the recalled experiences. The average pay-
offs are subject to additional modification which reflects the level of payoff variability.
Other approaches in experience-based decision-making have attempted to provide a more
sophisticated view of the exploration-exploitation trade-off. For example, Speekenbrink
and Konstantinidis (2014) found that explorative behaviour was dependent on the un-
certainty regarding each option’s average payoffs over time and that most people’s choice
behaviour was best explained based on a fine balance between exploration and exploita-
tion by considering the probability that an option offers the maximum payoff out of all
the available options.
As we noted in the Introduction, the list of models that can be applied to experience-
based tasks including the IGT is very large. In addition, a good model fit may be mislead-
ing and the result of model properties that are unrelated to the psychological processes
under investigation such as overfitting and flexibility (see Pitt & Myung, 2002). Cogni-
tive models cannot stand in isolation but need to make informative connections to other
measures of the same underlying process that they attempt to decompose and explain.
Hence, future research on cognitive modelling of experience-based decision-making can
address the issue of whether the proposed models capture basic psychological mechanisms
and whether they reflect stable and generalisable assessments of the underlying cognitive
and psychological processes.
7.5.3 Confidence and its relation to choice
The results of the behavioural experiments of this thesis (e.g., Experiments 6-8)
suggested a close link between deck selections and confidence ratings, meaning that decks
with positive expected values were more likely to be selected and received higher confi-
dence ratings compared to the decks with negative expected values. Chapter 6 provided a
formal analysis of participants’ confidence judgments which were in accordance with the
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relative strength of each deck as predicted by the choice RL models. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first demonstration that choice and confidence in sequential eco-
nomic decisions may constitute different manifestations of the same underlying decision
mechanism. It also strengthens the claim that learning to make advantageous decisions
is not dissociable from awareness in the IGT and offers little support to the view that
unconscious influences play an important role in decision-making under uncertainty.
The confidence modelling results are in line with findings from studies in the per-
ceptual and value-based decision-making literatures which have shown that choice and
confidence are interrelated components of decision-making. As our approach was a first
and exploratory attempt to relate and formally analyse confidence judgments, certain
ideas can be taken forward by future research. For example, the investigation of reaction
times and decision confidence in this context may shed more light into the psychologi-
cal underpinnings of experience-based decision-making. Similar analyses can be applied
to wagering and other assessments of awareness in order to examine the aspects of the
decision process that these measures assess.
7.6 Concluding remarks
This thesis examined the influence of implicit or unconscious processes on experience-
based decision-making and the IGT using behavioural experiments and computational
modelling analyses. In the experiments reported here, we obtained results at odds with
the predictions of the somatic marker hypothesis regarding the activation of an uncon-
scious emotional system, which is assumed to provide information about the outcome of
the decision-making process. Decision strategies in the IGT rely almost exclusively on ac-
quired conscious knowledge about the properties of the decks. The second major point of
the present thesis is that caution is advised when drawing conclusions about the existence
of implicit influences in decision-making under uncertainty when unsuitable methods of
measuring awareness are used. Persaud et al.’s (2007) conclusions seem ungrounded be-
cause of the pronounced failure of post-decision wagering to measure awareness with
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adequate sensitivity. We have shown that wagering underestimates awareness by com-
parison to other methods such as confidence ratings and quantitative questions, and that
wagering strategies are affected by the design of the pay-off matrix and response biases.
If we are to measure awareness as accurately and sensitively as possible, the results from
different methods should be combined in order to provide a finer and deeper examination
of claims involving implicit or unconscious influences.
The confidence model that we developed provided further support that the same
psychological mechanism which is responsible for choice behaviour can explain the way
participants place confidence ratings. Given the strong relationship between choice and
confidence, the evidence in favour of unconscious influences is very tenuous.

Appendices
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A Payoff schedule in Experiment 1
Table A.1: Payoff schedule in Experiment 1
Deck Deck
Trial A(+2) B (+2) C (+1) D (+1) Trial A (+2) B (+2) C (+1) D (+1)
1 26 -4 -1
2 27 -5
3 -3 -1 28 -3
4 29 -1.5 -5
5 -6 -1 30 -1
6 31 -7
7 -4 -1 32 -4 -25
8 33 -5
9 -5 -25 -1 34 -0.5
10 -7 -1 -5 35 -0.5 -5
11 36
12 -7 -0.5 37 -3 -1.5
13 -1.5 38 -6
14 -5 -25 39 -1
15 -4 40 -25 -1.5
16 41
17 -6 -0.5 42 -5 -1
18 -3 -1.5 43
19 44 -1
20 -1 -5 45 -7 -1
21 -25 46 -6 -5
22 -6 47 -1
23 48 -3 -1
24 -7 -1 49
25 -0.5 50 -4
Note : The payoff schedule was constructed based on the ratio of losses to wins of the
original IGT. For example, in the original task deck A has a 50% probability of loss.
The wins are always $100 and the losses range from $150 to $350. On trial 3 there is
a loss of $150. The ratio of losses to wins is therefore 1.5. Since the coefficient of win is
always 2 in Persaud et al.’s (2007) variation, we multiplied each ratio by 2. This gives
us the schedule of the losses. The average wager is (20 + 10)/2 = 15. For example, for
the first 10 trials on deck A the losses are (3 + 6 + 4 + 5 + 7) × 15 = 375 and the wins
are (2 × 10) × 15 = 300. The difference is five times the average wager per ten cards
(5 × 15 = 75). This procedure was applied on the remaining decks. The payoff schedule
is repeated twice for the 100 trials of the task.
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B Adapted Questionnaire from Maia
and McClelland (2004)
1. Please rate, on a scale from −10 to +10, how good or bad you think deck A is,
where −10 means that it is very bad and +10 means that it is very good.
2. Okay, now suppose that you were to select 10 cards from deck A.
a) What would you expect your average result to be?
b) For those trials in which you would get a win, what would you expect your
average winning amount to be?
c) In how many of the 10 trials would you expect to get a loss?
d) For those trials in which you would get a loss, what would you expect the
average loss to be?
3. Now suppose I told you that you could only select cards from one of the decks until
the end of the game, but that you were allowed to choose now the deck from which
you would draw your cards. Which of the four decks would you pick?
Note : Questions 1 and 2 are repeated for the remaining decks (B, C, and D).
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C Modelling Results
C.1 Predicted Choice Probabilities
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Figure C.1: Mean predicted choice probabilities of each cognitive model as compared to ex-
perimental data in Dataset 1
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Figure C.2: Mean predicted choice probabilities of each cognitive model as compared to ex-
perimental data in Dataset 2
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